Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wis.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1913
• Citation: 153 Wis. 552,141 N.W. 1119
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN ET AL.

153 Wis. 552

141 N.W. 1119

MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. CO.

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 31, 1913.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dane County; E. Ray Stevens, Judge.

Action by the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin and Ella Torvalson against the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Timlin and Kerwin, JJ., dissenting.

Action involving the question of whether railway employees, outside of those “working in shops or offices,” are within the protection of chapter 50, Laws of 1911, commonly called the Workmen's Compensation Act, now section 2394--1 to section 2394--31, inclusive, of the Statutes.

Torger Torvalson, an employee of the plaintiff and not working in a shop or office, while in the line of his duty, July 24, 1912, was accidently killed. Prior thereto and in due course, the defendant elected to accept the provisions of chapter 50 aforesaid by filing with the Industrial Commission its election in this form:

“Take notice that the undersigned employer of labor in Wisconsin accepts the provisions of chapter 50, Laws of 1911, Wisconsin Statutes.

Number of employees 1250--number varies somewhat from time to time.

Location of place of employment--Milwaukee, Fond du Lac, Stevens Point and other places.

Nature of employment--Miscellaneous office work, shop work, repairing cars, etc.

Dated at Milwaukee this 31st day of May, 1912.”

The defendant, in addition to filing the election as stated, complied with all the conditions of the law essential to bring itself therein so far as it was competent to do so.

In due course, after the accident, Ella Torvalson, a widow of the deceased and mother of three children by him, aged six, four and two years, respectively, duly made claim for such compensation as she and her family were entitled to under the law. Thereupon, the question was raised as to whether the Compensation Act extended to railway employees, other than those “working in shops or offices.” The decision was in the affirmative. Thereupon the railway company commenced this action in the circuit court for Dane county to review the question so decided, resulting in the conclusion of the Commission being affirmed. This appeal is from the judgment.W. A. Hayes, of Milwaukee (John L. Erdall, of Minneapolis, Minn., of counsel), for appellant.

W. C. Owen, Atty. Gen., and Byron H. Stebbins, First Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

MARSHALL, J.

[1] The only question of any moment presented for decision is, whether it is competent for a railroad company to accept the provisions of the statute aforesaid, except as to its employees “working in shops or offices.” It is appreciated that at the time appellant filed its election, it was commonly thought, that such competence did not exist. Though appellant's election was general in terms with special reference to employees working in shops or offices, doubtless, as its counsel frankly confesses was the fact, it intended to accept the compensation act to the fullest extent of its competency. The form used was furnished by the Industrial Commission. It used words of election, in general, to come under the act, as the law provides, followed by specifications as to the number of its employees, the kind of service and where the labor was being performed. The additional features were mere matters of administration. They were not intended by the Commission nor by appellant to limit the words of acceptance. Moreover, the law makes no provision for any such limitation. Therefore, we have no hesitancy in affirming the decision of the circuit court, that all of appellant's employees were included in the election if the law authorized it. There is, really, no contest on this point; but, if it were otherwise, there would hardly be room for reasonable doubt, that the Commission and the circuit court reached the correct conclusion. The question seems to be raised now merely for the purpose of having this court formally pass thereon.

Whether the compensation act extends to all railway employees, is of very great interest, because of the large number of persons affected, the hazardous nature of the employment, the manifest public policy to make such provisions for repairing the injuries to all employees so far as practicable, the evident justice of it, not as matter of charity but as matter of humanity and right both to the living and the dead and as matter of wise public economy as well, to the end that the maimed in service and the surviving widows and orphans and other dependents of those whose service result in fatal injuries should have their losses reasonably dealt with as matter of general concern. No movement in any age has made more for the elimination of waste and the economical application of personal injury cost of production and distribution of those things which are necessary for or administer to legitimate human desires, where it belongs, and to where it must inevitably go as a final resting place, than laws of which the one in question is a distinguished type,--a crystallization, as has been said before, into legal obligation of moral duty and economic truth. The conception and appreciation thereof is such among the nations of the world that the countries which have no such system are exceptional, and consciousness of the justice and necessity therefor is confessed, in general, by all mankind where the dignity of labor has its merited significance.

In view of what has been said, that the greatest of our industries,--the one for which such a law as the one in question is manifestly most needed, and it would seem most desired, by employers, employee and the public, should be left out of the scope of its beneficent provisions, would challenge attention as strange, “passing strange.” In the circumstances we face, the inclination, if not the duty, would be to include the industry rather than to exclude it by construction, if the meaning of the law must be read out of obscurity. It would seem almost unbelievable that the Legislature, in providing a system to lay the burdens of personal injury losses where they will be as soon as practicable absorbed into the products of industry, left out the most significant class, by far, of the object of solicitude.

[2] We must confess the idea has been prevalent that the Compensation Act was not intended to apply to railway employees, in general. That has come about, doubtless, from a sentiment which grew up while the act was under consideration in the Legislature, based, largely, on a lay understanding of the classification of railway employees into those engaged in shops or offices and all others found in the first part of the act, and the indifference of, or opposition from, some of the employees as well as employers, before the special committee which prepared the bill and before other legislative committees. Somehow, but just how, no one seems to comprehend, the air so to speak, became, during the progress of the act through the Legislature, charged with the idea that there was some specialization as to railway employees, and that, supplemented with the fact of railway employers having kept aloof from the matter until appellant chose to raise the question, seems to have caused more or less of a conviction that the general class of railway employees were not within the benefits of the law.

Notwithstanding that, upon the first occasion of the question being presented to the Commission for decision over a year after the enactment took effect, a decision seems to have been readily reached that the law, as regards its compensation features, in letter and spirit, includes, and was intended to include, all railway employees, and the learned circuit court reached the same conclusion. It does not seem that either the Commission or the trial court considered that it was required to solve any ambiguity in reaching that conclusion. If that be right, it is not the first time a wrong idea, produced by the atmosphere characterizing an enactment, and the harmony therewith for a long period of time, have taken hold of the public mind so as to produce quite a settled conclusion as to legislative intent, and the creation of a condition, which, after careful search when such was required, was not found, in fact, to be either in the letter or spirit, or intent, of the enactment; a significant instance being the conception of the Primary Election Law, that it rendered unlawful the holding of a political party delegate convention as a step in placing a choice of candidates on the primary ballot.

We have been constrained to remark as above, to show that we have not been unmindful of the general idea which has prevailed as to the scope of the Compensation Act. It is proper, in fact it seems a duty, to take notice of that, so far as we might otherwise be led to a too hasty conclusion as to the meaning of the law, looking only at its seemingly plain words in the light of the hope which was vitalized in its enactment and which grows with experience. The sentiments characterizing a law might have some influence to create obscurity, where otherwise it would not exist, but if after all, we find, as the circuit judge and the Commission did, the words of the act plain and the legislative purpose manifest, a contrary conception of it, however produced, cannot legitimately be permitted to create an obscurity to be cleared up by construction, influenced by the history of the legislative labors which constructed the law. A law, plain in its letter, may be obscure when applied to the subject with which it deals. The result may be absurd, or so harsh or unreasonable, as to produce conviction that the literal meaning is not the real purpose. But plain legislative language cannot well be rendered ambiguous by applying to it the mere direction given to public thought by events characterizing the enactment.

[3] The bill, as it was...