Mingus v. Butler

• Decision Date: 05 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-2286.,08-2286.
• Citation: 591 F.3d 474
• Parties: Ned MINGUS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sherilyn BUTLER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

591 F.3d 474

Ned MINGUS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sherilyn BUTLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-2286.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted: October 13, 2009.

Decided and Filed: January 5, 2010.

ON BRIEF: John L. Thurber, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Ned Mingus, Jackson, Michigan, pro se.

Before: O'CONNOR, Associate Justice;^* GILMAN and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Sherilyn Butler appeals the district court's interlocutory orders denying her summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and denying her summary judgment on plaintiff-appellee Ned Mingus's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, REMAND for further proceedings, and DENY Mingus's motion for appointment of counsel.

I.

Mingus is a prisoner confined at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility ("Correctional Facility") in Jackson, Michigan. Butler, a registered nurse, was the Health Unit Manager at the Correctional Facility in 2002, the relevant year for the allegations underlying this case.

In May 2003, Mingus, who suffers from macular degeneration and other physical infirmities, filed a civil rights complaint against Butler and eight other defendants, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the ADA, and state law. The complaint was based on the defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to and negligent treatment of Mingus's various medical conditions and denial of his requests for a single-occupancy room with key-operated locks. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, granted in part and denied in part the defendants' dispositive motions. Specifically, it denied Butler qualified immunity on Mingus's Eighth Amendment claim and rejected her sovereign immunity defense to an ADA suit in her official capacity. Report and Recommendation at 23, Mingus v. Antonini, 5:03-cv-60095-MOB-RSW (E.D.Mich. Feb. 22, 2005). The parties subsequently stipulated to dismissal without prejudice because the complaint contained unexhausted claims.

In October 2005, Mingus filed suit against Butler under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and under the ADA. He sought declaratory relief, a prospective injunction requiring the Correctional Facility to provide him with a single-occupancy room, and damages. The exhibits attached to the complaint document Mingus's medical history, communications with Butler and her subordinates, and his appeals through the administrative process. On March 2, 2002, Mingus wrote to Butler, notifying her that because he could not see his locks, he was unable to protect his property. In that letter, he remarked, "I am not helpless, and I see the larger world well enough to fend for myself. It's the little stuff and things a few feet away I can't see." He complained of other inmates, especially able-bodied ones, receiving single-occupancy rooms when he did not. In her medical notes, one of Butler's subordinates wrote that "inmate doesn't meet criteria for single man cell" and recommended that Mingus receive key-operated locks. In late March 2002, Mingus again wrote to Butler regarding his circumstances, indicating his intent to grieve her decision and clarifying that his "complaint is not just that I can't see my locks, because I'm vulnerable in many other ways." In response, one of Butler's subordinates again wrote in her medical notes, "Correspondence from inmate stating he is upset he cannot have single room.... Inmate does not meet criteria for single man room. Discussed this situation with Ms. Butler...." Throughout the administrative grievance process, Mingus continued to assert that he feared that he could not protect himself from other inmates and that their "predation is the direct result of my disability."

On February 21, 2008, Butler moved for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint. She moved on six grounds: (1) Title II of the ADA does not permit suits for damages against a state official in her individual capacity; (2) Title II of the ADA does not permit suits for damages against a state official in her official capacity if they are based on a theory of equal protection; (3) the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 suits for damages against a state official in her official capacity; (4) she was entitled to qualified immunity on Mingus's Eighth Amendment theory; (5) Mingus's Fourteenth Amendment claims fail under rational basis review; and (6) Mingus could not make a showing of irreparable harm necessary to warrant injunctive relief because he received his key-operated locks.

Butler supplemented the administrative record of Mingus's grievance with a Prison Policy Directive and "Guidelines" document. The former directed prison health personnel to "identify reasonable options available in a corrections setting" to accommodate a prisoner with a "special medical need." The latter set forth the criteria the prison used in assigning single-occupancy rooms. Specifically, it listed certain medical conditions, such as gender identity disorder, "which may require a single person cell." Although macular degeneration was not listed, the document also allowed that the "Outpatient Mental Health Team may order a single person cell for reasons other than those listed above but consistent with their guidelines."

The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Mingus's individual capacity ADA claim, official capacity § 1983 claim, and request for injunctive relief regarding the issuance of key-operated locks. However, he permitted the rest of Mingus's claims to proceed. Specifically, he reasoned that Title II of the ADA abrogated state sovereign immunity in official capacity suits under the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Relying upon the district court's orders in the 2003 lawsuit, he held that Butler was not entitled to qualified immunity because there were disputed issues of material fact regarding the scope of her supervisory authority at the Correctional Facility, her alleged deliberate indifference to Mingus's medical conditions, and her possible awareness of the substantial risks that Mingus's inability to see created for him and his property. The magistrate judge then ruled that Mingus's Fourteenth Amendment claims could proceed because a jury could find that Butler had no rational basis for denying Mingus a single-occupancy room when, according to Mingus's uncontradicted allegation, other similarly disabled prisoners were given such rooms. Finally, he allowed Mingus to pursue injunctive relief regarding his request for a single-occupancy room.

Butler timely objected to the Report and Recommendation and argued that the magistrate judge misconstrued the holding of Georgia, incorrectly analyzed qualified immunity, misapplied Fourteenth Amendment rational-basis analysis, and improperly second-guessed the discretionary decisions of prison administrators by allowing Mingus to pursue prospective injunctive relief. On September 19, 2008, the district court rejected all of Butler's objections and adopted the Report and Recommendation in full with emphasis on the importance of Georgia. Butler then timely appealed and, before us, Mingus moved for appointment of counsel.

II.

We address, in turn, Butler's assertions of qualified immunity to Mingus's Eighth Amendment claim and Eleventh Amendment immunity to the ADA claim, her appeal of the district court's denial of summary judgment on the equal protection claim, and Mingus's motion for appointment of counsel.

A. Qualified Immunity

The district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The Supreme Court has "held that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 [cannot] serve as the basis for appellate jurisdiction for appeals from qualified immunity denials to the extent that those appeals took issue with the district court's determination that there existed a genuine issue of fact for trial." Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 742 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)). Although the district court found that genuine issues of material fact exist, Butler has conceded the facts in the light most favorable to Mingus and raises a pure issue of law regarding her alleged deliberate indifference to Mingus's needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516-17 (6th Cir.2008) (requiring that, to appeal a denial of qualified immunity, "the defendant must be prepared to overlook any factual dispute and to concede an interpretation of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff's case"). We review de novo a district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds "because the determination of whether qualified immunity is applicable to an official's actions is a question of law." Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir.2002) (quotation omitted).

Qualified immunity is "an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity depends upon whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated and whether those rights were clearly established. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 394 (6th Cir.2008). This Court may exercise its "sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the...