Milroy v. Spurr Mountain Iron Min. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1880
• Citation: 43 Mich. 231,5 N.W. 287
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: MILROY v. SPURR MOUNTAIN IRON MINING CO. and others.

5 N.W. 287

43 Mich. 231

MILROY v. SPURR MOUNTAIN IRON MINING CO. and others.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 8, 1880

One having an entire claim against another cannot, without the debtor's assent, split up and assign portions thereof so that separate actions may be maintained. Thus an employe whose wages are payable daily has a cause of action for each day's services, but the amount due him at any time constitutes but one claim. A justice of the pcace may have jurisdiction of an action against a corporation, and a stockholder therof, under section 35 of the act of 1877. Where an action against a corporation for labor is brought against a corporation alone, and judgment is recovered thereon, a subsequent action cannot be maintained for the same matter against the corporation and a stockholder thereof.

Error to superior court of Detroit.

Moore, Canfield & Warner, for plaintiff in error.

W.P Wells and F.A. Baker, for defendants in error.

MARSTON, C.J.

This action was brought against the corporation and one of its stockholders under section 35 of Act No. 113 of the Session Laws of 1877, p. 95. It appeared upon the trial, and was not disputed, that the plaintiff and his son, a minor, performed labor for the corporation in 1877 and 1878; that they worked six months, commencing September 1, 1877, and that plaintiff was to receive $80 per month, and for his son's labor $35 per month. It was admitted that the value of the services of the plaintiff and his son for the six months ending March 1 1878, was $676.

Early in February, 1878,--the exact date does not appear,--the plaintiff assigned to Bigelow, Dousman & Co., merchants at Michigamme, of his claim against the corporation, $100.11. On the thirteenth of February, 1878, suit was commenced in justice's court to recover the amount so assigned, in the name of the plaintiff herein, for the use and benefit of Bigelow, Dousman & Co., and judgment was rendered therein February 27th for the amount assigned, and costs. This judgment not having been satisfied, this action was brought to recover the entire amount that the plaintiff would have been entitled to from September 1, 1877, when he and his son commenced work, to March 1, 1878. The judgment rendered in justice's court was introduced by the defendants, who claimed--First, that, such action having been brought against the corporation alone, the labor debt became merged in the judgment therein rendered, and that an action on the claim for labor could not afterwards be maintained against the corporation or the stockholders, or both jointly and, second, that the assignment to Bigelow, Dousman & Co. of a part of plaintiff's claim, action brought and judgment recovered therefor would prevent the plaintiff from afterwards maintaining any action for that portion of his claim which had accrued at the time such action was commenced, and not included therein.

To meet, in part, this second position the plaintiff claimed that the corporation had assented to the assignment, and that this would operate as a waiver of the objection. The plaintiff was permitted to recover for the services of himself and son which accrued subsequent to the date of the assignment, but not for any portion accruing previous thereto, and he now assigns error.

There was no evidence in the case tending to show any assent by the company which would prevent or preclude it from making this defence. There was evidence of negotiations between Bigelow, Dousman & Co. whereby they were to take assignments from the laborers of the amount of their respective accounts, give them credit for a specified time thereafter, and take the paper of the corporation, payable in three months, for the amounts assigned; but this was not consummated, they, Bigelow, Dousman & Co., giving notice of the assignments and commencing suit to recover the amount thereof immediately thereafter.

There can be no question, either upon reason or authority, that a claim like the present cannot be split and cut up into separate causes of action to suit the convenience or whim of the plaintiff. If so, he could assign, after working six months, a month's wages to an individual or firm, and so of each and every month, and thus have six separate suits commenced; or, he might commence six separate actions in his own name. The assignment, and the fact that the suit was commenced in the assignor's name, for the use and benefit of the assignees, can, in law, make no difference, and the suit must be treated precisely as though the assignees had no interest whatever therein, so far as this question is involved. The fact that he was hired by the month, and that his wages were payable monthly, cannot make any difference.

A man may be hired by the day, and at the close thereof a cause of action would accrue to him for his wages, and so, for each day that he would work under such an agreement, he could quit work at any time and maintain an action for his unpaid wages. He could not, however, work 30 days or for any other period then quit, and commence a separate action for each day's wages. In such a case, although the contract of hiring was by the day, and the parties may not have contemplated or provided for any additional labor, yet, if they did silently proceed, the one to work and the other to receive his labor, at the expiration thereof the entire amount unpaid would constitute but one cause of action. To permit separate causes under such circumstances would be to subject the debtor to costs and expenses far...