Minges v. State

• Citation: 192 N.E.3d 893
• Decision Date: 23 August 2022
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CR-285
• Parties: Frank E. MINGES, III, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

192 N.E.3d 893

Frank E. MINGES, III, Appellant (Defendant below),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CR-285

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: May 18, 2022

Filed August 23, 2022

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Michael C. Cunningham, Judson G. McMillin, Zachary J. Anderson, Mullin, McMillin & McMillin, LLP, Brookville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Sierra A. Murray, Andrew A. Kobe, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA PUBLIC DEFENDER COUNCIL: Bernice Corley, Suzy St. John, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF INDIANA: Amy E. Karozos, Jay M. Lee, Steven H. Schutte, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 21A-CR-216

David, Justice.

Over thirty years ago, this Court decided State ex rel. Keaton v. Cir. Ct. of Rush Cnty. , 475 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 1985). Citing an undue burden on prosecuting attorneys and the potential for abuse by defense counsel, the Court concluded criminal trial courts do not have inherent authority to require the State to produce complete copies of police reports over the prosecuting attorney's timely work product objection. Id. at 1148. Decided in a time when lawyers redacted documents using Marks-a-Lot markers, the Keaton court was unlikely to fathom electronic filing or software programs readily accessible to legal professionals today.

But as technology developed after our Keaton decision, the rules governing criminal procedure, and custom, likewise changed over time. And today, the majority of prosecutors across the State of Indiana regularly produce police reports to defendants and their counsel, while prosecutor's offices in the minority of counties automatically assert the work product privilege over these documents as a matter of policy.

In the midst of this change, Minges challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to compel the State to produce a copy of the police report related to his misdemeanor charges. In doing so, Minges asks us to reconsider our decision in Keaton . Today, we accept his request, overrule Keaton , and remand to the trial court to determine whether the police report is privileged work product in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

On October 13, 2020, a Dearborn County police officer observed a vehicle driven by Minges exceeding the speed limit and failing to stay in its traffic lane. The officer initiated a traffic stop, and a field sobriety test revealed Minges had a blood alcohol content of 0.099%.

The next day, the State charged Minges separately for operating his vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2(a), in a manner that endangered a person, a Class A misdemeanor under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2(b). That same day, defense counsel appeared on Minges’ behalf. Simultaneously, Minges filed a motion for discovery, which requested twenty-three items, including, and noteworthy for our purposes, "[a]ny and all reports known to the State made in writing by any policeman or investigating officer which are relevant to the charge against Defendant," and "any such reports which the Prosecuting Attorney may acquire or learn of in the future at any time prior to trial." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 19.

On October 26, the State responded to Minges’ discovery requests by producing copies of the probable cause affidavit and documents related to the search warrant. However, the State refused to produce a copy of the Dearborn County Sheriff's Department Case Report Narrative ("Police Report"), specifying the Police Report was "available to review upon appointment" with the Dearborn County Prosecutor's Office. Id. at 37, 58.

A contentious discovery battle ensued between the parties, and Minges moved to compel the State to produce the Police Report. In his motion, he recounted that his attorney requested a copy of the Police Report via e-mail, but the prosecutor denied his request and informed defense counsel that, pursuant to the policy of the prosecutor's office, he could review the report by making an appointment or signing a non-negotiable protective order. Because defense counsel questioned whether his ethical obligations to his client prevented him from signing the protective order,¹ he reviewed the Police Report at the prosecutor's office.

Over a month later, the parties appeared before the trial court regarding Minges’ motion to compel. At that time, defense counsel clarified the State had "no objection" to providing the Police Report to Minges, but rather "[i]t's just the manner in which it gets provided to [Minges and his counsel]." Tr. at 5. Further, Minges argued in his motion that "[t]he State's attempt to control when and where Defense Counsel can access evidence negatively impacts a Defendant's rights to the effective assistance of counsel and due process of law," and its policy was "impractical and problematic on its face, but especially in the midst of [the COVID-19] pandemic." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 59.

The State, on the other hand, conceded there was no harm in providing the Police Report to Minges and his counsel, but refused to do so because police reports are the work product of the prosecuting attorney. And, consistent with this Court's earlier decision in Keaton , 475 N.E.2d 1146, a trial court "in a criminal proceeding does not have any inherent power to order production of verbatim copies of police reports over a work product objection," unless the reports contain statements from witnesses. Tr. at 6–7.

The trial court acknowledged "this is an issue that's been litigated a lot in [the] courtroom in the past [twelve] years," but in the absence of case law overturning Keaton , concluded it had "no discretion" to compel the State to produce the Police Report. Id. at 7–8. Accordingly, the trial court denied Minges’ motion.

Minges moved to certify the trial court's order denying his motion to compel for interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted his motion, and the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction over the matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, writing that "[d]espite [the court's] concerns about the continued viability of Keaton ," but understanding it was bound by the Supreme Court's precedent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Minges’ request. Slip op. at 16–17. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals "agree[d] with Minges that reconsideration of [ Keaton ] is warranted." Id. at 17.

We accept these requests for us to reconsider our precedent. Ind. Appellate Rule 57(H)(5). Accordingly, we grant Minges’ petition for transfer and vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals. App. R. 58(A).

Standard of Review

Because trial courts have broad discretion on issues of discovery, we review discovery rulings—such as rulings on motions to compel—for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Jones , 169 N.E.3d 397, 402 (Ind. 2021). But we review questions of law, including whether this Court's precedent conflicts with Indiana's Trial Rules, de novo. Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Ind. Mfrs. Ass'n , 784 N.E.2d 463, 465 (Ind. 2003).

Discussion and Decision

The primary issue on appeal is whether State ex rel. Keaton v. Cir. Ct. of Rush Cnty. , 475 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 1985), deprives trial courts of their broad discretion in matters of discovery to order the State to produce complete copies of police reports despite a timely objection that the report is privileged work product of the prosecuting attorney.

Before we proceed to our analysis, we recall the facts and circumstances of Keaton . In 1983, the State charged David Kidd with murder, and he filed several discovery motions requesting copies of all relevant police reports. Id. The State refused to provide verbatim copies of the reports, arguing they were the work product of its prosecuting attorney. Id. at 1147. Instead, the prosecutor allowed defense counsel to examine the reports for exculpatory information. Id. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court ordered the prosecutor to produce "verbatim copies" of the police reports. Id. Disagreeing with the trial court, and citing an undue burden on prosecuting attorneys and the potential for abuse by defense counsel, this Court concluded "Where, as in the instant case, a timely work product objection has been made, a trial court's authority to control discovery does not extend to compelling production of verbatim copies of police reports." Id. at 1148. Therefore, the police reports were not discoverable. Id.

Minges requests that we overrule Keaton because its holding is "incongruous with the rules of this Court and the principles of fairness and justice." Pet. to Trans. at 14. We accept his request. For purposes of continuity and predictability in our jurisprudence, "we should be ‘reluctant to disturb long-standing precedent[.]’ " Layman v. State , 42 N.E.3d 972, 977 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Marsillett v. State , 495 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 1986) ). But even though "stare decisis often compels a court to follow its prior decisions, the doctrine is not a straitjacket and we may overrule or modify precedent if there are ‘urgent reasons’ or ... a ‘clear manifestation of error.’ " Ladra v. State , 177 N.E.3d 412, 421 (Ind. 2021).

Here, we find several reasons to support our decision. First, we analyze the extent to which Keaton conflicts with Indiana's Trial Rules. In doing so, we conclude Trial Rule 26(B)(3) supersedes the Court's decision in Keaton . Next, we examine whether the reasons justifying the Court's decision are proper considerations while analyzing whether a police report is protected by the work product privilege set forth in Trial Rule 26(B)(3). Concluding they are not and finding Trial Rule 26(B)(3) supersedes Keaton , we overrule Keaton and remand to the trial court to consider the State's claim that the Police Report constitutes the prosecutor's work...