Miner v. Miner
| Citation | 10 Wis.2d 438,103 N.W.2d 4 |
| Parties | Julie MINER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Harold MINER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 03 May 1960 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Clyde M. Paust, Milwaukee, for appellant.
Affeldt & Lichtsinn, Karl M. Anderson, Milwaukee, for respondent.
The defendant contends there are two questions on this appeal: 1. Can a stipulation entered into at the time of the divorce, providing for alimony, be modified by the court when there is a substantial change of circumstances? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to modify the alimony award because the plaintiff had obtained full-time employment and was self-supporting, and because the defendant had suffered a substantial decline in income?
The plaintiff does not contend that a judgment based upon a stipulation entered into at the time of divorce may not be modified, but argues that such a judgment for divorce should not be changed except for grave reasons, and the rule applicable to the modification of such judgments should be strictly applied.
When a court in a divorce action awards alimony, it is based upon the circumstances of the parties at the time of the judgment and is normally considered res judicata as to that situation. To modify the judgment at some subsequent time, it is incumbent upon the one who seeks the modification to show there is a substantial or material change in the circumstances of the parties which would justify such modification. This is especially true where the judgment incorporates the provisions of an agreement of the parties in reference to alimony. In such a case the substantial or material change in the circumstances should be such that it would be unjust or inequitable to strictly hold either party to the judgment.
In Littig v. Littig, 1938, 229 Wis. 430, 282 N.W. 547, the record discloses the judgment of divorce provided for alimony as stipulated by the parties and contained in the findings of fact. This court said (229 Wis. at page 438, 282 N.W. at page 550):
See also Bruun v. Bruun, 1958, 5 Wis.2d 59, 92 N.W.2d 213; 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (2d ed.), p. 393 et seq., ch. 17.
Parties to a divorce may enter into an agreement dividing the property, providing for alimony, and settling other matters involved. Such agreements are to be encouraged on the theory that the parties can more easily reach a just and acceptable adjustment of their rights than the court, and their views are helpful and an aid to the court in arriving at its determination. However, this may not always be the case. Either or both of the parties may not be motivated by any sense of justice. A divorce is not a business matter or a matter of bargaining. The parties thereto are not the only persons interested. The state has an interest in the divorce and in its consequences. Sec. 247.26, Stats., 28 W.S.A. p. 483. While stipulations for a division of estate, for alimony, or for support of children may be made by the parties in case a divorce be granted or a marriage be annulled, such stipulation is subject to the approval of the court. Sec. 247.10, 28 W.S.A., p. 443.
Agreements between parties in divorce actions are made in contemplation that the court must approve such agreements and usually that the provisions of the agreement with such modifications as the court shall make in the interest of justice shall be a part of the court's judgment. The court has the same serious duty to examine carefully such agreements or stipulations against the background of full information of the economic status and resources of the parties as it has in making a determination without the aid of such an agreement. The parties should be examined to determine if they understand the provisions and the effect of the agreement, that it was fairly and voluntarily entered into and was not made with any concessions by either party that the suit would be uncontested. There is no such thing in this state as a divorce by consent or agreement. The parties cannot be stipulation subscribe, modify, or oust the court of its power to determine the disposition of property, alimony, support, custody, or other matters involved in a divorce proceeding. When a court follows and adopts an agreement of the parties making it a part of its judgment, the court does so on its own responsibility, and the provisions become its own judgment.
In this case it appears there was a stipulation or consent of the parties in open court which became the adjudication of the court. However, there may be situations in which the parties enter into a formal contract or written agreement outside of court in which they finally settle all their financial rights and duties toward each other in contemplation of the uncertainties of the future. Sec. 247.10, Stats., 28 W.S.A. p. 443, requires only that a contract or stipulation be approved by the court; it does not require the court to provide in its judgment the terms thereof as an adjudication as the court did in Littig v. Littig, supra. When the court merely refers to such an agreement and approves it without making the provisions thereof a part of its judgment, the weight of authority is that such an agreement is not subject to modification by the court even though the circumstances of the parties change. The arrangement is contractual, not a judicial determination, and therefore no more subject to change by the court than the terms of any other private agreement. 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (2d ed.), p. 407, sec. 17.03, and cases therein cited. See also 58 A.L.R. 639; 109 A.L.R. 1068. For allied problems involving separation agreements see Tilton, 'Separation Agreements,' Milwaukee Bar Assoc. Gavel, p. 14, No. 1, Vol. 21.
It was this rule the trial court had in mind in refusing to modify the judgment. However, the difficulty is in determining the nature and basis of a particular award. A stipulation or agreement amounting to no more than an understanding of what the parties desire and recommend to the court does not rise to the dignity of a contract. Here the court in its judgment did not clearly let the matter of alimony rest upon the stipulation. The award was not contractual, but by adjudication and subject to modification.
The defendant decided for himself not to pay alimony as...
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