Minnesota, ex rel. Hatch v. Hoeven

Decision Date17 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. A1-04-021.,A1-04-021.
Citation331 F.Supp.2d 1074
PartiesState of MINNESOTA, by its Attorney General Mike HATCH, and Collin Peterson, Starkey Grove, and Charles Orvik, Plaintiffs, v. John HOEVEN, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Dakota, and Dean C. Hildebrand, in his official capacity as Director of the North Dakota Game and Fish Department, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of North Dakota

Harry Sieben, Jr., Sieben, Grose, Von Holtum, McCoy & Carey, Minneapolis, MN, Lawrence W. Pry, MN Attorney General's Office, St Paul, MN, for Plaintiffs.

Paul Craig Germolus, Attorney General's Office, Bismarck, ND, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

HOVLAND, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed on May 10, 2004. This motion concerns the issues of whether the Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims in federal court and whether the Defendants can assert the defense of sovereign immunity. The merits of the claims being asserted by the Plaintiffs are not before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of legislative and administrative changes North Dakota made to its hunting regulations prior to the 2003 waterfowl hunting season. On March 10, 2004, the State of Minnesota filed suit against North Dakota's Governor, John Hoeven, and the Director of the North Dakota Game & Fish Department, Dean Hildebrand, alleging that the newly adopted regulations violate the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. On April 8, 2004, Minnesota amended its complaint to add three individual plaintiffs: Collin Peterson, Starkey Grove, and Charles Orvik. The amended complaint added alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The amended complaint sets forth five counts. Count One alleges that a July 2003 gubernatorial proclamation1 barring non-resident hunting during the first week of waterfowl season violates the Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Two alleges that a statutory provision2 eliminating statewide non-resident waterfowl licenses and requiring non-residents to hunt waterfowl in zones specified by the governor's proclamation violates the Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Three alleges that other statutory provisions3 requiring non-residents to obtain a small game and waterfowl license to hunt on land they own or lease violates the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Four alleges that a statutory provision4 prohibiting non-residents from hunting on Game & Fish Department controlled lands during the first seven days of the pheasant hunting season violates the Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Five alleges that statutory provisions5 imposing higher non-resident waterfowl license fees violates the Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare North Dakota's regulations of migratory waterfowl hunting unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs also ask that the Defendants be permanently enjoined from enforcing discriminatory waterfowl hunting and licensing provisions.

On May 10, 2004, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims under the Commerce Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by sovereign immunity.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Unlike a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6), courts may consider matters outside the pleadings. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir.1990). The Court notes the parties have not submitted any affidavits or exhibits for the Court's review. In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept all of the factual allegations set out in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Faibisch v. University of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir.2002). Dismissal for failure to state a claim will only be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

A. STANDING

In its motion to dismiss, the Defendants argue that both the State of Minnesota and the individual plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims. The Defendants assert that Minnesota has failed to allege a sufficient injury to its quasi-sovereign interests. The Defendants also assert that the individual plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury in fact to a legally protected interest.

"In every federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to prosecute the action." Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). "In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute." Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). "The doctrine of standing is `an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), which itself `defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded.'" Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)).

Three requirements constitute the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing. "First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an `injury in fact,' which is `concrete,' `distinct and palpable,' and actual or imminent." McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 707, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). "Second, a plaintiff must establish `a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be "fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] some third party not before the court."'" McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 707, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976))). "Third, a plaintiff must show the `substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact." McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 707, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000)).

"At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). It is important to note that an inquiry into standing is not a review of the merits of the plaintiff's claims. Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority, 342 F.3d 871, 878 (8th Cir.2003).

1. STATE OF MINNESOTA

The State of Minnesota brought this suit on behalf of its residents in its capacity as parens patriae. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 40. Minnesota seeks to "vindicate its interest and that of its citizens in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system." Id. at ¶ 40. The Defendants contend Minnesota has not alleged a sufficient "quasi-sovereign" interest at stake in this litigation.

a. PARENS PATRIAE

To successfully assert the parens patriae doctrine, a "State must assert an injury to what has been characterized as a `quasi-sovereign' interest, which is a judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). Quasi-sovereign interests "consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace." Id. at 602, 102 S.Ct. 3260. Quasi-sovereign interests generally fall into two categories. "First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being — both physical and economic — of its residents in general." Id. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260. "Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system." Id. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260.

The Defendants assert that Minnesota has not alleged a threat to the health, comfort, and welfare of its citizens. It is clear from a review of the complaint that Minnesota is not relying on its interest in its citizens' health and well-being in asserting its parens patriae power.

However, Minnesota has asserted that its citizens have suffered an injury to their legally protected interest in the right to travel. The Defendants contend that Minnesota's attempt to assert parens patriae standing fails for two reasons: (1) Minnesota has no rightful status to dictate how another state manages its...

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  • Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Hoeven, A1-04-021.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota
    • June 8, 2005
    ...were barred by sovereign immunity. On August 17, 2004, the Court denied North Dakota's motion to dismiss. Minnesota, ex rel. Hatch v. Hoeven, 331 F.Supp.2d 1074 (D.N.D.2004). On January 27, 2005, Minnesota filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that North Dakota's waterfowl hunting r......

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