Milner v. Stepan Chemical Co., Civ. A. No. 83-1803-C.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-1803-C.
• Citation: 599 F. Supp. 358
• Parties: Douglas MILNER and Ann Milner, Plaintiffs, v. STEPAN CHEMICAL COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

599 F. Supp. 358

Douglas MILNER and Ann Milner, Plaintiffs, v. STEPAN CHEMICAL COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 83-1803-C.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 28, 1984.

Eugene R. Geary, Geary & Geary, Lowell, Mass., for plaintiffs.

James L. Ackerman, Day, Berry & Howard, Boston, Mass., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CAFFREY, Chief Judge.

This is a civil action brought by plaintiffs, Douglas and Ann Milner, residents of Massachusetts, against Stepan Chemical Company (Stepan), a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Delaware and having its principal place of business in Illinois. Douglas Milner, a former employee of Stepan, seeks damages for injury allegedly resulting from defendant's intentional infliction of emotional distress. The matter comes before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff Douglas Milner's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Defendant asserts that these claims are barred by the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act, M.G.L. c. 152, § 1 et seq., which provides plaintiff's exclusive remedy.¹ Plaintiff contends, however, that the exclusivity provision of the Act does not apply to the type of injury which he alleges.

On August 13, 1980, while plaintiff was employed by Stepan at its Wilmington plant, he sustained a serious injury to his right hand in a job-related accident. He was immediately taken to Wilmington Health Center for treatment. When he returned to his workplace later that day, he was told by defendant's area supervisor, Howard Moorman, to come to work the following day. Moorman further advised plaintiff that he should not report the injury as an industrial accident, in order to preserve the company's safety record. The day after the accident, Moorman called plaintiff at his home and repeated these admonitions.

On August 19, 1980, plaintiff was admitted to Choate Hospital where he was to undergo surgery on his injured hand. While he was awaiting surgery, plaintiff received a telephone call from defendant's maintenance supervisor, Richard Cantwell, who asked plaintiff to call in sick throughout the period of his hospitalization and not to report his injury as an industrial accident. After he was released from the hospital, plaintiff continued to receive telephone calls of this nature from both Moorman and Cantwell. Plaintiff asserts that the conduct of these two men amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, as a result of which he experienced "great emotional distress and feelings of insecurity." Complaint, First Cause of Act, ¶ 11.

Three events which occurred during the fall of 1980 form the basis of the claims set forth in plaintiff's third cause of action. First, plaintiff filed a Workmen's Compensation claim for the injury to his hand. Second, certain incidents took place which apparently caused Ronald McBrien, defendant's Wilmington plant manager, to harbor feelings of animosity toward plaintiff. Finally, the defendant company was taken over by the Olin Corporation ("Olin").

Near the end of September, plaintiff learned from defendant's personnel manager that he would no longer receive medical insurance or other benefits to which, plaintiff alleges, his employment contract entitled him. Subsequently, plaintiff also received from the Olin Corporation a letter stating that he would not be made an Olin employee. The letter was signed by plant manager Ronald McBrien.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant denied him fringe benefits to which he was entitled in retaliation for plaintiff's having filed a Workmen's Compensation claim. Plaintiff also asserts that defendant "maliciously interfered with ... plaintiffs' ... prospective employment contract with the Olin Corporation." Complaint, Third Cause of Action, ¶ 12. Plaintiff claims that each of these actions by defendant constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Complaint, Third Cause of Action, ¶ 12, 13.

The Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act bars common law tort actions which seek damages for "personal injury arising out of and in the course of ... employment." M.G.L. c. 152, § 26. Plaintiff asserts, however, that his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are not covered by the Act, because defendants' conduct was not only intentional, but "outrageous," and because this conduct occurred at times when plaintiff was not at work.

Plaintiff's arguments have no merit. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has...