Minneapolis General Elec. Co. v. Cronon

• Decision Date: 14 December 1908
• Docket Number: 2,659.
• Citation: 166 F. 651
• Parties: MINNEAPOLIS GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. CRONON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

166 F. 651

MINNEAPOLIS GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. CRONON.

No. 2,659.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

December 14, 1908

Syllabus by the Court

Where the inside wiring for lighting by electricity of a private house, such as a shop, is done under an independent contract with the owner of the building, and is accepted by him and approved by the city inspector as sufficient, such inside wires become the private property of the proprietor of the building, and are subject to his exclusive control. A third party voluntarily and uninvited entering such shop to ascertain the cause of and to extinguish a fire therein is a mere licensee, to whom the company furnishing the electric current to the house owes no obligation other than not to wantonly or knowingly injure him. And where such inside wiring becomes imperfectly insulated by the act of the owner of the building, without notice thereof to the electric company, resulting in injury to such licensee, held not to give a cause of action for such injury against the company in favor of the legal representative of the deceased licensee.

It devolves upon the plaintiff in an action for damages based upon the negligence of the defendant not only to present in his petition a definite theory upon which the negligence is predicated, but to support it by tangible evidence as distinguished from mere conjecture and possibility. Where the evidence leaves the matter uncertain as to which one of several things immediately brought about the injury, for some of which the defendant is answerable and for others he is not, it is error for the court to single out a responsible act and suggest to the jury that they may infer it, without directing their attention to other inferences, more or equally reasonable, exculpatory of the defendant.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is at best uncertain, and should not be applied except where it not only supports the conclusion contended for, but also reasonably excludes all others. It is limited to cases of absolute duty, or an obligation practically amounting to that of an insurer. Held that it cannot be invoked to hold liable an electric company furnishing a current of electricity to a private house connecting with inside wiring owned by and under the exclusive control of the proprietor of the building, for an injury resulting directly from the imperfect insulation and condition of such inside wiring, merely because the electric company is producing and furnishing the dangerous and subtle element of electricity under a contract with the owner of the building.

Clark Hempstead (M. B. Koon, Ralph Whelan, and William H. Bennett on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Arthur H. Noyes (Esli L. Sutton, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and PHILIPS, District Judge.

PHILIPS District Judge.

The writ of error is to have reviewed the judgment of the Circuit Court in awarding defendant in error $3,500 damages, resulting from the death of her husband, James E. Cronon.

About 6 o'clock a.m. on May 24, 1906, the deceased discovered smoke coming from the blacksmith shop of one Victor Nordloff, on Central avenue, in the city of Minneapolis, Minn. This shop was a small frame building of one room, one story in height, standing about 37 feet from the residence of the deceased. Finding the shop locked, Cronon thrust his hand through a broken pane of glass in the window, and, unfastening the window, entered the shop. He discovered that the wall near the window was afire, against which hung, suspended on a nail, an electric wire. This suspended wire was about 12 feet in length, with an incandescent electric bulb at the end, and was used by the blacksmith in shoeing horses and doing other work at nighttime, or when the day was dark. When not so in use the blacksmith hung this wire on a nail driven into the side wall of the shop. After entering the building through the window the deceased called to his wife to bring a pail of water, which she did and passed to him through said open window. He dashed the water on the fire, but failing to extinguish it called for another vessel of water, which his wife brought and passed to him in the same way, and which he threw on the fire with a like result. He then directed her to bring a larger vessel of water. As she turned to go, she testified, she heard him fall, and looking through the window discovered him lying on his back about three feet from said wall, with the end of the electric wire, broken off, grasped in his right hand, his hand resting on his chest. The man she called to the scene passed in through the window and found Cronon dead. The palm of his hand holding the wire was badly burned, indicating that death thus resulted from the electric current, as there was no other mark upon his body indicating contact with the wire.

The evidence of the wife was that when she returned to the window the last time, again placing her hands on the sill, she felt perceptibly an electric shock. This was confirmed by the man who entered through the window. His testimony was that he was working in the railroad yards hard by, and as it had been raining during the night he had on a rubber coat, and with him rubber gloves, which gave sufficient insulation to enable him to pass through the window without feeling any electric shock. As no such appearance of electricity was manifested at the window when the deceased passed and when the wife handed the first two buckets of water through the window, it is evident that the presence of sufficient electricity to be felt at the window did not manifest itself until after the suspended wire was separated from the nail on the wall and its broken end was left unprotected.

The inside wiring of the blacksmith shop was done under an independent contract by the plaintiff in error with the owner of the shop some three years prior to the accident in question, and it was inspected by the city authorities when completed, and accepted as sufficient. This inside wiring then became the private property of the owner of the building. The use of the suspended wire was for his own convenience, and the manner of hanging it against the wooden wall on the nail was of his own selection. From long use the insulating covering of this wire became much worn where it rested on said nail. There was no notice given to the electric company of this condition of the wire. When the blacksmith concluded his work the evening preceding the accident, he left the wire suspended on this nail. He closed and locked the shop and went to his home, and had not returned to his work at the time of the accident. The evidence further shows that the deceased frequented said shop, and had at times assisted the blacksmith in his work, and had knowledge of the use and position of said suspended wire.

The actionable negligence imputed by the petition to the company is as follows:

'That on the 24th day of May, A.D. 1906, and for a long time prior thereto, the above-named defendant had maintained said system or set of wires running into said blacksmith shop, a one-story frame building, known as 930 Central avenue, in the city of Minneapolis, Hennepin county, state of Minnesota, as above described, for lighting purposes, and that such wires had, through the carelessness and negligence of the above-named defendant, become old, defective, and dangerous, the insulation having worn off to a large extent. That the insulation and support of said wires had become, through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant, defective and insufficient, so that they had become crossed and in contact with other wires belonging to said defendant company, or to some other company to this plaintiff unknown, in such a way as to become on the day above set forth highly and dangerously charged with a high and dangerous voltage of electricity, so that early on the morning of the day above set forth, and before the above-named blacksmith, Victor Nordloff, had come to his shop known as 930 Central avenue, said blacksmith shop was set on fire by the defective and improperly insulated wires of said defendant company.'

A correct analysis of the foregoing specifications enforces the conclusion that the gravamen of the complaint is that the negligence of the company refers alone to the imperfect condition of the wires inside the building and the resultant injury therefrom.

The predicate of the charge is that the company had maintained said system or set of wires running into said blacksmith shop; that such wires, through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant, had become old, defective, and dangerous, the insulation having worn off to a large extent. It further avers 'that the insulation and support of said wires had become, through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant, defective and insufficient'; and that by reason of this fact they had become crossed and in contact with other wires of the defendant company or some other company, in such manner as at the time in question to become highly dangerous and charged with a high voltage of electricity. And, to put this construction beyond tolerant debate, it concludes with the statement that 'said blacksmith shop was set on fire by the defective and improperly insulated wires of said defendant company.' So, throughout the trial, and as indicated by the charge of the court, the company was sought to be held responsible for the condition of the wires inside of the shop, as not being in condition to receive the charge of the current at that time sent into the building. The court refused to admit proof offered by the company that the shop was wired under an independent contract, paid for by the shop owner, and it became his property, and under the...