Minkler v. State ex rel. Smithers

Decision Date20 March 1883
Citation14 Neb. 181,15 N.W. 330
PartiesMINKLER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA EX REL. SMITHERS.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error from Gage county.Bush & Rickards and Brown & Ryan Bros. for plaintiff.

Pemberton & Forbes and A. H. Babcock, for defendant.

COBB, J.

A complaint was made to the board of county commissioners against the plaintiff in error for willful maladministration in his office of county surveyor. He was tried and found guilty of this charge, and removed from office. The cause was removed to the district court on error, where the finding and judgment of the county commissioners were affirmed, and is now before this court on error to the district court.

The only substantial error assigned is that the action of the board of county commissioners is not sustained by the evidence in the case. Section 1 of article 2 of chapter 18, Comp. St., provides that “all county officers, including justices of the peace, may be charged, tried, and removed from office for official misdemeanors, in the manner and for the causes following: First, for habitual or willful neglect of duty; second, for gross partiality; third, for oppression; fourth, for extortion; fifth, for corruption; sixth, for willful maladministration in office; seventh, for conviction of a felony; eighth, for habitual drunkenness. The charge in this case was made under the sixth clause of the above section; and the maladministration in office charged was that of having “in his capacity of county surveyor, and while acting as such,” taken up, “removed, and carried away all of the government landmarks, and the stones set up to mark the section, half-section, and quarter-section corners” of certain sections of land therein described in his county.

There is no material conflict in the testimony. Nearly or quite all of the witnesses, including the plaintiff in error himself, who was sworn as a witness on his own behalf, testified in substance that he had removed the government section and quarter section corner-stones, knowing them to be such, of the section described in the complaint, and that he did it under pretense of rectifying the government survey. It is admitted by counsel that this was done without authority; but they contend that, as it was done “under claim of power to do so,” it was not willful maladministration in office. Counsel also claim that the power on the part of the county surveyor to remove the government corner-stones was fortified by the written opinion of respectable attorneys, and that “on such occasion the change was made to place the corners where such corners should be, under the plat and field-notes.” But neither such written opinion of attorneys, nor the plat or field-notes of the government survey, were offered in evidence, according to the bill of exceptions. Counsel draw a distinction between the legal meaning of the prefixes “mal” and “mis,” and in effect claim that while the county surveyor was guilty of misadministration, he was not guilty of maladministration. But whatever there may be in the original meaning of the two words, we find them used in the law books almost or quite interchangeably, indicating a regard for euphony of sound rather than a distinction in meaning. Thus, in Bouvier's Law Dictionery, under the word “malpractice,”--in Latin, male praxis,--we find the several definitions of willful malpractice and ignorant malpractice. Certainly the prefix “mal” is not used in the two last cases to signify intentional wrong. In the case of Coite v. Lynes, 33 Conn. 109, the court use the following language: “For a misfeasance strictly, a default in not doing a lawful act in a proper manner, omitting to do it as it should be done, while the malfeasance is the doing of an act wholly wrongful and unlawful, and non-feasance is an omission to perform a required duty at all, or total neglect of duty.”

The phrase “maladministration” is not found in any of the law dictionaries, but we cannot be far wrong in giving it the signification of wrong administration; and we believe that to be the sense in which the legislature used it in framing the section under consideration. Certainly the prefix “mal” could not have been therein used in the sense of corruption or oppression, as these are both expressly provided for by other clauses of the...

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