Mink v. Knox
| Decision Date | 12 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 04-cv-00023-LTB. |
| Citation | 566 F.Supp.2d 1217 |
| Parties | Thomas MINK, Plaintiff, v. Susan KNOX, a Deputy District Attorney working for the 19th Judicial District Attorney's Office, in her individual capacity, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
A. Bruce Jones, Marcy Geoffrey Glenn, Holland & Hart, LLP, Mark Silverstein, American Civil Liberties Union, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
David R. Brougham, Andrew David Ringel, Hall & Evans, LLC, Hall & Evans, LLC, for Defendant.
This civil rights case is before me on Defendant, Susan Knox's, Renewed Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 70], Plaintiff, Thomas Mink's, Response in Opposition [Docket # 73], and Defendant Knox's Reply [Docket # 77]. Oral arguments would not materially assist the determination of this motion. After consideration of the motion, the papers, and the case file, and for the reasons stated below, I GRANT Defendant Knox's Renewed Motion to Dismiss [Docket #70] and DISMISS this case.
Plaintiff Thomas Mink ("Plaintiff")— while a student at the University of Northern Colorado ("UNC")—created and published an internet-based journal called The Howling Pig. Several issues of the journal included a column published by Plaintiff under the pseudonym "Junius Puke," an apparent reference to actual UNC professor Junius Peake ("Peake" or "Professor Peake"). Peake was parodied in the column and, not amused, contacted the Greeley police who commenced an investigation for potential violations of Colorado's criminal libel statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-105. The police, in conjunction with the District Attorney's office, sought a search warrant. In December 2003, Defendant Knox—a deputy district attorney—reviewed and approved the search warrant affidavit, which was then presented to and approved by a magistrate judge. Greeley police executed the warrant at Plaintiffs residence, seizing his personal computer and other written materials.
Plaintiff filed the present action on January 8, 2004. The First Amended and Supplemental Complaint [Docket # 13] alleged four claims for relief: a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Colorado criminal libel statute ("Claim One"); a claim that Knox violated the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, et seq. ("Claim Two"); a claim that Knox—by reviewing and approving the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant— violated Plaintiffs right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures ("Claim Three"); and a claim that Knox violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. ("Claim Four"). On October 26, 2004, I issued an Order dismissing all four claims and dismissing the case [Docket #47]. As to Claim One, I held Plaintiff lacked standing because no charges had been brought and prosecutors stated they did not intend to prosecute in the future. As to Claim Two, I held Plaintiff failed to allege any action on behalf of Knox that could be construed to violate the Privacy Protection Act. As to Claim Three, I held Knox was entitled to absolute immunity from suit because she was she was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and within her role as an advocate before a judicial tribunal. As to Claim Four, I held Plaintiff failed to allege any action on behalf of Knox that could be construed to violate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
Plaintiff appealed as to the first three claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on Claims One and Two, but reversed and remanded on Claim Three. See Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.2007). The Tenth Circuit noted Id. at 1261-62 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 493-94, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). Applying this rule to the facts at bar, the court held that Knox "was not wearing the hat of an advocate" when she reviewed and approved the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant. Id. at 1262. The court noted the Government was "far from filing charges" at the time Knox reviewed the affidavit, and Knox was therefore not yet preparing for a judicial proceeding, but was merely assisting the Government in investigating Plaintiff and obtaining evidence against him. Id. Accordingly, Knox "acted to guide the police, not to prepare [her] own case." Id. at 1263.
The court concluded it was error to dismiss Count Three on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity, but held Knox "may be entitled to qualified immunity if she reasonably concluded probable cause existed to support the warrant application, or that the application of the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases to the criminal libel statute was not clearly established under the circumstances" of this case. Id. The court declined to address the qualified immunity issue in the first instance and remanded.
Granting a motion to dismiss is a harsh remedy which must be exercised with caution to protect the liberal rules of pleading and the interests of justice. See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359 (10th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, a claim "may be dismissed either because it asserts a legal theory not cognizable as a matter of law or because the claim fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim." Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1217 (D.Colo.2004).
When considering a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). While the factual allegations need not be pleaded in great detail, they must be sufficiently precise to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 1969, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (); Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir.2007).
A district court should dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." See Twombly, supra, 127 S.Ct. at 1974; see also Kay, supra, 500 F.3d at 1218. "Plausible" in this context refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs `have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). "Plausibility," however, does not refer to the likelihood that the allegations can be proven or even that the allegations are true. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247.
The determination of whether a complaint contains enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face is dependent on the context of the claim raised. See Robbins, supra, 519 F.3d at 1248; Kelley v. New York Like Ins. & Annuity Corp., No. 07-cv-01702-LTB-BNB, 2008 WL 1782647, at *3 (D.Colo. Apr.17, 2008). The "mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, within the context of the claim alleged, the complaint must contain enough specific allegations of fact to show that if all the alleged facts—and only the alleged facts—are believed to be true, the plaintiff has a claim for relief. See Twombly, supra, 127 S.Ct. at 1965; Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247-48.
The context of this case is a claim of qualified immunity by a state official who was sued for damages in her individual capacity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). I initially consider the threshold question of whether—taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the party asserting the injury—Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to show Knox's conduct violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).
If the answer to the first question is yes, I then ask if the right was clearly established within a sufficiently analogous factual setting. Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151; Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir.1992). This determination must also be made within the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498. This does not mean the prior case law must have precisely the same facts, however, but rather requires a...
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