Minks v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 17 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012–SC–000316–MR.,2012–SC–000316–MR.
• Citation: 427 S.W.3d 802
• Parties: William L. MINKS, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky

427 S.W.3d 802

William L. MINKS, Appellant

v.COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

No. 2012–SC–000316–MR.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

April 17, 2014.

Shannon Renee Dupree, Assistant Public Advocate, Counsel for Appellant.

John Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, David Bryan Abner, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion of the Court by Justice ABRAMSON.

William Minks appeals as a matter of right from a judgment of the Breckinridge Circuit Court sentencing him to a twenty-year prison term for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in the first degree, possession of drug paraphernalia, manufacturing methamphetamine, and for being a second-degree persistent felony offender.Minks raises two issues on appeal.He asserts as error an issue of first impression in this Court, namely whether he was denied due process of law when the trial judge who signed the search warrant for his residence also presided over his suppression hearing.Second, Minks claims that the search warrant was deficient because the four-corners of the affidavit upon which the warrant issued did not establish probable cause that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at his residence.Having carefully considered both arguments, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the Breckinridge Circuit Court.

FACTS

In March, 2011, Breckinridge County Deputy SheriffChris Woosley traveled to William Minks's trailer to serve an arrest warrant on Minks's brother, John.Minks answered the door, confirmed that John was inside the residence, and asked Deputy Woosley to remain outside.While there, Deputy Woosley noticed the odor of marijuana emanating from inside the trailer.Without waiting further, he entered the residence, finding John seated on the couch.When Deputy Woosley asked where the marijuana was located, John retrieved a plate of marijuana from underneath the couch and stated that it belonged to him.Deputy Woosley arrested John and asked Minks for his consent to search the trailer.Minks refused to consent, and Deputy Woosley returned to the courthouse to prepare an affidavit for a search warrant.Breckinridge Circuit Court Judge Bruce Butler signed the warrant and Deputy Woosley returned to the trailer.

Upon executing the search warrant at Minks's residence, Deputy Woosley discovered a box filled with equipment commonly used in manufacturing methamphetamine.Officers also discovered two bags with a small amount of methamphetamine in a pillow case.Minks was charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, manufacturing methamphetamine, and being a persistent felony offender in the second-degree.After finding Minks guilty on all charges, the jury recommended a sentence of twenty years, and the trial court sentenced Minks accordingly.

ANALYSIS

I.The Trial Judge Was Not Required to Recuse Himself From Presiding Over the Suppression Hearing.

Following the indictment, Minks filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered during the search of his residence.That same day, Minks filed a motion to transfer the case to another Breckinridge County circuit judge on the grounds that Judge Butler, who had signed the search warrant and was to preside over the suppression hearing, was potentially a witness at the hearing.After considering the motion, Judge Butler declined to transfer the case.In an order denying the motion, Judge Butler cited Hirning v. Dooley,679 N.W.2d 771(S.D.2004) as supportive of his belief that he was not required to recuse himself from the suppression hearing, despite having signed the search warrant.Judge Butler then conducted the suppression hearing and denied Minks's motion to suppress.

Minks now argues that he was denied due process of law and a fair trial when the same judge who signed the search warrant for his residence presided over the suppression hearing concerning the fruits of that search.He asserts that the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits this practice, as it gives rise to the “appearance of impropriety” on the part of the trial court.The Commonwealth counters that Judge Butler properly refused to recuse himself because there was no evidence that Judge Butler harbored a personal bias against Minks, had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, or had expressed opinions concerning the merits of the proceeding.

We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial judge's denial of a motion to recuse.Hodge v. Commonwealth,68 S.W.3d 338, 345–46(Ky.2001);Sommers v. Commonwealth,843 S.W.2d 879, 880–82(Ky.1992).“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”Commonwealth v. English,993 S.W.2d 941, 945(Ky.1999).

Canon 3E of the Judicial Code of Ethics, codified in Supreme Court Rule(“SCR”) 4.300, provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances [where] the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]”This principle is also codified in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 26A.015, which requires that a judge disqualify himself or herself “[w]here [the judge] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the proceeding[,]” as well as “[w]here he has knowledge of any other circumstances in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”KRS 26A.015(a) and (e).“Thus, under both the statute and the Canon, recusal is proper if a judge determines that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.]”Petzold v. Kessler Homes, Inc.,303 S.W.3d 467, 471(Ky.2010)(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, Judge Butler, in his capacity as trial court judge, was essentially asked to review whether Judge Butler, in his capacity as warrant-issuing judge, had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed based on the totality of the circumstances presented within the four corners of the affidavit.As both parties have expressed, the question of whether a judge is ethically required to recuse himself under these conditions is a matter of first impression for Kentucky courts.¹There is no claim that Judge Butler was not a detached and neutral magistrate capable of making a probable cause determination for the search warrant in the first place.Cf.Commonwealth v. Brandenburg,114 S.W.3d 830(Ky.2003);Dixon v. Commonwealth,890 S.W.2d 629(Ky.App.1994).Rather, Minks asserts that he was deprived of due process of law when Judge Butler refused to recuse himself from the suppression hearing in which he was required to rule upon the validity of the search warrant which he had issued.

The jurisprudential landscape concerning this question is decidedly tilted in favor of the Commonwealth's position that recusal was not required.The federal circuits that have weighed the issue agree that a judge is not disqualified from later participating in the case by virtue of the fact that he or she issued the search warrant in the case.The language of the federal statute governing disqualification, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), is substantially similar to KRS 26A.015 and Canon 3E(1), providing that, “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”²

The Sixth Circuit has held that judges need not recuse from hearing motions to suppress evidence obtained by wiretap warrants which they themselves signed, concluding that earlier participation in the same trial alone does not constitute sufficient grounds for recusal.SeeUnited States v. Lawson,780 F.2d 535(6th Cir.1985);United States v. Murray,762 F.2d 1013(6th Cir.1985);Southerland v. Irons,628 F.2d 978(6th Cir.1980).The Eleventh Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, finding that recusal under this circumstance is not required so long as the warrant-issuing judge does not “[consider] any extrajudicial source of knowledge or [have] any personal bias or prejudice.”United States v. Slay,714 F.2d 1093, 1095(11th Cir.1983).The Eighth Circuit has concluded that automatic recusal is unwarranted absent a specific showing of “personal bias on the part of any judicial officer,”United States v. Jones,801 F.2d 304, 312(8th Cir.1986), but, as noted by Minks, nevertheless harbors “doubts about the practice” of allowing a warrant-issuing judge to later preside over a suppression hearing in the same case.United States v. Alton,982 F.2d 285, 287(8th Cir.1992).

Many of our sister states allow a warrant-issuing judge to preside over later proceedings in the same case.³The Mississippi Court of Appeals stands alone in Brent v. State,929 So.2d 952(Miss.App.2005), having ruled that a trial judge who issued a search warrant and later reviewed the warrant during a suppression hearing was required to recuse himself despite pronouncing his impartiality.The Brent court held that the circumstance was inherently problematic, concluding that “[n]ot only might a reasonable person harbor doubts about the impartiality of the judge in this situation, we find that any reasonable person should have such doubts.”Id. at 955.

Having carefully considered the question, we decline to adopt a rule that any judge must automatically recuse from hearing a challenge to a search warrant which he or she issued.As in other contexts, pursuant to statute and our rules governing judicial ethics, there must be evidence drawing the judge's impartiality into question before an appellate court will find abuse of discretion in the judge's refusal to recuse.

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