Minidoka & Southwestern Railroad Company v. Weymouth

• Decision Date: 28 January 1911
• Citation: 113 P. 455,19 Idaho 234
• Parties: MINIDOKA & SOUTHWESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent, v. F. E. WEYMOUTH et al., Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

113 P. 455

19 Idaho 234

MINIDOKA & SOUTHWESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent, v. F. E. WEYMOUTH et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 28, 1911

PUBLIC LANDS-RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY-GOVERNMENT EASEMENT-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.

(Syllabus by the court.)

1. Lands withdrawn under the act of Congress of June 17, 1902 known as the Reclamation Act, for the purposes of irrigation under an irrigation system constructed by the government, and which lands are subject to homestead entry under the act of Congress, are public lands within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1875, known as the Railroad Right of Way Act, and are subject to railroad rights of way for any railroad company which complies with the provisions of the act.

2. The act of Congress of August 30, 1890, reserving to the government an easement for ditches and canals over all lands west of the 100th meridian, which might thereafter be patented by the government to any entryman, does not apply to railroad rights of way acquired under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875.

3. The act of Congress of August 30, 1890, which refers to lands "taken up," and land "entries," and lands "patented," does not refer to or include easements and rights of way granted for specific purposes where the fee does not pass and where no patents are issued and where the amount of land covered by the easement is not limited in area or extent.

4. The acts of Congress relative to the public lands providing for entries thereof and authorizing easements and rights of way thereover must be construed together and in the light of the conditions of the country as they existed when the several acts were passed, as well as to the purposes declared by the acts, and force and effect should be given to the provisions of each and every act in so far as it is possible to do so.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, for Lincoln County. Hon. Edward A. Walters, Judge.

Action by the plaintiff for an injunction. Judgment and order for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Order affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

C. H Lingenfelter and B. E. Stoutemeyer, for Appellants.

"The words of a private grant are taken most strongly against the grantor. But this rule is reversed in cases of public grants. They are construed strictly in favor of the government on grounds of public policy." (Lewis' Sutherland Stat Const., par. 548; Mills v. St. Clair Co., 8 How. (U S.) 581, 12 L.Ed. 1201; Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 51, 18 L.Ed. 137; State v. Bentley, 23 N.J.L. 532, 538; Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412, 4 S.Ct. 475, 28 L.Ed. 321; Hannibal R. R. Co. v. Packet Co., 125 U.S. 260, 271, 8 S.Ct. 874, 31 L.Ed. 731; Mayor v. Ohio etc. R. R., 26 Pa. 355; San Francisco v. Sharp, 125 Cal. 534, 58 P. 173; Globe v. Bellingham Co., 10 Wash. 458, 38 P. 112; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U.S. 24, 11 S.Ct. 478, 35 L.Ed. 55; Coosaw Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 12 S.Ct. 689, 36 L.Ed. 537; L. & N. R. R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 16 S.Ct. 714, 40 L.Ed. 849; Wisconsin Central v. United States, 164 U.S. 190, 17 S.Ct. 45, 41 L.Ed. 399; Long Island Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 17 S.Ct. 718, 41 L.Ed. 1165.)

Even if the plaintiff could be considered to have acquired a valid title to the right of way claimed by it, its title was certainly acquired under the land laws of the United States after the passage of the act of Congress of August 30, 1890, and it is subject to the provisions of that act.

Under this statute the right of the government to construct the ditch in question has been fully affirmed by the Land Department of the United States in 36 Land Dec. 482, by this court in the case of Green v. Wilhite, 14 Idaho 238, 93 P. 971, and by the federal court of this district in a case of the same name referred to and quoted in the Idaho decision.

"A certification of land to the state for the benefit of a railroad company under the acts of Congress by the Land Department of the United States has the same legal effect as a patent." (United States v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 67 F. 948, 15 C. C. A. 96.)

An examination of the public land statutes of the United States shows that Congress has uniformly used the term "sale" in its proper and generally accepted meaning as defined by the supreme court in the case of Williamson v. Berry, and always in connection with a transfer of title under the various acts authorizing the transfer of title upon payment of a purchase price. But it is equally noticeable that the term "sale" is never used in those acts of Congress which authorize and regulate the entry of land under the homestead law, such entries not being regarded as sales, but as a gift or bounty from the government to the settler.

If any uncertainty ever existed as to what lands are regarded as lands sold by Congress and what lands are lands reserved from sale, it has been removed by the decision of the supreme court in the case of Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471, 4 S.Ct. 210, 28 L.Ed. 198.

Where lands are granted by an act of Congress which does not require the issuance of a formal patent, the certificate of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, or Secretary of the Interior, or other government officer named in the statute is the legal equivalent of a patent. (Frasher v. O'Connor, 115 U.S. 102, 5 S.Ct. 1141, 29 L.Ed. 311; McCreery v. Haskell, 119 U.S. 327, 7 S.Ct. 176, 30 L.Ed. 408; Curtner v. United States, 149 U.S. 662, 13 S.Ct. 1041, 37 L.Ed. 890.)

"Where the language of a statute is dubious and open to different interpretations, the established construction of it by the department of the government charged with its execution will have very great force, and generally a controlling one in an interpretation given by the court." (St. Paul M. & M. R. Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528, 11 S.Ct. 168, 34 L.Ed. 767; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How. (U. S.) 317, 12 L.Ed. 1095; United States v. Mayes, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 177, 20 L.Ed. 381; United States v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136, 16 S.Ct. 247, 40 L.Ed. 369; Sturr v. Beck, 133 U.S. 541, 10 S.Ct. 350, 33 L.Ed. 761.)

P. L. Williams and D. Worth Clark, for Respondent.

The land in question was not taken out of the category of public lands by the withdrawal made by the Secretary of the Interior; the land was not withdrawn from entry, or especially reserved from sale. Under this law two forms of withdrawal are provided for. (United States v. Hanson, 167 F. 881.)

The words "public lands" have long had a settled meaning in the legislation of Congress, and when a different intention is not clearly expressed, the term "public land" is used to designate such land as is subject to sale or other disposal under the general laws. (Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 23 L.Ed. 769; Bardon v. Nor. P. R. R. Co., 145 U.S. 535, 12 S.Ct. 856, 36 L.Ed. 806; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U.S. 618, 8 S.Ct. 1228, 31 L.Ed. 844; Cameron v. United States, 148 U.S. 301, 13 S.Ct. 595, 37 L.Ed. 459; Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 14 S.Ct. 820, 38 L.Ed. 714; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 21 S.Ct. 690, 45 L.Ed. 963; Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 25 S.Ct. 193, 49 L.Ed. 403.)

Unless rights of way for railroads may be procured by compliance with the act of March 3, 1875, then no right of way may be acquired across lands situated within the boundaries of a reclamation project. (United States v. Minidoka & Southwestern R. Co., 176 F. 762.)

In view of the fact that provision is made for obtaining rights of way over forest and other reservations, it must be apparent that Congress did not consider any necessity for such provisions in cases of reclamation projects, because certainly Congress would not have knowingly left the law in such a condition that rights of way for various public enterprises might not be acquired across public lands situated within reclamation project boundaries. Such a construction would defeat the object of the law, to wit, the settlement and cultivation of these lands. (In re Frank Laughrin, 29 Land Dec. 147.)

Public grants are construed strictly against the grantee, but they are not so construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is given by necessary or fair implication. (United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 150 U.S. 14, 14 S.Ct. 11, 37 L.Ed. 975, and cases cited.)

Under these grants the question of the reasonable amount of land necessary for such use is not open to consideration and determination by the courts. The grant by Congress of a right of way one hundred feet on each side of the central line of the track was a conclusive determination of the reasonable and necessary quantity of land to be dedicated to such use, and carried with it the right of possession in the grantee therein named and its successor. (Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Quigley, 10 Idaho 770, 80 P. 401; Northern P. R. Co. v. Smith, 171 U.S. 268, 18 S.Ct. 794, 43 L.Ed. 160; New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 19 S.Ct. 881, 43 L.Ed. 407.)

It is indispensable to a correct understanding of a statute to first inquire what object is intended to be accomplished by it. When the subject matter is once clearly ascertained, and its general intent, a key is found to all its intricacies. (2 Sutherland, p. 379.)

AILSHIE, J. Stewart, C. J., concurs. SULLIVAN, J., Dissenting.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

This action was prosecuted by the Minidoka & Southwestern Railway Co. for the purpose of obtaining an injunction restraining the defendants from trespassing upon and permanently occupying a part of the respondent's railroad right of way between the towns of Rupert and Burley in Lincoln county. The judge of the trial court made an order and granted a writ enjoining and restraining the defendants, and they thereupon...