Minnesota Chippewa Tribal Housing Corp. v. Reese

• Decision Date: 27 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 5-95-169(RLE).,CIV. 5-95-169(RLE).
• Citation: 978 F.Supp. 1258
• Parties: MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBAL HOUSING CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. Walter F. REESE and Linda Reese, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

978 F.Supp. 1258

MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBAL HOUSING CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. Walter F. REESE and Linda Reese, Defendants.

No. CIV. 5-95-169(RLE).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fifth Division.

March 27, 1997.

Larry A. Kimball, Walker, MN, for plaintiff.

Defendants, pro se.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

ERICKSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the consent of the parties, as authorized by Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), upon the Motion of the Defendants to Dismiss, and upon the Court's request of the parties to brief the issue of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

The issues have been considered by the Court upon the parties' written submissions and, for these purposes, the Plaintiff Minnesota Chippewa Tribal Housing Corporation ("MCTHC") has appeared by Larry A. Kimball, Esq., and the Defendants have appeared pro se.

For reasons which follow, the Defendants' Motion is denied, and we dismiss this action, sua sponte, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

By a lease dated February 24, 1977, the Defendants, who are members of the Leech Lake Band of Minnesota Chippewa Indians ("Leech Lake Band"), leased land held in trust by the United States government on behalf of the Leech Lake Band. Memorandum in Support of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, at 1. The lease has a term of 25 years and was approved by the Minneapolis Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). See, Title 25 U.S.C. § 415(a); Lease, attached as Exhibit B, Memorandum in Support of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction. The express purpose of the lease was "to enable [the Defendants] to obtain a loan from [the MCTHC], under the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency Act (Section 16 of the 1976 Minnesota Session Laws, Chapter 254), to make improvements on the lease premises."¹ Id. By that lease, the Leech Lake Band further granted the Defendants permission to convey to the MCTHC "a real estate mortgage covering [the Defendants'] leasehold interest," and improvements "which may be constructed thereon." Id.

The MCTHC is a corporation that is engaged in the administration of State and Federal funds for the creation and maintenance of housing for low income residents at the Leech Lake, White Earth, Bois Forte, Fond du Lac, Mille Lacs and Grand Portage Reservations. The Board of Directors of the MCTHC consists of members of the respective tribal councils. On or about April 21, 1977, the Defendants executed and delivered a note and mortgage in favor of the MCTHC, in return for $32,154. Note, attached as Exhibit A, Complaint. The note specifies repayment in 360 monthly installments of $144.39.²

The Defendants are alleged to have failed to perform under the loan agreement, and the MCTHC commenced an action in Minnesota State Court to foreclose on the mortgage. On September 24, 1991, the Court entered judgment on behalf of the MCTHC and against the Defendants and, according to the MCTHC, awarded to it the amount of the unpaid loan, plus interest, and "all right, title and interest in and to the dwelling." Memorandum in Support of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, at 2. In December of 1991, the MCTHC commenced an unlawful detainer action to physically remove the Defendants from the premises. Prior to a resolution of that action, however, the parties purportedly reached an "accord and satisfaction whereby Defendants would remit the sum of $4,267 for arrearages (sic) and enter into a rental agreement." Complaint. According to the MCTHC, the Defendants refused to execute the rental agreement, and made no further payments. Id.

In June of 1992, the MCTHC commenced a second unlawful detainer action in Minnesota State District Court. In response, the Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On October 9, 1992, the Court dismissed the unlawful detainer action with prejudice, and vacated "[t]hat portion of the judgment entered in the mortgage foreclosure action which purported to adjudicate the right to possession of the property in question." Minnesota Chippewa Tribal Housing Corporation v. Reese, Nos. CO-92-420 and C2-91-628 (Minn.Dis.Ct. October 9, 1992), attached to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Citing Title 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b), the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction "to adjudicate the right of ownership or possession of any interest in property held in trust by the United States for any Indian person or tribe."³ Id.

In October of 1993, the MCTHC, rather than appealing the State District Court determination, commenced an unlawful detainer action in the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Tribal Court. The MCTHC dismissed that action, however, without prejudice, on December 23, 1993. According to the MCTHC, "it became evident that the Leech Lake Tribal Court had no procedural or substantive provisions that would allow an unlawful detainer action, or any other civil action other than prosecution of game and fish violations on the Reservation." Memorandum in Support of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, at 3; Notice of Dismissal, attached to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The MCTHC commenced this action on August 8, 1995. In its Complaint, the MCTHC "claims possession" of the property, on the ground that "[t]he Defendants have failed to perform under either the original loan agreement, or the subsequent accord and satisfaction agreement, and refuse to quit the premises." Complaint. For relief, the MCTHC demands "restitution of said premises," and the sum of $10,947. Presumably, the figure is derived from calculating 41 payments at $267, which, in the view of the MCTHC, is a reasonable rental value for the property.

On July 3, 1996, more than four months after the Dispositive Motion deadline, and in excess of two months after the case had been certified "Ready for Trial," the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Notwithstanding the express directive contained in the Pretrial Order, the Defendants did not request that we modify the Dispositive Motion deadline, nor did the Defendants provide any explanation for the substantial delay in the filing of their Motion. By Order dated October 15, 1996, we directed the Defendants to show cause, by no later than November 1, 1996, why this Court should consider those arguments, which do not relate to the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court, and which were belatedly raised in their Motion to Dismiss. On November 7, 1996, the Defendants informally moved for an extension of time in which to reply to our October 15 Order and, on November 22, 1996, we granted the Defendants until December 15, 1996, within which to file their responses. To date, we have not received a response from the Defendants, let alone a showing of good cause that the dispositive motion deadline could not have been met "despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." See, Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendment to Rule 16. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.⁴

Additionally, in view of our uncertainty as to our jurisdiction to hear this action, we instructed, sua sponte, the parties to brief the issue of our subject matter jurisdiction. The parties have submitted supplemental briefing and, as a consequence, the jurisdictional issue is now ripe for determination.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review. As a Federal Court, we have limited jurisdiction and may only hear matters which fall within our jurisdictional limits. Marine Equipment Management Co. v. U.S., 4 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir.1993) ("Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction and have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.") As a consequence, we have a primordial duty, in every case before us, to inquire whether the vital prerequisite of subject matter jurisdiction has been satisfied. Bradley v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 962 F.2d 800, 802 n. 3 (8th Cir.1992); Thomas v. Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 523 (8th Cir.1991); Woodke v. Dahm, 873 F.Supp. 179, 185 (N.D.Iowa 1995), aff'd, 70 F.3d 983 (8th Cir.1995). Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold consideration the Court has "broader power to decide its own right to hear the case than it has when the merits of the case are reached." Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir.1993), quoting Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 1049, 127 L.Ed.2d 371 (1994); see also, Bueford v. Resolution Trust Corp., 991 F.2d 481, 485 (8th Cir.1993) ("Lack of subject matter jurisdiction * * * cannot be waived[;][it] may be raised at any time by a party to an action, or by the court sua sponte,"); Redman v. F.A.A., 759 F.Supp. 1384, 1387 (D.Minn. 1991); Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a Federal District Court has "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." "It is well settled that this statutory grant of `jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.'" National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 850, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 2450-2451, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 1391, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972); Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8th Cir.1980); Vizenor v. Babbitt, 927 F.Supp. 1193, 1199 n. 3 (D.Minn.1996). Although a plaintiff need not base his claim on a Federal statute or a constitutional provision, he must "assert a claim `arising under' federal law." National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, supra 471 U.S. at 850, 105 S.Ct. at 2451. As the Supreme Court has succinctly explained, "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." Id. at 850-51, 105 S.Ct. at 2451, quoting American...