Milton v. City of Marianna

• Decision Date: 16 November 1932
• Citation: 144 So. 400,107 Fla. 251
• Parties: MILTON et al. v. CITY OF MARIANNA.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

144 So. 400

107 Fla. 251

MILTON et al. v. CITY OF MARIANNA.

Florida Supreme Court

November 16, 1932

Commissioners' Decision.

Bill by the City of Marianna against John Milton, Jr., and others. From an interlocutory order overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

ELLIS J., dissenting. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; D J. Jones, judge.

COUNSEL

John H Carter and John H. Carter, Jr., both of Marianna, for appellants.

Carter & Pierce, of Marianna, for appellee.

OPINION

ANDREWS C.

This cause is here upon appeal from the circuit court of Jackson county from an interlocutory order overruling a demurrer to the bill of complaint which seeks to foreclose certain tax liens of the city of Marianna.

The bill was filed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 14209, Special Acts of 1929, which authorized foreclosure in one bill upon separate parcels of land owned by different persons. The foreclosure is against five separate parcels of land, and names the respective owners as defendants.

The owners of one of the parcels of land filed a demurrer to the bill and set up as grounds (among others) that the bill is multifarious, and that it shows upon its face that it is founded upon a special legislative act, purely local in its application, which attempts to confer special jurisdiction upon the circuit court of Jackson county, and thus undertakes to 'regulate the practice of the courts of justice' by special law in violation of section 20 of article 3 of the Constitution of Florida. It was from an order overruling the demurrer that appeal was taken.

Appellants assigned only one error, namely: 'The court erred in overruling the demurrer of said defendants to the bill of complaint,' and our deliberations will be confined only to the questions raised by the demurrer.

It is first contended under the above assignment that the act under which the bill to foreclose was brought is unconstitutional, in that it undertakes to 'regulate the practice of courts of justice' by conferring upon the 'Circuit Court of Jackson County' special jurisdiction to foreclose in one suit separate tax liens of the city of Marianna upon several parcels of property owned by different persons.

It is suggested that the act in question was passed under the authority of section 8 of article 8 of the Constitution of Florida which places exclusive power in the Legislature to provide for the government and powers of municipalities.

This act not only undertakes to provide a foreclosure method for enforcing city tax liens, in place of ordinary tax sale method, but to include in one suit more than one parcel of real estate. In exercising the powers expressly conferred by section 8 of article 8, the Legislature must not violate any other provisions of the Constitution. State v. Johns, 92 Fla. 187, 109 So. 228.

This court will take judicial notice of the fact that for many years the circuit courts of the state have recognized and enforced the provisions of special laws authorizing named municipalities in their respective circuits to foreclose its delinquent tax liens in equity. See City of Orlando v. Giles, 51 Fla. 422, 40 So. 834; Fuff v. City of Jacksonville, 39 Fla. 1, 21 So. 776; Parker v. City of Jacksonville, 37 Fla. 342, 20 So. 538. See, also, League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 22 S.Ct. 475, 46 L.Ed. 478.

It was held in the recent case of Jackson v. Town of White Springs (Fla.) 138 So. 629, that, where a bill of complaint to foreclose city tax liens, after alleging ultimate facts, attaches copy of assessments roll and makes same a part thereof, it sufficiently stated a cause of action for foreclosure. In the instant case a copy of such assessments for each parcel bearing the name of the owner is attached to the bill.

The provisions of the act conferring jurisdiction upon the 'Circuit Court of Jackson County' to foreclose city tax liens of the city of Marianna do not violate section 20, article 3, of the Constitution. It confers no more power of jurisdiction upon that court than it already had without such provisions, Municipal tax liens may be foreclosed in equity in the circuit court of the county where located without such statutory authority. In the recent case of First Trust & Savings Company v. West Lake Investment Company (Fla.) 141 So. 894, it was held that foreclosure of tax certificates is within the constitutional provision giving circuit courts original jurisdiction of 'such other matters as the Legislature may provide' and constitutes 'cases in equity.' Section 11, article 5. In fact, this separable portion of the act, if not valid, may be excluded, and the remaining valid portions enforced. Town of Boynton v. State (Fla.) 138 So. 639; South Florida Trust Company v. Miami Coliseum Corp., 101 Fla. 1351, 133 So. 334.

It likewise follows that, if the circuit court of Jackson county did have chancery jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, in case of the disqualification of the persiding judge by reason of being related to the owners of one of the parcels of land within the statutory prohibitive degree, the jurisdiction for some other circuit judge to entertain the suit is conferred by statute by producing a proper certificate to that effect to another circuit judge, which in this case seems to have been done. Section 4348(2681), C. G. L. 1927.

As to whether the city of Marianna under this statute may in one suit foreclose against separate parcels of land owned by different taxpayers, it seems that similar authority has been conferred by similar special acts of the Legislature, and has been, at least by implication, recognized in this state. Bostwick v. City of South Jacksonville, 77 Fla. 860, 82 So. 235; Parker v. City of Jacksonville, 37 Fla. 342, 20 So. 538. In these cases the issues, however, turned upon another point as to the sufficiency of the descriptions of some of the pieces of property upon which the tax lien was being foreclosed. It does not appear that the exact point presented has been in terms ruled upon by this court.

The joinder of parties in equity is largely a matter of discretion of the court, and therefore the misjoinder of parties in such suits cannot always be detected with definiteness. The general rule in equity as to parties defendant is that, if the interest of those present and those absent are inseparable, the case must fail, but, if the interest of the parties present are separable, and the decree may be made without affecting the interest of those not present, the case may be decided on its merits as between those who are regularly before the court. 20 R. C. L. 703, § 44. See, also, Johnson v. Benbow, 93 Fla. 124, 111 So. 504; Mountein v. King, 75 Fla. 12, 77 So. 630.

In this connection it will be observed that section 15 of the General Acts of 1929, Ex. Sess. (chapter 14572), provides that in the foreclosure of state and county taxes as many certificates may be included in one suit as the complainant desires and as many defendants as may be necessary; and section 30-A provides that the court may at any time order the separation of any suit involving two or more certificates if the ends of justice shall seem to require it. This, of course, may be done even at the trial. There is no reason why the same could not be done in the instant case, for a court of chancery always retains that power.

The cases furnish no definite rule by which to determine with precision in every instance when defendants with 'distinct and unconnected interest' may be sued jointly in equity without making the bill multifarious. It is stated in Ruling Case Law that it has been found practicable to formulate certain rules, an example of which may be seen in one laid down by Lord Redesdale, which has received approval in this country, that: 'Where there is a general right claimed by the bll, and covering the whole case, it will not be regarded as multifarious, though the defendants have separate and distinct rights.' It is further stated that the courts will in such cases pursue the course which seems most likely to enable it to do complete equity in the particular case with the least expense, delay, and trouble, striving to obviate the necessity of a multiplicity of suits. 20 R. C. L. 679, 680, § 18; 20 R. C. L. 703, 704, § 44; 21 C.J. 423, § 446.

The statutory power to join defendants in the same suit where the complainant claims relief against them severally is not confined to cases in which the causes of action alleged against several defendants are identical, but extends to cases where the subject-matter of the complaint as against the several defendants is substantially the same, and the respective rights of all the defendants depend substantially upon the decision of the same questions of law and facts, although the interest of each defendant is a separable and distinct, rather than a joint or mutual interest. 47 C.J. 76, § 155; 21 C.J. 423; Deans v. Wilcoxon, 25 Fla. 980, 7 So. 163.

This court has recently held that, where the controversies involved can be determined in one suit as well as in several suits, and such procedure does not interfere with the proper administration of justice, an objection for multifariousness may be properly overruled, for only a person who is prejudiced thereby may complain. Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Eno, 99 Fla. 887, 128 So. 662, 70 A. L. R. 506; Taylor v. Taylor, 100 Fla. 1110, 130 So. 713.

The procedure adopted in the instant case is not subject to the objection that it interferes with a proper administration of justice or prejudices the rights of appellants.

Appellant also contends that there is an adequate and efficient remedy long used in this state for enforcing the payment of delinquent city taxes by advertising and public...