Minor v. Cochise County
Decision Date | 05 June 1979 |
Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 2,2 |
Citation | 125 Ariz. 174,608 P.2d 313 |
Parties | Warren MINOR et al., Petitioners/Appellants, v. COCHISE COUNTY, Arizona, a body politic, and Kerley Chemical Corporation, Real Party in Interest, Respondents/Appellees. 3097. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This appeal seeks review of a superior court order dismissing appellants' petition for special action for the reason that they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Appellants contend that their special action fell within one of the exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Appellee Kerley Chemical Corporation (Kerley) leased a parcel of property located on a railroad siding from Southern Pacific Railway. This property is situated about 10 miles from the town of Benson, Arizona. Kerley intended to build a chemical manufacturing plant, and, after obtaining an air quality permit from the State Environmental Health Services, wrote to the Cochise County Planning Department. The details of the proposed chemical operation were set forth in the letter and Kerley inquired about a use permit from the county. By letter dated February 7, 1977, the planning department advised Kerley that under § 308 of the Cochise County Zoning Regulations, lands within the railroad's right-of-way are exempt, that the enclosed use permit application should be completed and returned, and that no fee would be required because of the exemption status.
Kerley's application for the use permit was approved on February 18, 1977, and the community promptly became aware of such fact. On February 28, one resident wrote to the Planning and Zoning Department objecting to the permit, and by letter dated March 7, was advised by the department that since the property where the Kerley operation was to be conducted was located within the operating right-of-way of Southern Pacific, such use was exempted from county zoning regulations. No attempt was made to seek administrative review by the County Board of Adjustment, and on May 5, 1977, a special action was filed in superior court challenging the planning department's approval of Kerley's use permit application.
Appellees moved to dismiss the special action, and at the hearing thereon, the foregoing facts were established by documentary evidence and from testimony of both Mr. Rivera, Chief Inspector of the Cochise County Planning Department and Mr. Altenstadter, Planning Director. The parties stipulated that Kerley broke ground on March 30, 1977, and a letter from Kerley to Mr. Rivera, dated April 15, 1977, indicated the construction on the initial phase of the plant was complete and that the plant was in satisfactory operation. Appellees' motion to dismiss the special action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was granted.
A.R.S. § 11-830(A)(2) restricts the power of counties to "(p)revent, restrict, or otherwise regulate the use or occupation of land or improvements for railroad, mining, metallurgical, grazing or general agricultural purposes, if the tract concerned is five or more contiguous commercial acres." The Cochise County zoning ordinance has adopted this restriction on regulation in § 308(a):
"Nothing contained in these zoning regulations shall prevent, restrict, or otherwise regulate the use or occupation of land or improvements for railroad, mining, metallurgical, grazing or general agricultural purposes, if the tract is not less than five contiguous commercial acres."
A.R.S. § 11-807 provides for the creation of boards of adjustment and delineates their powers:
"B. The board of adjustment may:
1. Interpret the zoning ordinance when the meaning of any word, phrase or section is in doubt, when there is a dispute between the appellant and enforcing officer, or when the location of a district boundary is in doubt.
2. Allow a variance from the terms of the ordinance when, owing to peculiar conditions, a strict interpretation would work an unnecessary hardship, if in granting such variance the general intent and purposes of the zoning ordinance will be preserved."
Subsection (C) and (D) of A.R.S. § 11-807 provide for review:
Section 2308 of the Cochise County Zoning Regulations provides for appeals from the county zoning inspector:
The general rule is that a party seeking relief from zoning action must first pursue and exhaust the administrative remedies available before instituting a proceeding for judicial relief, unless, however, the administrative remedy is inadequate or non-existent. Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corporation, 27 Ariz.App. 600, 557 P.2d 532 (1976). This principle, which requires one to exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing to a court, is to afford the administrative body a full opportunity to reexamine and restudy the matter. Pima Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 11 Ariz.App. 480, 466 P.2d 31 (1970).
We agree with appellants that their lawsuit was not barred by their failure to file an appeal with the Cochise County Board of Adjustment. A.R.S. §§ 11-801 thru 808 provide for the administration and enforcement of county planning and zoning. As noted above, A.R.S. § 11-807 defines the powers of a county board of adjustment, appeals to such board and judicial review of the board's action. A.R.S. § 11-808 provides for enforcement of a county zoning ordinance, and subsection (D) thereof states:
"If any building or structure is or is proposed to be erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered,...
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Minor v. Cochise County, 14476-PR
...Superior Court of Pima County dismissing appellants' special action. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, reversed, 125 Ariz. 174, 608 P.2d 313 (App.1979). Opinion of the Court of Appeals vacated, and judgment of the Superior Court Appellants filed a special action in the Cochise Cou......
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