Mincieli v. Bruder
| Decision Date | 07 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-6455-Civ.,91-6455-Civ. |
| Citation | 914 F. Supp. 512 |
| Parties | John MINCIELI, Plaintiff, v. Audrey BRUDER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Arthur M. Wolff, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Paul A. McKenna, Miami, FL, for plaintiff.
Michael Ross Piper, Johnson, Anselmo, et al., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Audrey Bruder's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and/or motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Preliminarily, the Court notes that the 1991 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the terms "directed verdict" and "judgment notwithstanding verdict," in favor of the all inclusive term "judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 advisory committee's note. Therefore, the Court denies as moot the defendant's alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict. For the reasons stated below, however, the Court grants the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff John Mincieli brought this action for violation of his constitutional rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a result of his arrest by Defendant Audrey Bruder, a police officer with the City of Sunrise. In his complaint, Mincieli alleged that Bruder arrested him without probable cause and performed an unreasonable search and seizure of his premises and property. Mincieli sought general, special and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and attorney's fees and court costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. As part of her answer, Bruder asserted that she was entitled to qualified or good faith immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bruder, however, did not seek a ruling on this issue prior to trial.1
The action came before the Court and a jury for trial. At the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, and again at the close of all the evidence, Bruder moved for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). The Court denied both motions as to Mincieli's claim that Bruder arrested him without probable cause. The Court, however, granted the motion at the close of all the evidence as to Mincieli's claim that Bruder performed an unreasonable search and seizure of his premises and property. The jury returned a verdict for Mincieli. In the verdict form, the jury answered the special interrogatory submitted by the Court as follows:
Interrogatory # 1: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause, under the circumstances described by the Court in its instructions?"
Answer: "Yes."
The jury then awarded Mincieli special, monetary and/or economic damages in the amount of $1,000,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $300,000.
In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), Bruder renewed her motion for judgment as a matter of law after trial.2 Bruder argues that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: (1) probable cause existed for Mincieli's arrest as a matter of law; and (2) Bruder is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc)).
At the time of his arrest, Mincieli owned a car-towing business located within the City of Sunrise. Officer Bruder first came to Mincieli's towing yard in August 1988 to investigate Mincieli's complaint that some of the cars in his yard had been burglarized and vandalized. A 1986 Subaru registered to Judie Rochelle Minkoff was one of the cars included in the report. Over the next several months, Bruder investigated the ownership status of the Subaru. As a result of such investigation, Bruder filed a probable cause affidavit and supporting documentation with the state attorney's office, which resulted in the issuance of a capias for Mincieli's arrest. Pursuant to the capias, Bruder arrested Mincieli in May 1989 for the following crimes: third degree felony of motor vehicle theft; second degree felony of dealing in stolen property; third degree felony of notary public violation by false acknowledgment; and third degree felony of fraudulent transfer of a motor vehicle title. Although Mincieli was prosecuted for two of these charges; namely, motor vehicle theft and dealing in stolen property, the prosecution ended in dismissal.
Mincieli, a notary public in the State of Florida, testified that the owner of the Subaru, Judie Minkoff, had signed the transfer of title section on the back of the Subaru's certificate of title in his presence but that he had not notarized the signature at that time. When Bruder visited Mincieli's yard on August 29, 1988, Mincieli showed her the certificate of title, bearing Minkoff's unnotarized signature. Afterwards, Mincieli notarized Minkoff's signature, but dated his notarization as of August 26, 1988. He stated that he used this date to coincide with the date on a check written by Daniel Kaplan, who purchased the Subaru from him.
Bruder testified that, upon her review of the Subaru's title record with the Department of Motor Vehicles, she found a completed transfer of title stating that the Subaru had been purchased directly from Minkoff by Kaplan. Minkoff's signature appeared notarized by Mincieli as of August 26, 1988. Bruder, however, had seen the unnotarized certificate on August 29, 1988. Bruder further testified that she presented the results of her investigation to Assistant State Attorney Mark Horn. After consultation with Horn, she prepared a probable cause affidavit enumerating the four felony charges recommended by Horn. Once Horn obtained a capias, she proceeded to arrest Mincieli on May 3, 1989.
Mincieli presented the expert testimony of former City of Sunrise Police Chief Edward Patten. Chief Patten opined that no reasonably competent officer in Bruder's position would have sought a capias for any of the four felony offenses for which Mincieli was arrested. Bruder did not present any opposing expert testimony.
Bruder first argues that she had probable cause "as a matter of law" to arrest Mincieli for the two felony charges related to the Subaru's certificate of title; i.e., the notary public violation by false acknowledgment and the fraudulent transfer of a motor vehicle title.3 Under the previously recited standard of review, however, a better statement of the issue is: Whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mincieli, no reasonable jury could have concluded that Bruder lacked probable cause for Mincieli's arrest for these violations? Bruder would have the Court answer this question in the affirmative by relying on Mincieli's testimony that he back-dated the notarization of Minkoff's signature and Mincieli's acknowledgment that the Subaru transaction that actually took place was from Minkoff to Mincieli to Kaplan, even though the certificate showed a direct transfer from Minkoff to Kaplan.
The Court instructed the jury on probable cause as follows:
In this regard, you are instructed that a law enforcement officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect if the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonable trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. The existence of probable cause to arrest is based on objective standards.
As to the notary public violation, the Court instructed the jury that this crime requires the false or fraudulent acknowledgment of an instrument. As to the motor vehicle transfer violation, the Court instructed the jury that it is unlawful to make a false statement on a certificate of title application, or to otherwise commit a fraud in any such application.
The Court finds that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mincieli, and drawing all inferences in his favor, supports the jury's explicit determination that Bruder lacked probable cause to arrest Mincieli for these violations. Viewing the evidence in such a light, a reasonable jury could have concluded that the facts and circumstances within Bruder's knowledge would not have led a prudent officer to believe that Mincieli had committed the title-related offenses. Specifically, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mincieli's back-dating of the signature notarization and his role in the direct transfer of title from Minkoff to Kaplan were insufficient to support a reasonable belief that Mincieli had committed these violations, absent fraudulent intent on the part of Mincieli. Accordingly, the Court rejects Bruder's request for entry of judgment as a matter of law on the basis that no reasonable jury could have concluded that Bruder lacked probable cause for Mincieli's arrest for these violations.4
Bruder next argues that she is entitled to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Harris v. Dist. Bd. Trustees of Polk Community College
... ... Al Coletta v. The City of North Bay Village, 962 F.Supp. 1486 (S.D.Fla.1997) (quoting Mincieli v. Bruder, 914 F.Supp. 512, 516 (S.D.Fla.1994) aff'd. 73 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 294, 136 L.Ed. 2d 213 ... ...
-
Coletta v. The City of North Bay Village
... ... immunity is a legal determination that must be made by the court and may be made either before trial, during trial, or after trial." Mincieli v. Bruder, 914 F.Supp. 512, 516 (S.D.Fla.1994) (Highsith, J.), aff'd 73 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 294, 136 ... ...
- True Life Choice v. DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. OF FLA.