Minneapolis Community Development Agency v. Lake Calhoun Associates, s. 90-5077
| Decision Date | 21 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 90-5077,90-5078,s. 90-5077 |
| Parties | MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Appellant, v. LAKE CALHOUN ASSOCIATES, an Illinois General Partnership, Appellee. MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Appellee, v. LAKE CALHOUN ASSOCIATES, an Illinois General Partnership, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Wayne Popham, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.
Linda Holstein, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Before ARNOLD and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and BENSON, * Senior District Judge.
In this breach of contract action, the Minneapolis Community Development Agency and Lake Calhoun Associates appeal from the district court's 1 rulings on the Agency's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. We affirm.
Lake Calhoun Associates (LCA) is an Illinois general partnership that owns property near Lake Calhoun in Minneapolis. In 1986, LCA asked the Minneapolis Community Development Agency (MCDA) for help in obtaining several easements, owned by private parties, that encumbered the property. Once these easements were obtained, LCA planned to build luxury apartments on the site. The MCDA agreed to create a redevelopment plan and to obtain the easements either by purchase or through eminent domain proceedings. After the Minneapolis City Council approved the redevelopment plan, the MCDA and LCA entered into a contract concerning the acquisition of the easements.
The MCDA began eminent domain proceedings in March 1987. To succeed in such proceedings, the MCDA had to show that the proposed project had a public purpose, that the property to be condemned was located in a blighted area, and that the project was necessary for redevelopment. The Hennepin County District Court dismissed the MCDA's petition, finding that the project mainly benefited LCA and not the public, that the property was not blighted, and that the MCDA had failed to show necessity.
After this dismissal, the MCDA and LCA decided to adopt alternative methods for acquiring the easements. The first method was to appeal the Hennepin County District Court's decision. The second method was to begin new eminent domain proceedings under a different statutory authority. The first approach ended in February 1988 when the MCDA dismissed its appeal. The second approach ended on June 30, 1988, when the MCDA suspended performance under the contract because LCA had not paid the MCDA after repeated requests to do so.
The MCDA thereafter sued LCA in federal district court, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. LCA counterclaimed, alleging breach of the duty of best efforts, anticipatory repudiation, and breach of fiduciary duty. Before trial, the district court dismissed the MCDA's unjust enrichment claim and granted the MCDA's motion for summary judgment on LCA's breach of fiduciary duty claim.
After trial, the jury found that the MCDA had not used its best efforts in attempting to obtain the easements, and awarded LCA $510,000 in damages. The jury also found in favor of LCA on its anticipatory repudiation claim, awarding LCA $1,794,000. The MCDA then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion with regard to the $510,000 best efforts award, but granted the motion with regard to the $1,794,000 anticipatory repudiation award. The district court also granted the motion for a new trial, but only if its JNOV were to be vacated or reversed on appeal.
The MCDA has spent a great deal of time and effort rearguing the facts in this case. These factual issues, however, are not before us. What is before us is the issue of whether the district court properly denied the MCDA's motion for JNOV on LCA's breach of best efforts claim, and whether the district court properly granted JNOV on LCA's anticipatory repudiation claim.
In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for JNOV, we apply the same standard as the district court. Morgan v. Arkansas Gazette, 897 F.2d 945, 948 (8th Cir.1990). This standard requires us to
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, assume that the jury resolved all conflicts of evidence in favor of that party, assume as true all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the facts, and deny the motion, if in light of the foregoing, reasonable jurors could differ as to the conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence.
Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. Dicon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir.1989).
The MCDA argues that the district court improperly denied its motion for JNOV on LCA's breach of best efforts claim. The MCDA proffers two theories in support of its argument. Its first theory, that LCA waived its right to have the MCDA use its best efforts by continuing to pay the MCDA after the unsuccessful condemnation proceedings, is without merit because LCA's payments were not clearly inconsistent with its rights under the contract. The MCDA's second theory is that the evidence fails to show that the MCDA did not use its best efforts to obtain the easements. The MCDA is wrong. The district court noted that there was "very substantial evidence" supporting the jury's finding, and we agree. For example, the MCDA's manager in charge of acquiring property for redevelopment admitted that the MCDA's redevelopment plan, used in the first condemnation proceeding, did not reflect the MCDA's best efforts. The manager also admitted that the MCDA staff person who testified at the condemnation proceeding did not know information crucial to proving that the condemnation was necessary for the planned redevelopment. Therefore, there is evidence such that reasonable jurors could differ on the issue of whether the MCDA used its best efforts in attempting to obtain the easements, and thus the district court properly denied the motion for JNOV on this basis.
In its cross-appeal, LCA argues that the district court improperly granted the MCDA's motion for JNOV with respect to the jury's finding that the MCDA breached the contract by anticipatory repudiation. The district court instructed the jury that to find such a repudiation, it had to find that the MCDA made a clear and positive statement demanding performance from LCA before such performance was due and threatening to stop...
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