Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC., No. 10–1195.

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
• Citation: 132 S.Ct. 740,181 L.Ed.2d 881,565 U.S. 368
• Parties: Marcus D. MIMS, Petitioner v. ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC.
• Docket Number: No. 10–1195.
• Decision Date: 18 January 2012

565 U.S. 368
132 S.Ct. 740
181 L.Ed.2d 881

Marcus D. MIMS, Petitioner
v.
ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC.

No. 10–1195.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 28, 2011.
Decided Jan. 18, 2012.

Scott L. Nelson, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Gregory G. Garre, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Donald A. Yarbrough, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Scott L. Nelson, Counsel of Record, Gregory A. Beck, Allison M. Zieve, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Eric D. Reicin, Sallie Mae, Inc., Reston, VA, Barbara A. Sinsley, Manuel Newburger, Barron, Newburger & Sinsley PLLC, The Penthouse, Austin, TX, Gregory G. Garre, Counsel of Record, Lori Alvino McGill, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

565 U.S. 370

This case concerns enforcement, through private suits, of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA or Act), 47 U.S.C. § 227. Voluminous consumer complaints

565 U.S. 371

about abuses of telephone technology—for example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes—prompted Congress to pass the TCPA. Congress determined that federal legislation was needed because telemarketers, by operating interstate, were escaping state-law prohibitions on intrusive nuisance calls. The Act bans certain practices invasive of privacy and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to prescribe implementing regulations. It authorizes States to bring civil actions to enjoin prohibited practices and to recover damages on their residents' behalf. The Commission must be notified of such suits and may intervene in them. Jurisdiction over state-initiated TCPA suits, Congress provided, lies exclusively in the U.S. district courts. Congress also provided for civil actions by private parties seeking redress for violations of the TCPA or of the Commission's implementing regulations.

Petitioner Marcus D. Mims, complaining of multiple violations of the Act by respondent Arrow Financial Services, LLC (Arrow), a debt-collection agency, commenced an action for damages against Arrow in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Mims invoked the court's "federal question" jurisdiction, i.e., its authority to adjudicate claims "arising under the ... laws ... of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The District Court, affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, dismissed Mims's complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. Both courts relied on Congress' specification, in the TCPA, that a private person may seek redress for violations of the Act (or of the Commission's regulations thereunder) "in an appropriate court of [a] State," "if [such an action is] otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of [that] State." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5).

The question presented is whether Congress' provision for private actions to enforce the TCPA renders state courts the exclusive arbiters of such actions. We have long recognized

565 U.S. 372

that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916). Beyond

132 S.Ct. 745

doubt, the TCPA is a federal law that both creates the claim Mims has brought and supplies the substantive rules that will govern the case. We find no convincing reason to read into the TCPA's permissive grant of jurisdiction to state courts any barrier to the U.S. district courts' exercise of the general federal-question jurisdiction they have possessed since 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470; 13D C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & R. Freer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3561, p. 163 (3d ed. 2008) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). We hold, therefore, that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over private suits arising under the TCPA.

I

A

In enacting the TCPA, Congress made several findings relevant here. "Unrestricted telemarketing," Congress determined, "can be an intrusive invasion of privacy." TCPA, 105 Stat. 2394, note following 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Congressional Findings) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, Congress reported, "[m]any consumers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance [telemarketing] calls to their homes." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]utomated or prerecorded telephone calls" made to private residences, Congress found, were rightly regarded by recipients as "an invasion of privacy." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although over half the States had enacted statutes restricting telemarketing, Congress believed that federal law was needed because "telemarketers [could] evade [state-law] prohibitions through interstate operations." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also

565 U.S. 373

S.Rep. No. 102–178, p. 3 (1991), 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1970 ("[B]ecause States do not have jurisdiction over interstate calls[,] [m]any States have expressed a desire for Federal legislation....").¹

Subject to exceptions not pertinent here, the TCPA principally outlaws four practices. First, the Act makes it unlawful to use an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice message, without the prior express consent of the called party, to call any emergency telephone line, hospital patient, pager, cellular telephone, or other service for which the receiver is charged for the call. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Second, the TCPA forbids using artificial or prerecorded voice messages to call residential telephone lines without prior express consent. § 227(b)(1)(B). Third, the Act proscribes sending unsolicited advertisements to fax machines. § 227(b)(1)(C). Fourth, it bans using automatic telephone dialing systems to engage two or more of a business' telephone lines simultaneously. § 227(b)(1)(D).²

132 S.Ct. 746

The TCPA delegates authority to the FCC to ban artificial and prerecorded voice calls to businesses, § 227(b)(2)(A), and to exempt particular types of calls from the law's requirements, § 227(b)(2)(B), (C). The Act also directs the FCC to prescribe regulations to protect the privacy of residential

565 U.S. 374

telephone subscribers, possibly through the creation of a national "do not call" system. § 227(c).³

Congress provided complementary means of enforcing the Act. State Attorneys General may "bring a civil action on behalf of [State] residents," if the Attorney General "has reason to believe that any person has engaged ... in a pattern or practice" of violating the TCPA or FCC regulations thereunder. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(g)(1) (Supp.2011). "The district courts of the United States ... have exclusive jurisdiction" over all TCPA actions brought by State Attorneys General. § 227(g)(2). The Commission may intervene in such suits. § 227(g)(3).⁴

Title 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), captioned "Private right of action," provides:

"A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State—

"(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,

"(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or

"(C) both such actions.

"If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an

565 U.S. 375

amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph."

A similar provision authorizes a private right of action for a violation of the FCC's implementing regulations.⁵

B

Mims, a Florida resident, alleged that Arrow, seeking to collect a debt, repeatedly used an automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded or artificial voice to call Mims's cellular phone without his consent. Commencing suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Mims charged that Arrow "willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA." App. 14. He sought declaratory relief, a permanent

132 S.Ct. 747

injunction, and damages. Id., at 18–19.

The District Court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Mims's TCPA claim. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the District Court explained, federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was unavailable "because Congress vested jurisdiction over [private actions under] the TCPA exclusively in state courts." Civ. No. 09–22347 (SD Fla., Apr. 1, 2010), App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a–5a (citing Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 (C.A.11 1998) ). Adhering to Circuit precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the...