Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson

Citation91 Minn. 30
Decision Date04 December 1903
Docket NumberNos. 13,565 - (7).,s. 13,565 - (7).
PartiesMINNESOTA SUGAR COMPANY v. SAMUEL G. IVERSON.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Douglas A. Fiske, Ell Torrance, and Childs, Edgerton & Wickwire, for petitioner.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

W. B. Douglas, Attorney General, for respondent.

COLLINS, J.

At the last term of this court the petitioner herein applied for a writ of certiorari directed to the State Auditor, and requiring him to transmit certified copies of the records of his office, and all of the reports theretofore made to him, and all other papers relating to the claim of the petitioner for a bounty upon sugar manufactured by it during the year 1900, which bounty, it was asserted, was due from the state under the provisions of Laws 1895, p. 490 (c. 205) as amended by Laws 1899, p. 389 (c. 307). Upon the return to the order to show cause, and a stipulation, we directed that the writ issue as prayed for, but deferred stating our reasons for so determining until the question arising upon the return should be presented for decision. The return having been made, the cause was set down for argument upon the merits, and has been duly presented and submitted by counsel for the respective parties.

We shall first express our views on the right of the petitioner to the writ. In State v. Clough, 64 Minn. 378, 67 N. W. 202, it was stated that to render the proceedings of special tribunals, commissioners, or ministerial officers judicial in their nature, they must affect the rights and property of a citizen in a manner analogous to that in which such rights are affected by the proceedings of courts acting judicially. Further discussion in that opinion was merely elaborative of the above concise proposition. The perplexity in determining whether or not certiorari will lie in any given case arises out of the difficulty in distinguishing between legislative, executive, or ministerial acts, and those of a judicial nature, in which an officer, commissioner, or a special tribunal is called upon to act in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity. This is the chief distinguishing test, as is conceded by the Attorney General. If the determination of the tribunal or the officer called upon to act affects the rights or property of a citizen analogous to the manner in which they are affected by proceedings or decisions of courts acting judicially, the proceedings in question are of a judicial nature, and the writ will lie. If they do not so affect rights or property, the determination in question must be considered as ministerial, legislative, or administrative, as the case may be, and so treated by the courts. The character of the office or tribunal does not determine the question, but, rather, the nature of the act performed.

Under the 1899 statute the State Auditor is made the officer who has to pass upon and determine the validity of all claims for bounty made by any party under the act. If the Auditor, by acting in conformity with the statute, has the power of adjudication upon the rights of persons and property, his acts must be quasi judicial, at least. He is the special tribunal or officer called upon to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of the parties are, and he acts judicially when passing upon the constitutionality of the law and disposing of such rights. In the case at bar the State Auditor exercised no ministerial duties whatever when he declined and refused to allow the claim upon the ground that the law upon which the petitioner was obliged to rely was unconstitutional. He disposed of the petitioner's property rights in precisely the manner in which they might be affected or swept away by proceedings in the courts. He ascertained no facts, nor was he compelled so to do, according to the stipulation, for they were agreed upon. He did not have to construe the law, because its terms were plain and beyond controversy. The facts being undisputed, the Auditor declared that the law in question was obnoxious to the constitutional provisions, and for that reason alone he refused to comply with it.

In State v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 304, 90 N. W. 772, it was said that "the exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially." It is obvious that in the present case the act of the Auditor was judicial. It matters not that the court cannot by a writ of certiorari cause the Auditor to act in conformity with the bounty act. We can merely review his determination at this time, and, if found erroneous, another and further remedy must be discovered by the petitioner.

Having stated the sole issue made by the return, we pass to the merits of the case, and find involved the constitutionality of Laws 1899, p. 389 (c. 307), the requirements of which have been complied with in all matters of detail by the petitioner. This statute was an amendment to Laws 1895, p. 490 (c. 205), which appears to have been enacted without any reference whatsoever to the cultivation of the sugar beet in Minnesota. It contained no provision that the sugar for which a state bounty was to be paid should be manufactured from beets grown in Minnesota, nor did it provide, as does the act of 1899 — although this fact is not material in the present controversy — that the manufacturer should pay a certain minimum sum per ton for all beets consumed. Other regulations found in the last-mentioned act, and upon which counsel for petitioner have placed great stress, are not to be found in that of 1895.

The Attorney General, representing the state, insists that at least two sections (sections 5 and 10 of article 9) of the Constitution are violated by the provisions of either and both of these acts. These sections of the fundamental law are limitations upon the state, solely, not upon minor subdivisions thereof; and three propositions are submitted in behalf of the state, as follows: First, that under section 5 the state (with certain exceptions) is prohibited from contracting any debt or being a party in carrying out any work of internal improvement; second, that under section 10 the state is prohibited from giving or loaning its credit or aid to any individual, association, or corporation; third, that irrespective and independent of these provisions the legislature is powerless to provide for or authorize the expenditure of public funds of the state except for a public purpose. Naturally these propositions are very closely associated. And the Attorney General also contends that the whole question involved in this case has already been determined by this court in each of the following cases: State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 15 N. W. 375; Coates v. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498, 35 N. W. 366; Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331; Wm. Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118, 77 N. W. 568. It is argued that it is well settled by these cases that the legislature is powerless to appropriate money for the purpose designated in these acts, because this bounty is simply a gratuity from the state for the encouragement of a private enterprise and the aggrandizement of private parties. Let us turn to these cases, and examine them with reference to the assertion of counsel for the state that, if they are to be followed, this case is easily disposed of adversely to the petitioner's claim:

In State v. Foley, supra, it was said, when referring to the legislative power of taxation, that it "does not extend to the exacting of contributions from the people for a merely private purpose, unconnected with any duty, moral or legal, on the part of the state or of the political subdivision upon which the burden is imposed. Such a proceeding would not be taxation at all. Taxation comprehends only the imposition of charges for public purposes."

Again, in Coates v. Campbell, supra, a case in which the legality of certain bonds issued by a village in aid of the improvement of a private water power — the village to have part of the power for the perpetual use of its fire department — was at issue, the court used this language: "As it is entirely manifest that the general and chief purpose of the act is to improve the water power, and without which purpose the act would not have been passed, the question necessarily arises, what is to be the character of...

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