Minerva Partners v. First Passage

Decision Date06 February 2007
Docket NumberDocket No. 270778.
Citation274 Mich. App. 207,731 N.W.2d 472
PartiesMINERVA PARTNERS, LTD, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. FIRST PASSAGE, LLC, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and Sherman J. Eaton, Jr., Marilyn Eaton, John F. Eaton and Frank Eaton, Defendants.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Garan Lucow Miller, P.C. (by Robert D. Goldstein and Peter B. Worden, Jr.), Grand Blanc, for First Passage, LLC.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and FITZGERALD and OWENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, the parties dispute the ownership of an abandoned portion of Keystone Road in Garfield Township, Grand Traverse County. Defendant First Passage, LLC, appeals by right the order of the Grand Traverse Circuit Court denying its motion for summary disposition, in which order the trial court also quieted title to the disputed property by dividing it along the centerline of the abandoned road and holding that each party held title to the portion of Keystone Road adjoining that party's property. Plaintiff Minerva Partners, Ltd., cross-appeals the trial court's order denying each party a private easement for ingress or egress across the disputed property owned by the other party. We reverse the trial court's order quieting title to the disputed property, but we affirm the trial court's holding that neither party retains easement rights over the portion of the disputed property held by the other party.

Keystone Road, a road oriented in a southwest to northeast direction, became a public road between 1895 and 1908. Although it is unclear what method was used to dedicate the land as a road, the parties stipulate that the road was not created by plat or other formal dedication pursuant to statute, but was created either through common-law dedication or the highway-by-user doctrine. In 1997, the Grand Traverse County Road Commission abandoned the portion of Keystone Road in dispute in this case.1

In 1935, Ilo E. Tannewitz received title to land, including the property now belonging to plaintiff and defendant, from her husband. With this transfer, Tannewitz owned land on both sides of the road. Further, the property transferred to Tannewitz, as described in the February 1935 deed, included the property under the road.

In November 1956, Tannewitz deeded a parcel of property south and east of the road to the Cherryland Humane Society. This parcel's northwest boundary was the southeast right-of-way of Keystone Road; the description of the property in the deed did not include the land under the road.2 Tannewitz transferred two additional parcels of land to Cherryland in September 1959 and May 1967. The property included in the metes-and-bounds descriptions of these parcels did not include any land under Keystone Road.

In April 1958, Tannewitz transferred several parcels of land to the Traverse City Industrial Fund, Inc.,3 including the land now belonging to plaintiff north and west of the road. In this deed, this parcel was described as follows: "The Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter, except: . . . that part South and Easterly of [the road]."

In September 1981, the Industrial Fund transferred title to the parcel bordering the road (and now belonging to plaintiff) to Essex Group, Inc. In February 1988, Essex transferred title of this parcel to United Technological Automotive, Inc. (UTA). The metes-and-bounds descriptions of the property in these deeds indicated that the property was bounded by the northwest right-of-way line of the road. Accordingly, these deeds did not transfer title to land under the road to the purchasers of the property.

Tannewitz died on January 5, 1982. In her will, she left the remainder of her property, including her residual rights to the property under and surrounding the road, to her niece, Ruth Anna Raub Eaton. Ruth Anna died intestate in February 2000. Her sons John, Sherman, and Frank Eaton inherited her property. Accordingly, any residual rights to property under the road vested in them.

After the road commission abandoned the road in February 1997, Cherryland continued to use an approximately 140-foot long portion of the former road abutting LaFranier Road to access its property.4 Although this access route did not span the width of the road, it included property located on both sides of the centerline. In October 2004, Cherryland purchased any remaining property interest that John and Sherman Eaton had in the access route. Cherryland transferred title to the property it owned south and east of the road, plus title to its interest in the access route, to defendant on November 5, 2004.5

On November 22, 2004, defendant purchased any remaining property interest that the Industrial Fund had in the access route. Defendant received any property interest that Frank Eaton, his heirs, and his assigns had in the access route through a judgment quieting title issued in March 2005.6

Although the information included in the lower court record does not establish a clear chain of title after UTA obtained ownership of the parcel north and west of the road, the parties do not dispute that Lear Corporation owned this property by 2004. On March 10, 2005, Lear filed a complaint to quiet title to the property located in the road. Specifically, Lear claimed ownership of the portion of the access route located northwest of the centerline.

On March 29, 2005, the Industrial Fund transferred to Lear its interest in property located in the road, but not the access route. The deed specified that the property constituting the access route had not been transferred to Lear because the Industrial Fund had already transferred its interest in this property to defendant. Lear subsequently sold the property north and west of the road and any interest it had in the land within the road to Minerva Partners, Ltd. The trial court substituted Minerva Partners for Lear as plaintiff in this action in December 2005.

In March 2006, defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that it held fee title to the portion of the access route located north and west of the centerline of the road. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary disposition, asserting that under Michigan law, after the abandonment of a public road, the remaining parcel of land reverts to the abutting property owners to the centerline of the former roadway, regardless of the existence of a deed to the contrary. Moreover, plaintiff argued, the owner of land abutting a public road has a private easement across that road even after its abandonment.

After two hearings regarding the matter, the trial court concluded that when the road was abandoned, title to the property to the centerline automatically reverted to the abutting landowners. However, the trial court also concluded that neither party retained private ingress and egress rights over the portion of the road on the other party's side of the centerline.

I

Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously concluded that, after the road commission abandoned the road, ownership of the half of the road abutting each party's property reverted to that landowner. We agree. We review de novo both a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition and its decision in an action to quiet title. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999); Burkhardt v. Bailey, 260 Mich App. 636, 646, 680 N.W.2d 453 (2004). We review the entire trial court record to determine if the trial court's order granting summary disposition was in error. Maiden, supra at 118, 597 N.W.2d 817.

Generally, a dedication is "an appropriation of land to some public use, accepted for such use by or in behalf of the public." Gunn v. Delhi Twp., 8 Mich. App. 278, 282, 154 N.W.2d 598 (1967), quoting Clark v. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich. 646, 656-657, 55 N.W.2d 137 (1952). The dedication of private property can occur either pursuant to statute or under common-law principles. Gunn, supra at 282, 154 N.W.2d 598. This Court has noted that, "[f]or a road to become public property, there generally must be either a statutory dedication and an acceptance on behalf of the public, a common-law dedication and acceptance, or a finding of highway by public user." Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Personal Residence Trust v. Emmet Co. Rd. Comm., 236 Mich.App. 546, 554, 600 N.W.2d 698 (1999).

Although a variety of acceptable methods exist to dedicate a parcel of land as a public highway, not all dedications of land result in a similar interest being passed to the public authority. The nature of the real property interest passing from the grantor to the government unit depends on the method of dedication. Kalkaska v. Shell Oil Co. (After Remand), 433 Mich. 348, 354 n. 11, 446 N.W.2d 91 (1989). "`The effect of a dedication under the statute has been to vest the fee in the county, in trust for the municipality intended to be benefited, whereas, at common law, the act of dedication created only an easement in the public.'" Id., quoting Village of Grandville v. Jenison, 84 Mich. 54, 65, 47 N.W. 600 (1890). Similarly, the highway-by-user statute creates an easement for public use in private property. See Eyde Bros. Dev. Co. v. Eaton Co. Drain Comm'r, 427 Mich. 271, 281-282, 398 N.W.2d 297 (1986).

An easement cannot be abridged or taken away by the owner of the burdened land after it has been granted or otherwise established. Murphy Chair Co. v. American Radiator Co., 172 Mich. 14, 28, 137 N.W. 791 (1912). However, an easement may be lost through abandonment. Goodman v. Brenner, 219 Mich. 55, 60, 188 N.W. 377 (1922). An easement is abandoned when the owner of the easement relinquishes it with the intention of releasing his or her right to the easement. Id. After the easement is abandoned, the unencumbered fee...

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    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
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    ...purchaser receives both the interest described in the deed and the rights indicated in the plat. Minerva Partners, Ltd. v. First Passage, LLC, 274 Mich.App. 207, 219, 731 N.W.2d 472 (2007). When interpreting a plat, this Court seeks to effectuate the intent of the plattor. Tomecek v. Bavas,......
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