Miniel v. Cockrell

• Decision Date: 25 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-20097.,02-20097.
• Parties: PETER J. MINIEL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

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PETER J. MINIEL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-20097.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 17, 2003.

Revised August 25, 2003.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston.

Before JOLLY, DAVIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner, Peter J. Miniel (Miniel), was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death. He now seeks a Certificate of Appealability (COA) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) from the district court's denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the following claims: (1) the jury was precluded from considering mitigating evidence during sentencing; (2) he was denied the right to trial by an impartial jury; and (3) counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to conduct a pretrial investigation and present mitigating evidence during sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we deny COA on Miniel's claims.

I. BACKGROUND.

On October 7, 1988, Miniel was convicted of the felony murder of Paul Manier (Manier).

After arriving at Manier's house to procure marijuana, Miniel concocted a plan to rob him. Miniel's co-defendant, James Warren Russell, Jr. (Russell), distracted Manier by telling him he was going to get cocaine. Manier cleaned a small mirror to use to snort the cocaine. When Manier leaned over the mirror, Miniel struck him on the back of the head with a beer mug. Miniel continued to strike Manier until he fell to the ground. When Russell returned, he joined Miniel and struck Manier several times with a shock absorber that was nearby. Dissatisfied with Russell's efforts, Miniel took the shock absorber and began striking Manier with it. When Miniel could not knock out Manier, he stabbed Manier several times with a small knife. After this proved ineffective, Miniel attempted to slit his throat while Russell held him. Finally, Miniel attempted to asphyxiate Manier by shoving a blanket down his throat.

After the murder, Miniel became angry when he realized that he had killed Manier for only twenty dollars. Miniel and Russell searched the apartment for drugs or money but all they could find to steal was stereo equipment. They washed off Manier's blood and hid the knife. Afterwards, Miniel and Russell went to Burger King to eat hamburgers.

A jury convicted Miniel of capital murder. On October 12, 1988, the jury returned affirmative answers to two special issues required for imposition of the death penalty under Texas law, and the trial court sentenced Miniel to death.

Miniel appealed his conviction to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which affirmed his conviction and sentence. Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The United States Supreme Court denied his application for a writ of certiorari. Miniel v. Texas, 506 U.S. 885, 113 S.Ct. 245 (1992). Thereafter, Miniel sought post-conviction relief in state court, filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1993 and an amended petition in1996. Judge Larry Fuller, who was not the trial judge, presided over this proceeding. The State filed its answer in March 1999. Both sides filed affidavits, and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the state district court requested that the parties submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The state district court adopted the State's proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law and denied relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted this order in December 1999.

Thereafter, Miniel sought post-conviction relief in federal district court pursuant to 28 § U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment in October 2001. The district court denied Miniel's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The district court also denied Miniel's request for a COA. Miniel now seeks a COA from this court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Miniel filed the instant Section 2254 application for habeas relief after the April 24, 1996 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). His application is therefore subject to AEDPA. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997).

Under AEDPA, an appeal may not be taken to this court unless the petitioner first obtains a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "This is a jurisdictional prerequisite because the COA statute mandates that `[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. . . .'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)) . "The COA statute requires a threshold inquiry into whether the circuit court may entertain an appeal." Id. (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 482 (2000); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 248 (1998)). A COA will be granted only if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a petitioner "must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3394 n. 4 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Any doubt regarding whether to grant a COA is resolved in favor of the petitioner, and the severity of the penalty may be considered in making this determination. Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 495 (5^th Cir. 1997).

The analysis "requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merit." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039. We must look to the district court's application of AEDPA to the petitioner's constitutional claims and determine whether the court's resolution was debatable among reasonable jurists. Id. "This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims." Id. Rather, "`[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.'" Id. at 1040. (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484).

In making this assessment, we must be mindful of the deferential standard of review the district court applied to Miniel's claims as required by AEDPA. Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 484-85 (5^th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(d) requires a federal district court to give deference to determinations by a state habeas court that adjudicated the petition on the merits. See Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 484-85 (5^th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court defers to a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims on the merits unless the state court's decision was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." A state court's decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000). A state court's decision constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it is objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1521.

III. MITIGATING EVIDENCE.

A. Denial of Mitigating Evidence Instruction

Miniel argues that the state court denied a jury instruction with respect to the following mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth Amendment: his drug and alcohol use at the time of the offense; his youth (age 23); his good behavior while incarcerated; and his religious conversion.¹ Finding Miniel's claim precluded by precedent, we deny a COA.

In Penry I, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence on the ground that, although the evidence regarding the defendant's mental retardation and childhood abuse was presented to the jury at the penalty phase of the trial, the special issues prescribed by Texas statute prevented the jury from giving mitigating effect to that evidence. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2952 (1989). Since the holding in Penry, federal courts have had the opportunity to determine whether the special issues provided a vehicle for considering numerous types of mitigating evidence.

As in the instant case, the petitioner in Tucker v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 276, 281 (5^th Cir. 1997), argued that the jury was prevented from considering the mitigating evidence of her intoxication at the time of the offense and her age, twenty-three. We rejected that claim and found that the petitioner had failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. Id. at 281-82. More specifically, a jury can give "full effect" to evidence of voluntary intoxication in its determination of whether the defendant acted deliberately, which is contained in the first special issue. Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486, 489 (5^th Cir. 1994). The second special issue with respect to future dangerousness affords the jury an adequate vehicle to consider the defendant's youth. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 370, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2670 (1993).

With respect to the evidence of Miniel's good behavior while incarcerated, the Supreme Court has explained that no special instruction is necessary to enable the jury to consider the mitigating effect of the petitioner's evidence regarding his good prison disciplinary record. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2329-30 (1988). Finally, with respect to Miniel's...