Minneapolis, St Paul Sault Ste Marie Railway Company v. Michael Popplar

• Citation: 59 L.Ed. 1000,35 S.Ct. 609,237 U.S. 369
• Decision Date: 26 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 223,223
• Parties: MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. MICHAEL A. POPPLAR, as Administrator of the Estate of Richard S. Popplar, Deceased
• Court: United States Supreme Court

237 U.S. 369

35 S.Ct. 609

59 L.Ed. 1000

MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v MICHAEL A. POPPLAR, as Administrator of the Estate of Richard S. Popplar, Deceased.

No. 223.

Argued and submitted April 14, 1915.

Decided April 26, 1915.

Messrs. M. D. Munn, A. H. Bright, and J. L. Erdall for plaintiff in error.

Mr Samuel A. Anderson for defendant in error.

Memorandum opinion by direction of the court, by Mr. Justice Hughes:

This action was brought in the state court by an administrator to recover damages for an injury causing the death of the intestate. The injury was received (September 6, 1909) by the decedent, a brakeman, while he was un- coupling a car which was being 'kicked' to a siding, and recovery was sought because of noncompliance with the Federal safety appliance act. 27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8605, 32 Stat. at L. 943, chap. 976, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8613. Upon the trial a motion was made for a direction of a verdict upon the grounds that the evidence failed to show neglect on the part of the railroad company, and did establish contributory negligence. Apart from the exception to the denial of this motion, there were no exceptions to the instructions given to the jury. There was a finding for the plaintiff, and the railroad company moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial; the motions were denied. The supreme court of the state affirmed the judgment. 121 Minn. 413, 141 N. W. 798, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 383.

There was testimony that the decedent, on giving the stop signal, attempted to uncouple the 'head car' that was to be left to run of its own momentum on the siding; he tried repeatedly to do this by pulling the coupling pin with the lifter at the end of the next car, but without success, and then, stepping between the two cars, while they were moving at the rate of about 4 miles an hour, in order to effect the uncoupling by hand, he was run over and killed. The conductor, a witness for the company, who examined the coupling apparatus soon after the accident, testified that it worked with difficulty and that he would have reported it as a 'bad coupler' had it been brought to his attention. Without going into the evidence in detail, it is sufficient to say that we find no ground for reversal in the ruling that there was enough to go to the jury upon the question whether, in fact, the coupler was defective. See Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Padgett, March 22, 1915 [236 U.S. 668, 59 L. ed. ——, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481].

It is urged that the right of recovery was barred by reason of the fact that the decedent disobeyed a rule of the company which forbade him from going between moving cars. The state court held that the jury might find that a practical necessity existed for the disobedience of this rule, and that the course which the decedent followed in the emergency was that of a reasonably prudent man. Our power to review the judgment is controlled by § 237 of the Judicial Code [36 Stat. at L. 1156, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1214] (Rev. Stat. 709), and we may not consider questions which are not Federal in character. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 291, 52 L. ed. 1061, 1066, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Duvall, 255 U. S. 477, 487, 56 L. ed. 1171, 1176, 32...