Minnick v. Cnty. of Currituck
Decision Date | 14 May 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 2:10–CV–17–BO.,2:10–CV–17–BO. |
Citation | 861 F.Supp.2d 677 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
Parties | Duane MINNICK, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CURRITUCK; Knott's Island Volunteer Fire Department; Crawford Township Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.; David F. Scanlon, II, named in his individual and representative capacities; Michael Carter, named in his individual and representative capacities; Terry King, named in his individual and representative capacities; Jerit Van Auker, named in his individual and representative capacities; Chris Dailey, named in his individual and representative capacities; Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas A. Woodley, David W. Ricksecker, Diana J. Nobile, Kurt T. Rumsfeld, Megan Kathleen Mechak, Woodley and McGillivary, Washington, DC, M. Travis Payne, Edelstein & Payne, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff.
Jacqueline Terry Hughes, Julie B. Bradburn, Kristen Yarbrough Riggs, Theresa Marie Sprain, Mary Nell Craven, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Jeffrey A. Doyle, Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe and
Garofalo, LLP, Katie Weaver Hartzog, Paul H. Derrick, Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog, LLP, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [DE 88, 90, 92]. Plaintiff responded to each of the Motions, Defendants replied, and the Motions are now ripe for adjudication. Mr. Minnick asserts that he was terminated from his employment with Currituck County for speaking out about safety violations at the volunteer fire departments and for his union affiliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Mr. Minnick has failed to demonstrate that he was terminated or suffered other adverse employment action as a result of official policy or custom of Currituck County, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Mr. Minnick was hired by the Currituck County Fire and EMS Department as a firefighter and EMT on April 9, 2007. On January 31, 2008, he organized a labor association and local affiliate of International Association of Firefighters (IAFF)—Local 4633. From that time until his termination, he acted as president and assisted other employees by raising issues and pursuing grievances on their behalf. He expressed concerns to volunteer fire chiefs that volunteer members were traveling at a high rate of speed in a school zone, that equipment was inadequate, and that volunteers took unsafe actions while on duty. During Mr. Minnick's employment, he claims that efforts were underway to integrate volunteers and paid staff. With the introduction of the IAFF Local, Mr. Minnick claims that volunteers were concerned that the Union, and the professionalization of fire protection services, would drive them from the County. He further asserts that he was a satisfactory employee, with satisfactory evaluations and no complaints about his skills as a firefighter.
Mr. Minnick received some written warnings while employed with Currituck County, for violations of the exchange of duty policy, for failure to follow the chain of command, and for failure to report to work on time. On July 11, 2009, Mr. Minnick was again late to report to work. He was suspended without pay for two shifts and was issued a final written warning. Chief Glover held a predisciplinary conference with Mr. Minnick to explain the sanctions. One month later, the President of Knott's Island VFD (where Mr. Minnick was then assigned) wrote a letter to Chief Michael Carter, complaining about Mr. Minnick's “denial of the station rules and ... disrespect for the members.” Knott's Island Defs.' Ex. X. Chief Carter then recommended Mr. Minnick's termination. Mr. Minnick grieved his termination, which was upheld by Chief Carter and County Manager Scanlon.
Mr. Minnick filed the instant lawsuit on May 7, 2010. His second amended complaint [DE 55] alleges that he has suffered from retaliatory conduct for exercising his First Amendment rights to engage in union activity and to speak out on matters of public concern. Mr. Minnick pursues his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, he points to the following actions: (1) Volunteer Chief Dailey (of Crawford Township VFD) contacted County Manager Scanlon, Chief Carter, and Currituck County, directing them to take disciplinary action against Mr. Minnick; (2) Knott's Island VFD, Volunteer President King, Volunteer Chief Dailey, and Volunteer Chief Van Auker exercised their authority in directing Chief Carter and County Manager Scanlon to terminate Mr. Minnick; (3) Chief Carter transferred Mr. Minnick to Corolla Fire Station, forcing him to commute over two hours; (6) Chief Carter denied Mr. Minnick a transfer because of his involvement in Local 4633. As relief, he seeks a declaratory judgment, permanent injunction, an accounting, expungement of records, money damages, compensatory damages, front pay, and punitive damages.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment will be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden to show the court that there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party must then show that there is “evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 reaches only those persons acting under color of state law, which may include municipalities and other local government bodies. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). However, a local government body cannot be held liable under section 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018.Section 1983 liability can only attach to a local government body when “it causes such a deprivation through an official policy or custom.” Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.1999).1 “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 at 479–80, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986) (plurality opinion). In order to evaluate the instant motions for summary judgment, then, the Court must determine, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Minnick, if any of the named defendants caused the alleged deprivation of Mr. Minnick's rights through operation of official policy or custom.
Official policy or custom can be found in certain affirmative decisions of individual policymaking officials. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. To determine whether an individual is one such policymaking official, courts ask whether the individual speaks “with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). Whether an official speaks with final policy-making authority is a question of state law, not of fact. Ulrich v. City and County of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 985 (9th Cir.2002). For example, the Eighth Circuit has held that a fire chief did not have final policy-making authority where his actions were subject to review of the city administrator. Bechtel v. City of Belton, Mo., 250 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir.2001). The Fourth Circuit has held that a plaintiff's section 1983 claim against a City Council for her termination must fail when the ultimate termination decision was made by the Chief of Police. Iglesias v. Wolford, 667 F.Supp.2d 573 (E.D.N.C.2009), aff'd400 Fed.Appx. 793 (4th Cir.2010) (per curiam).
Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes § 69–25.5, Currituck County has contracted with Crawford Township VFD and Knott's Island VFD, incorporated nonprofit volunteer fire departments, to provide fire protection and rescue services. The contracts governing these relationships provide that “all County employees working with the Department shall be under the direction and control of the County Manager or his designee and the Chief of EMS and/or shift supervisors.” Crawford Township Defs.' Ex. T, ¶ 14; Knott's Island Defs.' Ex. 6, ¶ 14. Therefore, as volunteer fire departments subject to contract, Crawford Township VFD and Knott's Island VFD do not have supervisory control over or authority to discipline County employees, such as Mr. Minnick. Rather, the VFDs must “work through the County Manager ... and the Chief of EMS when personnel issues arise regarding County employees.” Crawford Township Defs' Ex. T, ¶ 14; Knott's Island Defs.' Ex. 6, ¶ 14.
Although County employees are expected to adhere to Department guidelines, exception is made “where they conflict with Currituck County guidelines.”...
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...the court rejected the plaintiff's argument and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Minnick v. Cty. of Currituck, 861 F. Supp.2d 677, 681 (E.D.N.C. 2012) ("[I]t would be inappropriate for this Court to look behind state law assigning final policymaking authority to the ......