Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Western Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1895
• Parties: MINNEAPOLIS & ST. L. RY. CO. ET AL. v. MINNEAPOLIS WESTERN RY. CO. MINNEAPOLIS WESTERN RY. CO. v. MINNEAPOLIS & ST. L. RY. CO. ET AL. (TWO CASES).
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

61 Minn. 502

63 N.W. 1035

MINNEAPOLIS & ST. L. RY. CO. ET AL.

v.MINNEAPOLIS WESTERN RY. CO.

MINNEAPOLIS WESTERN RY. CO.

v.MINNEAPOLIS & ST. L. RY. CO. ET AL. (TWO CASES).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 28, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. The receiver of an insolvent railroad corporation has no power to institute condemnation proceedings in behalf of the railway company without authority so to do first given by the court in which the receivership proceedings were pending.

2. One railroad company has no authority, under the general statutes of this state, to condemn the lands of another railroad company occupied or used or necessary for the prosecution of its railroad business, except for crossing purposes. A general power to exercise the right of eminent domain gives no such authority.

3. The fact that the appellant railway company has used and occupied the premises under a revocable license from the owner, before the respondent company purchased them, gives the former no special or additional rights to condemn the premises, such condemnation not having been instituted until after the appellant company has acquired them, and until after the final determination of the ejectment suit brought against it by the respondent company.

4. Buck, J., is of the opinion: (1) That the receiver of an insolvent railroad corporation has no legal power to institute condemnation proceedings. (2) That under the constitution the power of the court is purely judicial, and that where an insolvent railroad company is in the hands of a receiver, under the control of the court, it has no inherent power to authorize the institution of condemnation proceedings by the receiver, or to extend or build additional lines, and where it does so it is a usurpation of power, and void for want of jurisdiction.

Appeals from district court, Hennepin county; Seagrave Smith, Judge.

Applications by the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company and W. H. Truesdale, receiver, against the Minneapolis Western Railway Company, for the condemnation of lands and for an injunction. From judgments for respondent, applicants appeal. Affirmed.

Albert E. Clarke and W. F. Booth, for appellants.

W. E. Dodge, for respondent.

BUCK, J.

There are three appeals before this court upon the same subject-matter, and which, by the agreement of the parties, are to be considered together, as each is dependent upon the other, and the question at issue cannot be well understood and determined without reference to the record in all. There does not appear to be much controversy as to the facts. The question involved in the appeals is whether the appellant railway company has the right to condemn certain land for railroad use.

These appeals came before this court from the following described proceedings: First. A petition in the ejectment case brought by the Minneapolis Western Railway Company against the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company and others, whereby the last-named company and its receiver asks to have what is known in the record as the “33-feet strip” condemned, so that it may use such strip jointly with this respondent. Second. A petition by the appellant to condemn the right of way for the joint use of the parties over what is described as the “trestle tracks.” Third. A petition made by the appellants for an order restraining respondents from ejecting the appellants from the premises referred to as the “33-feet strip” and the “trestle tracks,” pending the hearing upon the petitions to condemn. Upon all of these proceedings the court below decided against these appellants.

The premises in controversy are situate in the city of Minneapolis, and near or adjacent to a large number of mills and elevators, and the railroad tracks thereon furnish facilities for the transportation business done by these mills and elevators. At all times between the year 1872 and June 13, 1891, the legal title to the premises was in the Minneapolis Mill Company, a corporation with its principal place of business at the city of Minneapolis. The appellant railroad company, with the consent of the mill company, entered upon the so-called “33-feet strip,” and constructed its railroad tracks thereon, in the years 1875 and 1876, and has ever since maintained its tracks thereon, and operated its cars over said tracks, although it never had any title to the premises. On June 13, 1891, the Minneapolis Mill Company executed and delivered to the Minneapolis Western Railway Company a deed of the premises in controversy; but, the description in the deed not being satisfactory, another deed of the premises was executed by the same grantors and delivered to same grantee on the 13th day of October, 1891, and on the last-named day the grantee above named made demand for possession of the premises, which being refused it brought an ejectment suit to recover possession thereof on January 22, 1892. This 33-feet strip is not a part of the main line of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company, but a branch or side track extending from its main line alongside of the mills and elevators above referred to. The trestle tracks are an extension of the 33-feet strip, and these tracks were built by the mill company, although used by the appellant railroad company for the same purpose as the other tracks. The ejectment suit was brought to recover possession of the 33-feet strip, and upon trial the court found in favor of the plaintiff, and upon appeal to this court the judgment was affirmed.

It appeared that the appellant railroad company was merely a parol licensee of the mill company during the whole time that it operated its cars over the tracks upon said 33-feet strip, and that the mill company had a right to terminate at any time and did terminate the license on June 13, 1891. After the decision of the case in this court the appellant railroad then sought to have the premises condemned for its right of way by proceedings attempted by it in the same ejectment suit, after two trials and final judgment, as we understand the whole record. We assume that this attempt to have the land condemned for railroad purposes was made pursuant to Gen. St. 1878, c. 34, §§ 33-36 (Gen. St. 1894, c. 34, §§ 2657-2660), which provide for ascertaining the compensation for lands taken by a railroad company, pending and by proceedings incident to an action in ejectment by the landowner against the railroad company. All of the questions raised in this proceeding and by the restraining order and the attempt to condemn the trestle tracks finally resolve themselves into the question of whether the appellant railway company has the right to condemn both pieces of land for railroad use.

The court below based its decision upon the ground that the right of the petitioners to condemn the right of way over...