Minnesota State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd

• Citation: 241 N.W.2d 624,308 Minn. 24
• Decision Date: 26 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 45644,45644
• Parties: MINNESOTA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH, By Warren R. LAWSON, M.D., Petitioner, Respondent, v. CITY OF BRAINERD, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 624

241 N.W.2d 624

308 Minn. 24

MINNESOTA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH, By Warren R. LAWSON, M.D., Petitioner, Respondent, v. CITY OF BRAINERD, et al., Appellants.

No. 45644.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 26, 1976.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Appellant city of Brainerd is not barred by doctrine of res judicata where it was only a nominal party in first action and where its duty to affirmatively represent the will of its citizens was subsequently activated by public referendum.

2. Brainerd has standing to challenge constitutionality of a statute where the statute has a specific adverse effect upon the city and involves a question of substantial public interest to its citizens.

3. In light of the substantial public health benefit of fluoridation and its innocuous effect on the individual, fluoridation of the public drinking water is a justified intrusion into an individual's bodily integrity; and, accordingly, we find the Minnesota Fluoridation Law, Minn.St. 144.145, to be constitutional.

4. A governmental subdivision is not a 'person' for purposes of the due process clause; and therefore, the fact that fluoridation may require a city to incur expense in remedying, or even replacing, its present filtration system does not afford it a constitutional right to a due process hearing.

John Remington Graham, Minneapolis, D. A. Larson, City Atty., Brainerd, for appellants.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Peter W. Sipkins, Sol. Gen., Richard G. Mark, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard A. Wexler, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc.

MacLAUGHLIN, Justice.

The issue on this appeal is whether the appellant city of Brainerd must fluoridate its municipal water supply in compliance with Minn.St. 144.145. The trial court rejected appellants' arguments that the statute is unconstitutional and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding Brainerd to comply with the law. We affirm.

In 1967, the Minnesota Legislature enacted what is commonly referred to as the Minnesota Fluoridation Law, Minn.St. 144.145. The statute required that prior to January 1, 1970,--

'* * * the person, firm, corporation, or municipality having jurisdiction over a municipal water supply, whether publicly or privately owned or operated, shall control the quantities of fluoride in the water so as to maintain a fluoride content prescribed by the state board of health.'

In 1969, the Minnesota State Board of Health adopted regulations which require that the fluoride content of municipal water supplies be maintained at an average concentration of 1.2 milligrams per liter. Minn.Reg.1969 MHD 112(b) (now Minn.Reg. MHD 138).

In 1972, Minnesotans Opposed to Forced Fluoridation (MOFF), a private nonprofit corporation, sought an injunction against enforcement of the fluoridation statute in the city of Brainerd. The city of Brainerd and the Minnesota State Board of Health were named as defendants. In that action the trial court found the fluoridation law to be a valid exercise of legislative authority which did not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens of the state nor constitute pollution within the meaning of the Environmental Rights Act. The court therefore denied the injunction and no appeal was taken.

After this decision, the Minnesota State Board of Health attempted to persuade Brainerd to fluoridate its water. During this time the city of Brainerd held a special referendum which resulted in a vote of 1,863 to 199 against fluoridation and a vote of 1,697 to 325 in favor of holding a 'convention of the people' to 'deliberate on the constitutionality of forced fluoridation.' The total membership of the 'convention of the people' was the mayor, members of the city council, and members of the water and light board of the city of Brainerd. On July 5, 1974, this convention declared § 144.145 and Minn.Reg.1969 MHD 112(b) to be an unconstitutional invasion of individual rights.

On September 5, 1974, the State Board of Health filed a petition for a writ of mandamus after a previous petition was dismissed for insufficient pleading. Appellants answered the petition, and respondent moved for judgment on the pleadings. On December 5, 1974, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus. In its memorandum the trial court concluded that appellants were barred by the judgment in the MOFF proceeding from relitigating the validity of the fluoridation law. The trial court further found that the fluoridation law was not nullified by the Brainerd convention, that the city was not entitled to an administrative hearing prior to fluoridation, and that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel Brainerd to comply with the law. The city of Brainerd and its officials appeal this decision.

1. The major issue raised on this appeal is whether the Minnesota Fluoridation Law is constitutional. However, respondent first questions whether the city of Brainerd may properly raise such a challenge. Respondent contends that Brainerd is barred under the doctrine of res judicata from bringing this action since Brainerd was a party in MOFF v. City of Brainerd and Minnesota State Board of Health, in which the constitutionality of the fluoridation law was upheld. In that case, MOFF sought an injunction against the fluoridation of Brainerd's water supply naming the city of Brainerd as one of the defendants in the action. The trial court denied the injunction, and no appeal was taken. In the current action, the State Board of Health seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the city of Brainerd to fluoridate its water supply pursuant to the statute and regulation. The trial court concluded that Brainerd may not now oppose the fluoridation since it had the 'opportunity and * * incentive' to voice any objection it had in the MOFF proceedings; and even though it failed to do so, it is nevertheless bound by that judgment.

We have observed that res judicata--

'* * * operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action, concluding the parties and their privies not only as to every matter that was litigated but also as to any other claim or defense which might have been litigated.' Howe v. Nelson, 271 Minn. 296, 301, 135 N.W.2d 687, 691 (1965).

This rule is based upon 'considerations of public policy which demand an end to litigation where a party has had a full, free, and untrammeled opportunity to present facts pertinent to a decisive issue.' Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 520, 131 N.W.2d 741, 745 (1964).

Although it is a close question, we conclude that Brainerd did not have such an opportunity. It must be remembered that Brainerd was merely a nominal party in the first action and appeared solely in its capacity as proprietor of the water supply. Since the first trial, the referendum by the people of Brainerd has activated the city's duty to affirmatively represent the will of its citizens. Had the referendum occurred prior to the time of the first action, Brainerd would certainly have actively taken part in support of MOFF's position for an injunction against compulsory fluoridation of its water supply. While the question is not free from doubt, we have decided, because of the obvious public purpose to be served by a decision of this case on its merits, that Brainerd is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. ¹

2. Respondent also argues that appellant city of Brainerd, as a public body acting through public officials, is without standing to challenge the constitutionality of the fluoridation statute. In State ex rel Clinton Falls Nursery Co. v. County of Steele, 181 Minn. 427, 430, 232 N.W. 737, 738 (1930), we stated:

'* * * The better doctrine supported by the weight of authority is that (a public) official so charged with the performance of a ministerial duty will not be allowed to question the constitutionality of such a law. * * * Officials acting ministerially are not clothed with judicial authority. To permit them to refuse to perform their duty on the ground that the commanding law is unconstitutional would be a dangerous practice in that they who have only ministerial duties would be raising questions affecting the rights of third persons while they themselves would have no direct interest in the question and could not in any event be made responsible.'

However, we added (181 Minn. 431, 232 N.W. 738):

'There is found among the authorities a well recognized exception to the foregoing rule when the rights of the state or the public interest are involved.'

See, also, Elwell v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974).

In Commr. of Taxation v. Crow Wing County, 275 Minn. 9, 13, 144 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1966), we recognized a second exception:

'* * * In our view the interest required to give standing to a political subdivision must be one predicated upon some adverse effect upon the governmental unit.'

See, also, Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 301 Minn. 137, 222 N.W.2d 523 (1974).

We hold that the city of Brainerd has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the fluoridation law under either of the above two exceptions. First, the question of fluoridating the drinking water of Brainerd involves a question of substantial public interest to the people of Brainerd. In view of Brainerd's overall responsibility for providing safe and satisfactory water to its citizens, it is proper that the city have standing to challenge the statute in the public interest. Second, it is alleged by Brainerd that the fluoridation statute has a specific adverse effect upon the city of Brainerd in that it threatens to destroy the city's water filtration system. Thus, Brainerd, in its capacity as proprietor of the water supply, has a very specific and concrete interest in challenging the validity of the statute. Finally, it must be remembered that the standing doctrine is primarily designed to guarantee that there is a sufficient case or controversy...