Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan

• Decision Date: 13 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10 C 6003.,10 C 6003.
• Citation: 847 F.Supp.2d 1088
• Parties: MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Arlene KAGAN, Tammy Kagan, Scott Kagan, and Richard Kagan, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

847 F.Supp.2d 1088

MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.Arlene KAGAN, Tammy Kagan, Scott Kagan, and Richard Kagan, Defendants.

No. 10 C 6003.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

March 13, 2012.

Catherine A.T. Nelson, Cozen & O'Conner, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Stephen M. Komie, Sara Elizabeth Toney, Komie & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Arlene Kagan.

Steven Neal Fritzshall, Brad J. Pawlowski, Fritzshall & Pawlowski, Chicago, IL, for Defendants Tammy Kagan, Scott Kagan and Richard Kagan.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

Minnesota Life Insurance Company (“Minnesota Life”) brought this interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 against Arlene Kagan, and Tammy Kagan, Scott Kagan, and Richard Kagan (collectively, “the Children”), to settle their competing claims to the proceeds of a life insurance policy it issued to the now decedent Allen Kagan. (R. 1, Compl.) Presently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment by Arlene and the Children, (R. 25, Arlene's Mot.; R. 30, Children's Mot.), and two motions to strike. (R. 40, Arlene's Mot. to Strike; R. 43, Children's Mot. to Strike.) For the reasons stated below, both motions to strike are denied, Arlene's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Children's motion for summary judgment is denied.

RELEVANT FACTS¹

I. Motions to strike

Before summarizing the facts of this case, the Court first addresses the parties' motions to strike portions of the opposing party's Rule 56.1 statements of fact.

A. Arlene's motion to strike

Arlene seeks to strike paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Children's Facts because “they allege certain statements which are privileged pursuant to Illinois law.” (R. 40, Arlene's Mot. to Strike at 1.) Specifically, Arlene contends that these statements, which pertain to the marriage counseling she and Allen received prior to his death, are privileged under the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (the “Act”), 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 110/1, et seq. ( Id. at 2.)

Paragraph 21 states that “[f]rom at least early 2008 until the time he passed away, Allen Kagan and Arlene Kagan were involved in marriage counseling on at least a monthly basis.” (R. 31, Children's Facts ¶ 21.) Given that it is the affidavit of Tammy, Allen's daughter who lived with them during this time, which provides the evidentiary support for this fact, paragraph 21 clearly falls outside the provision of the Act that Arlene cites in support of her argument. Section 110/10 of the statute applies only to the privilege of “a recipient” of counseling or “a therapist” not to disclose certain records or communications as specified in the statute, not a third party's personal observation that a person has attended counseling. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 110/10. Additionally, Tammy's observations are clearly not “records” or “communications” as defined by the Act. Id.§ 110/2. Finally, contrary to Arlene's argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, Tammy need not have attended the marriage counseling to have personal knowledge that the marriage counseling occurred. The Court therefore will not strike paragraph 21 of the Children's Facts.

Paragraph 22 provides that “Allen Kagan made notes in his personal handwriting regarding their marital counseling issues.” (R. 31, Children's Facts ¶ 22.) Once again, Tammy's affidavit in which she states that she found certain notes, attached as Exhibit K, after Allen's death, supports this statement. ( Id. Ex. 12, Tammy's Decl. ¶ 17.) While the Court finds that the statement in paragraph 22 does not violate the Act, it is concerned by the notes contained in Exhibit K. An initial review of the notes indicates that they may have been written by Allen “to a therapist ... in connection with mental health ... services,” and therefore “communications” under the Act. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 110/2. The record regarding these notes and the marriage counseling that Arlene and Allen participated in is not sufficiently developed, however, to conclude definitively that the notes constitute “communications” as defined by the Act. Further, the parties' briefing regarding the applicability of the Act in this context, in which notes found after the death of a recipient of therapeutic treatment are sought to be disclosed by his children, but a co-recipient of the treatment asserts a claim of privilege, is cursory and unhelpful.² The Court will therefore not strike Exhibit K. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will request the Clerk of the Court to refile Exhibit K under seal.

B. The Children's motion to strike

The Children seek to strike several portions of Arlene's Facts, Arlene's Additional Facts, and supporting affidavits. (R. 32, Children's Rule 56.1 Resp.; R. 43, Children's Mot. to Strike.) Their objections fall into three main categories. First, the Children contend that the Minnesota Life and other business documents that Arlene relies upon lack foundation. (R. 32, Children's 56.1 Resp.; R. 43, Children's Mot. to Strike ¶ 2; R. 30, Children's Resp.) Second, they argue that several of the facts in Arlene's Rule 56.1 statement contain legal conclusions. ( Id.) Finally, the Children contend that certain facts regarding Allen's heart condition and Arlene's knowledge of Allen's condition are vague and lacking in foundation, and that the supporting affidavit is insufficiently detailed and contains inadmissible hearsay. ( Id.)

Regarding the Minnesota Life documents and other business records, the Children's motion to strike fails. While Arlene has not set forth the foundation that would be necessary at trial to introduce the documents, the Children do not dispute the authenticity of the documents, and, in fact, rely on several of them in support of their own motion for summary judgment. ( See Children's Facts, Exs. A, G.) Thus, absent any arguments that the Minnesota Life documents and other business records “cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence” at trial, the Court declines to strike Arlene's facts that rely on these documents. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2) (“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”) (emphasis added); see also Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 585 (N.D.Ill.2000) (“[A]lthough the evidence supporting a factual contention need not be admissible itself, it must represent admissible evidence. For example, a deposition transcript is not usually admissible at trial but (obviously) may be used in support of summary judgment; but a hearsay statement made during a deposition does not constitute adequate evidentiary support for a factual proposition.”) (citation omitted).

The Court also declines to strike any of Arlene's facts based on the Children's argument that they contain legal conclusions. To the extent that a purported fact contains a legal conclusion, the Court will not consider it. “Indeed, it is the function of the Court, with or without a motion to strike, to review carefully both statements of material facts and statements of genuine issues and the headings contained therein and to eliminate from consideration any argument, conclusions, and assertions that are unsupported by the documented evidence of record offered in support of the statement.” Prince v. Chi. Public Sch., No. 09–CV–2010, 2011 WL 3755650, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 25, 2011).

The Children's third objection to portions of Arlene's affidavit in support of her Statement of Additional Facts also fails. The Court finds that the affidavit is sufficiently detailed, based on personal experience, and therefore in accordance with Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court denies the Children's motion to strike in its entirety.

II. The undisputed material factsA. The claimants

Allen, whose life insurance policy benefits gave rise to this suit, died on December 2, 2009. (R. 32, Children's Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 11.) Arlene is Allen's surviving spouse. ( Id. 12.) They were married on August 13, 2006. ( Id. ¶ 10.) From at least early 2008 until the time he passed away, Allen and Arlene were involved in marriage counseling on at least a monthly basis. (R. 31, Children's Facts ¶ 21.)

Prior to their marriage, Arlene and Allen entered into an Antenuptial Marital Property Agreement (“Antenuptial Agreement”) on August 8, 2006. (R. 32, Children's Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 8.) The Antenuptial Agreement provides that Allen shall execute a Last Will and Testament bequeathing all property or assets acquired after marriage to Arlene. ( Id. ¶ 16.) The Antenuptial Agreement further provides that it shall be binding upon Allen's heirs, executors, and administrators. ( Id. ¶ 19.)

Tammy, Scott, and Richard are Allen's surviving children. ( Id. ¶¶ 3–5.) Tammy and her two children lived with Allen and Arlene prior to Allen's death. (R. 31, Children's Facts, Ex. J; R. 38, Arlene's Add. Facts ¶ A2.) This living arrangement caused tensions between Tammy, Arlene, and Allen. (R. 38, Arlene's Add. Facts ¶¶ A9–A13.)

B. Allen's other life insurance policies and will

Prior to September 2007, Allen worked for Target Corporation. (R. 27, Arlene's Facts, Ex. P.) Target Corporation offered Allen a life insurance policy and supplemental coverage (the “Target Policies”) as an employee benefit. ( Id. at ML 19–21.) The Target Policies were provided by Minnesota Life. ( Id. at ML 47–49.) The Target Policies were specified in the Antenuptial Agreement as non-marital property. (R. 27, Arlene's Facts, Ex. D at 10.)

After terminating his employment with Target, Allen continued the coverage from the Target Policies. (R. 27, Arlene's Facts, Ex. P at ML 11, 19, 21.) Allen actively managed these policies from 2007 to 2009, changing the beneficiaries and coverage amount of at least one policy. (R. 38, Arlene's Add. Facts ¶¶...