Milwaukee Cnty. v. Isenring

Decision Date01 February 1901
Citation109 Wis. 9,85 N.W. 131
PartiesMILWAUKEE COUNTY v. ISENRING ET AL.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Judge.

1. A law is “general” in the broad sense of the term if it extends to the whole state or the whole of a legislative class of localities legitimately created for the purposes of general legislation.

2. A law is “general” in the restricted sense of the term, as it is used in section 21, art. 7, of the constitution, not only when it is general in the broad sense thereof, but also when it is of that character in the sense of being public. But if it applies only to a single subdivision of the state, as a county, town, city or village, or a collection of such localities not constituting a legitimate class thereof for the purposes of legislation, it is local in character. Where a law is public and general in the sense indicated the two terms are synonymous.

3. If a law be general merely because it is public and not in the broad sense above indicated, it is local and special, and must be tested as to its validity by section 18, art. 4, of the constitution, and section 21, art. 7, as well; and if it belong to one of the prohibited classes of special legislation, it must be further tested by the constitutional restriction on that subject.

4. The journals of the two houses of the legislature may be referred to by courts as to the steps taken by the legislature in the passage of bills, and they are generally conclusive in that regard. They are not thus effective as to the contents of a law when such contents are called in question. In such a case the presumption is that the contents of a law, as found in the official publication thereof, are the same as when it passed the legislature, and that it was constitutionally passed. If it be challenged upon either ground, the question presented is one of law to be solved by the court in the same way that other legal questions are solved. In reaching a conclusion the court may examine the journals of the legislature as to what it did in the passage of the law; and as to the contents thereof it may go further and examine the original bill, or go to any other source of information that may be judicially considered trustworthy.

5. Whether an act specially designed to make the offices of sheriff, under sheriff and deputy sheriff in a single county salaried offices violates section 23, art. 4, of the constitution, in regard to there being but one system of county government affecting the whole state, and that such system shall be as uniform as practicable, doubted, but the point is not decided.

Appeal from superior court, Milwaukee county; J. C. Ludwig, Judge.

Action by the county of Milwaukee against Fred G. Isenring and others. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Appeal from an order of the superior court of Milwaukee county overruling a demurrer to the complaint in an action against the sheriff of Milwaukee county and his bondsmen to recover the fees and charges collected by him and his deputies for official services. The allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action if the plaintiff is entitled to the fees and emoluments of the sheriff's office, which ordinarily go to the sheriff and his deputies. That turns on the validity of chapter 364, Laws 1876, as amended by chapter 227, Laws 1877. The first of such chapters, during its passage through the legislature, was entitled the same as it now appears in the printed laws, viz.: “An act in relation to sheriff's fees.” It deals only with the manner of compensating the sheriff of Milwaukee county, providing that he shall receive a salary of $5,000 per annum, payable quarterly out of the county treasury, in lieu of the fees, costs and charges ordinarily belonging to sheriffs by law, and that he shall charge and collect such fees, costs and charges and pay the proceeds into the county treasury. The act of 1877 amended and revised that of 1876. It was entitled, during its passage through the legislature, the same as the published law, viz.: “An act to amend chapter 364 of the Laws of 1876, entitled ‘An act in relation to sheriff's fees.’ The first section, in addition to the provisions of the original act, provides that the under sheriff and all deputy sheriffs of Milwaukee county shall collect for all official services performed by them and pay the proceeds thereof into the county treasury, requires of the sheriff quarterly reports under oath as to all such collections, and allows him and such deputies traveling expenses when in discharge of official duties outside the corporate limits of the city of Milwaukee, the same to be paid on itemized bills audited by the board of supervisors. The second section provides for the appointment of an under sheriff at a salary of $1,400 per year and nine deputy sheriffs, each to have a salary of $800 per year, except one to act as sheriff's clerk and have $1,200 per year, all such salaries to be paid out of the county treasury the same as the salaries of ordinary county officers. The balance of the act, in addition to the usual concluding section, relates to auditing the accounts of the sheriff and his deputies from the 1st day of January preceding the passage of the act, so as to make it relate back to that date. The validity of such laws was challenged by the demurrer.

Edgar L. Wood and Quarles, Spence & Quarles, for appellants.

A. C. Umbreit, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts).

Appellants' counsel insist that the act of 1876, that of 1877, and chapter 137, Laws 1878, amending the act of 1877, are local in character, within the meaning of section 18, art. 4, of the constitution, which provides that, “no private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title,” and cite to our attention numerous decisions of this court to sustain that view. Counsel for respondent just as confidently contend that such acts are not local within the meaning of such constitutional provision, and cite to our attention numerous decisions of this court to sustain that view. Clearly, both contentions cannot be correct though it must be admitted that each has support in our decided cases. The cause of that confusion will appear by a review of such cases, and the right of the matter will be made too plain for reasonable controversy.

The difficulty commenced in State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279, which involved the question of whether an act changing a county seat was a general law within the meaning of section 21, art. 7, of the constitution, which provides that, “the legislature shall provide by law for the speedy publication of all statute laws, and of such judicial decisions made within the state, as may be deemed expedient. And no general law shall be in force until published.” It was then contended on one side that the word “general” relates to the state at large, and on the other that it has reference to the mere public character of an act in that its effect is general as regards the people of the locality referred to therein, whether that locality include the entire state or some subdivision thereof, as a county, town, city or village, or some collection of such subdivisions. The latter idea prevailed, Justice Cole dissenting, using language to the effect that an act cannot be public and general and at the same time local. The view thus expressed by Mr. Justice Cole has never considerately and permanently found lodgment in the jurisprudence of this state and displaced the reasoning of Mr. Justice Paine, who delivered the opinion of the court; though it has so influenced judicial action, at times, that the court temporarily stepped aside from the position firmly taken at the start. In Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 136, which involved the character of the law incorporating the city of Janesville, as regards section 21, art 7, of the constitution, Justice Paine, speaking for the court, rediscussed the subject of the meaning of the word “general,” as used in statutes and constitutions, at great length and with much learning, demonstrating by reference to authorities, from Coke down to the time of writing the opinion, that the term “public,” in its legal sense, and the term “general” in that sense, as used in statutes and constitutions, are synonymous, and that the fact that an act is local or special does not necessarily militate against its being public and general. The court so decided, Justice Cole, however, dissenting upon the same ground as before, with increased firmness, and giving additional reasons to support his view. That case was soon followed by several others involving the same question, in which it was affirmed without dissent. Town of Rochester v. Alfred Bank, 13 Wis. 432,Berliner v. Town of Waterloo, 14 Wis. 378, and Mills v. Town of Jefferson, 20 Wis. 54, are among such cases. In each of such cases the law involved was challenged under section 21, art. 7, yet the reasoning and decision in each are to the effect that an act may be local and yet be general. That naturally led to the decision in Durkee v. City of Janesville, 26 Wis. 697, opinion by Mr. Justice Cole, where an act amending the charter of the city of Janesville, a law of the same character as those held in the previous cases to be general, was decided to be local within the meaning of section 18, art. 4, and so clearly of that character as not to admit of a reasonable controversy about it. In Castello v. Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522, in dealing with the question of whether a law authorizing a town to purchase a bridge was a general law as regards rules of pleading, the decision was in the affirmative, referring, for support, to those cases where the word “general,” as used in the constitution, had been considered. The effect was in line with the reasoning of Mr. Justice Paine in Clark v. City of Janesville, that “general” and...

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    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 10 Junio 1998
    ...or local interests, being smuggled through the legislature.' " Davis, 166 Wis.2d at 519, 480 N.W.2d 460 (quoting Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131 (1901)). The question here is whether the amended MPCP comes within the purview of art. IV, § ¶70 In Davis, we set forth......
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    ...of separate, unrelated, and distinct proposals. Durkee v. City of Janesville, 26 Wis. 697, 701 (1870); Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131 (1901). The framers trusted that if a bill affecting private or local interests had a single subject and a title which called atte......
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    ...The smuggling analysis has been confined to attacks on legislation based on the terms of art. IV, § 18. ¶66 In Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131 (1901), we noted that "[t]he framers of the constitution, in adopting sec. 18, art. IV, intended to guard against the dang......
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