Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
• Writing for the Court: FOWLER
• Citation: 246 N.W. 567,210 Wis. 467
• Decision Date: 06 February 1933
• Parties: MILWAUKEE LINEN SUPPLY CO. v. RING.

210 Wis. 467
246 N.W. 567

MILWAUKEE LINEN SUPPLY CO.
v.
RING.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 6, 1933.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; Charles L. Aarons, Circuit Judge.

Action by the Milwaukee Linen Supply Company against Edwin A. Ring. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Affirmed.

Action commenced May 6, 1932, to enjoin a discharged employee from violating his agreement not to solicit or divert the employer's customers or its business or patronage within a stated time and territory. Judgment for defendant entered June 20, 1932. The plaintiff appeals.

The defendant had been for eleven years in the employ of plaintiff as a driver of a wagon collecting and delivering towels and linen in the prosecution of its business of furnishing customers with towels and shop and office linen. On May 14, 1930, the defendant was promoted to the position of route foreman. A contract in writing was then signed by the parties whereby the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant a stated wage of $42.50 per week, and the defendant agreed that he would not within two years after leaving plaintiff's employment call for or deliver laundered linen to persons who should have been customers of plaintiff and supplied by the defendant during any time he might have been employed under the contract, would not solicit or divert plaintiff's customers or its business or patronage within said period, and would not within said period engage in the supply business, or call for or deliver laundered or unlaundered towels or linens for himself or any other persons within the limits of Milwaukee and specified suburbs.

The contract was not to run for any specified term, but might be terminated by either party on two weeks' notice. The defendant continued to work under said contract until March 7, 1932, when the plaintiff terminated his service by giving the specified notice. The defendant thereafter endeavored to procure employment outside the towel and linen supply business, but was unable to do so. In April, 1932, he was employed as a solicitor by a competitor of plaintiff. The only work he could procure up to this time was peddling soap from door to door, at which he earned about $4 per week. He was partially disabled physically, and the disability so affected his appearance as to handicap him seriously in procuring employment in most lines, and he lacked experience and familiarity with lines of business other than that in which he had been so long employed.

The trial court found as above stated and many other evidentiary facts well supporting its conclusions of ultimate fact: “(17) That the restrictions against defendant's employment sought in this action to be enforced by the plaintiff are not reasonably necessary for the fair protection of the plaintiff's business

[246 N.W. 568]

or rights; (18) that said restrictions unreasonably restrict the rights of the defendant, giving due consideration to the existing circumstances; (19) that the interests of the public would be adversely affected under present conditions by the granting of the injunction prayed for and the keeping of the defendant out of employment, without any appreciable benefit to the plaintiff; (20) that the plaintiff has failed to prove that irreparable injury will result to it if the injunction asked for in this action is not granted; (21) that the granting of the injunction to plaintiff would do more injustice than justice and would result in greater damage to the defendant and the public than corresponding benefit to the plaintiff.” Judgment was entered dismissing the complaint on the merits.

Robert B. Ells, of Milwaukee, for appellant.

Alfred C. Rudolph, of Milwaukee, for respondent.

FOWLER, J.

[1][2] The contract in suit is one in restraint of trade, which is tersely defined as one whose “performance would limit competition in any business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.” Such a contract “is illegal if the restraint...