Minor v. City Of Antioch
| Decision Date | 13 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. C 08-03470 JSW.,C 08-03470 JSW. |
| Citation | 722 F.Supp.2d 1133 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | Marvetia Lynn RICHARDSON, Latoya Norman, Samonia Nelson-Calip and Lamona Nelson as guardian ad litem for “KC,” a minor, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ANTIOCH, City of Antioch Police Department, Police Chief James Hyde, Officer Santiago Martinez, Jr., Officer Jason Vanderpool, Officer Jason Joannindes, Sgt. Thomas Fuhrmann and Does 1-100, inclusive, Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Quinton Blair Cutlip, Meis & Associates, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.
James V. Fitzgerald, III, Noah G. Blechman, McNamara, Ney, Beatty, Slattery, Borges & Brothers LLP, Walnut Creek, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants City of Antioch, City of Antioch Police Department, Police Chief James Hyde, Officer Santiago Martinez, Jr., Officer Jason Vanderpool, Officer Jason Joannindes, Sgt. Thomas Fuhrmann and Does 1-100, inclusive (collectively “Defendants”) and the cross motion for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs Marvetia Lynn Richardson, Latoya Norman, Samonia Nelson-Calip and Lamona Nelson, as guardian ad litem for “KC,” a minor (collectively “Plaintiffs”). Having considered the parties' pleadings, relevant legal authority, the Court HEREBY DENIES Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment and GRANTS Plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment.
On July 18, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Antioch, the Antioch Police Department and individual officers. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their rights, specifically: (1) Fourth Amendment rights to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure, not to be subjected to excessive force during the course of an arrest, and the right not to be retaliated against for asserting Fourth Amendment rights; (2) Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be deprived of due process of law or the equal protection of the law; (3) retaliation against Plaintiff Richardson for exercising her rights guaranteed under the First Amendment; (4) conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of the rights and privileges secured by the Constitution; (5) negligent failure to prevent the deprivation of Plaintiffs' rights; (6) discrimination; (7) assault; (8) battery; (9) false arrest; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) violation of California Civil Code § 51.7; (1 2) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; and, (13) negligent hiring, training and retention by Defendants City of Antioch, City of Antioch Police Department and Police Chief Hyde. The City's liability for these actions is premised on Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Plaintiffs' claims arise from an incident that occurred in the early morning of June 7, 2007. On that date just before 1:00 a.m., the tenants living at 1947 Mokelumne Drive in Antioch, California, called the police department to complain about noise in the house. (Declaration of James V. Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald Decl.”), Ex. S (Declaration of Jason Vanderpool) at ¶ 2.) Several guests, including children, were staying with Plaintiff Marvetia Lynn Richardson (“Richardson”), an inspector with the San Francisco Police Department. (Declaration of Marvetia Lynn Richardson (“Richardson Decl.”) at ¶ ¶ 2, 10; Declaration of Samonia Nelson (“Nelson Decl.”) at ¶ 4; Declaration of KC (“KC Decl.”) at ¶ 5; Declaration of Latoya Norman (“Norman Decl.”) at ¶ 2; Declaration of Nolan Satterfield (“Satterfield Decl.”) at ¶ 3.) Richardson, an African-American woman, owned the home in a predominantly White neighborhood in Antioch. (Richardson Decl. at ¶ 3.) On March 31, 2007, Richardson had served her upstairs tenants with a 30-day notice to quit and the tenants had contacted the police numerous times complaining about their alleged treatment in the house. ( Id. at ¶¶ 5-9.) None of the previous visits had resulted in any further action. However, on June 7, 2010, the Antioch police responded to the tenants' 911 call to find the house filled with Richardson's guests: Latoya Norman, Ms. Norman's three young children who were three, five and eight, a family friend named Nolan Satterfield, Samonia Nelson, Richardson's girlfriend and her two daughters, who were six and fourteen, as well as a teenage cousin. The children and adults, with the exception of Richardson, were planning to go to Six Flags/Marine World the next morning. (Richardson Decl. at ¶ 11; Nelson Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 5; Norman Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 3; Satterfield Decl. at ¶ 3.)
Responding to the 911 call citing a fight or disturbance, the police arrived at the house at approximately 1:09 a.m. (Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. C; Ex. D (Declaration of Santiago Martinez) at ¶ 3.) The officers knocked on the door, were let in by one of the house guests, and witnessed the hostility between the house guests and the tenants. ( Id., Ex. D at ¶ 3; Declaration of Quinton B. Cutlip (“Cutlip Decl.”), Ex. 5 (Deposition of Jason Vanderpool) at 55:17-57:18.) Richardson was asleep in her bedroom at the time. (Richardson Decl. at ¶¶ 10-13; Norman Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 7.) The tenants complained that the guests, who were strangers to them, were making loud noises, preventing them from going to sleep, and threatening them. (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 5 at 58:14-25; 65:13-23.) At that point, one of the guests woke up Richardson who confirmed that the people in her home were indeed her invited guests. (Richardson Decl. at ¶ 13.) She also indicated that Nelson was her girlfriend. After an unpleasant exchange of words with the officers, Richardson requested that the officers leave her home and not return without a warrant. (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 5 at 68:21-69:17.)
After approximately five to ten minutes, the officers left the house, believing the incident to be resolved. ( Id., Ex. 11.) After the police left, Richardson asked her guests to shut everything down and go to bed as it was late and she wanted no further disturbances. (Richardson Decl. at ¶ 14.) The officers walked across the street and, after talking for about five minutes by their cars, heard loud noises from the house and heard someone yell, “call the police.” (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 5 (deposition of Santiago Martinez) at 89:2-20; Ex. 6 at 114:3-22.) At that point, the officers called for a supervisor and the tenants ran out of the house. ( Id., Ex. 6 at 115:8-12; 117:13-21.)
The tenants left the house at 1:24 a.m. and were visibly upset. After calming them down, Officer Martinez started the audio recorder in his shirt pocket which recorded the rest of the incident. (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 6 at 134:16-21.) The tenants stated that the house guests had entered their room and threatened them and that they were scared. (Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. D at ¶ 9.) After the tenants left the home, it was relatively quiet from inside the house. (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 1; Ex. 11 at 16.) The officers asked the tenants for their version of events and inquired whether there might be firearms in the house due to Richardson's position as a police officer. (Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. I at 1-7.) The officers began to knock at the door to gain entry, but heard the house guests inside deny them access. (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 11 at 16; Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. G at 3.) The police thought they heard a vacuum cleaner start running in the house. (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 1; Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. G at 3.) 1
After the officers investigated whether there was another way into the house, spoke with the tenants, and knocked and announced several times, did they decide to enter the home without a warrant. (Cutlip Decl., Ex. 1.) The entry was made at 1:50 a.m., approximately 26 minutes after the tenants left the home. ( Id.) Upon entry, the police tried to gather the house guests in one room. The audio tape of the incident reveals that the officers yelled at KC to wake up three times and to get up four times in rapid succession. ( Id.) After 25 seconds, during which time KC was unresponsive, Officer Martinez ordered her arrested for “pretending to be asleep.” There is evidence that Latoya Norman complained about being handled roughly by the officers and Richardson was tased in her home. (Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. G; Norman Decl. at ¶ 25; Richardson Decl. at ¶¶ 15-18.)
The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the remainder of this order.
Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if the fact may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1997).
A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the...
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