Mims v. City of New Castle

Decision Date30 November 2021
Docket Number2:20-CV-01814-CCW
PartiesJAMES MIMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW CASTLE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the City of New Castle's (New Castle) Motion to Dismiss James Mims' (Mr Mims) Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 12. For the reasons that follow, New Castle's Motion will be GRANTED.

I. Background

Mr. Mims is a landlord who owns rental properties in the City of New Castle. He alleges that, because he typically rents to racial minorities, people with disabilities, and low-income persons, New Castle has, under its rental property inspection program, a custom and/or policy of denying or delaying the issuance of occupancy permits to Mr. Mims and citing him for building code violations for illegitimate reasons.

A. Procedural History

Mr. Mims filed his complaint on November 18, 2020, and his operative Amended Complaint on February 24, 2021. See ECF Nos. 1, 10, & 11. The Amended Complaint includes eleven Counts: Counts II through VII allege violations of various federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983[1]; Count I-which does not invoke Section 1983 -alleges a violation of Due Process under the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions; Count VIII alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982; Count IX alleges a violation of the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; and Counts X and XI allege state law claims for tortious interference with contract (Count X) and abuse of process (Count XI).

New Castle's Motion seeks dismissal of Mr. Mims' Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See ECF No. 12.

Following the filing of New Castle's Motion, Mr. Mims filed a Response in Opposition, and New Castle filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 15 & 16. After review of the parties' briefing, the Court ordered supplemental briefing to address certain issues related to Count II (Equal Protection), Count IV (Commerce Clause), and Count VII (Fair Housing Act). ECF No. 18. The parties duly filed supplemental briefs, ECF Nos. 23 & 24, and New Castle's Motion is now ripe for disposition.

B. Factual Allegations

The relevant facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are as follows. Mr. Mims alleges that for the past 15 years he has been in the business of purchasing, refurbishing, and renting housing units located within the City of New Castle, either in his own name or in the name of his solely owned realty company, Mims Realty, LLC. ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 12-14. Mr. Mims alleges that (1) the vast majority of people to whom he rents have low to moderate incomes, (2) about 50% or more of Mr. Mims' rentals are to people with some degree of mental or physical disability, and (3) about 10% to 15% of his rentals are to people who are properly classified as ethnic minorities, with a large percentage of these minorities being African American. Id. ¶¶ 15-17. By comparison, Mr. Mims alleges that the City of Newcastle's population is approximately 83.2% white, 12.2% African American, 1.6% Latino, 0.1% Native American, 0.4% Asian, 0.1% Pacific Islander, with approximately 27.2% of the population living below the poverty line. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

Mr. Mims alleges that, from approximately 2006 through January 2019: (1) he was customarily deprived of his right to rent his units for a period of approximately 30 to 90 days, due to the City's denial of occupancy permits, id. ¶¶ 26-27; (2) his rental properties “have also been the subject of numerous additional, non-permit related inspections by the City of New Castle, ” and that no explanation was given for these inspections, id. ¶¶ 27-28; (3) the City of New Castle issued citations to him and/or his realty company on at least fifty (50) separate occasions for alleged violations of the International Property Maintenance Code, ” all but one of which Mr. Mims successfully challenged the Magisterial District Court, id. ¶¶ 29-30.

Mr. Mims asserts that New Castle had a “custom, policy and practice of taking punitive measures against certain property owners, including [Mr. Mims], who disagree or defy the rental restrictions imposed against said property owners.” Id. ¶ 37. In particular, Mr. Mims alleges that “statements and comments were made by elected officials and department heads that encouraged the radical enforcement of code enforcement laws and the rental inspection program… with the specific purpose of eliminating the availability of rental units to African American or other minority tenants, government subsidized tenants, or mental or physically disabled tenants.” Id. ¶ 23. He further alleges that “elected officials and department heads made racist and derogatory comments about Plaintiff's prospective tenants” and “verbalized their displeasure of [Mr. Mims] practice of renting his units to persons of minority ethnic background, particularly African-Americans, as well as mentally disabled individuals.” Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Mr. Mims alleges that he “was specifically informed that if [he] rented his properties to [such persons], unfavorable actions would be taken against [him].” Id. ¶ 35. Mr. Mims alleges the existence of handwritten instructions and “a written list of certain property owners, including [Mr. Mims], ” that was circulated among elected officials and employees with instructions to carry out unwarranted inspections and issue citations, regardless of the actual conditions of the properties. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.

Mr. Mims' Amended Complaint does not identify or describe any specific citation, failed inspection report, or denial of occupancy permit during the 13-year time period covered in the Amended Complaint.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true a complaint's factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d. Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it cannot rest on mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Accordingly, [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” id., and be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than the sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a three-step process for district courts to follow in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). That said, under the notice pleading standard imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, even after the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connolly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that “at least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss).

Finally, if a civil rights claim is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held that the district court must provide leave to amend “unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236; see also Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (“In our Circuit, district courts must offer amendment [in civil rights cases]- irrespective of whether it is requested-when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.') (citation omitted)). Amendment is futile where an amended complaint could not withstand a renewed motion to dismiss. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

The Court will first analyze the Counts that the parties specifically addressed in their initial and supplemental briefing, and then analyze New Castle's general argument that the Amended Complaint, in its entirety, fails to make out any plausible claim as required by Twombly and Iqbal.

A. Count II: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause

Count II of the Amended Complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, asserts that New Castle has violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against Mr. Mims “on the basis of race and national origin in the leasing of real property.” See ECF No. 11 ¶ 59. The parties did not specifically address the Equal Protection claim in their initial briefing, and the Court therefore ordered supplemental briefing on this claim. In his Supplemental Brief, Mr. Mims clarifies that he seeks to make a “class of one” Equal Protection claim and alleges that New Castle “has treated him differently from other landlords in the area by filing frivolous citations for...

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