Minor v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 03 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. A045254,A045254
• Citation: 219 Cal.App.3d 1541,268 Cal.Rptr. 919
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Steve MINOR, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL COURT, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 919

268 Cal.Rptr. 919

219 Cal.App.3d 1541

Steve MINOR, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL COURT, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. A045254.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

May 3, 1990.

Louise H. Renne, City Atty., Kimberly A. Reiley, Chief Trial Deputy, Geoffrey Spellberg, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Robert H. Blumenthal, San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

SMITH, Associate Justice.

Florida resident Steve Minor posted $18,000 cash bail for a California criminal defendant who subsequently failed to appear, resulting in the San Francisco Municipal Court issuing notice of bail forfeiture and loss of the funds. Minor sued the municipal court and the City and County of San Francisco's controller (together the city) in the superior court, seeking return of the funds. The superior court granted summary judgment in his favor, concluding that notice of the forfeiture was constitutionally deficient. The city appeals, urging lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that the notice was sufficient.

We will affirm.

BACKGROUND

Minor posted bail in the municipal court on February 1, 1984 for Yohalmo Arbaiza, a defendant charged with various felony sex offenses in People v. Arbaiza (Mun. Ct. City & County of S.F., 1984, No. 672577). Arbaiza failed to appear (evidently for a scheduled February 15 date), and the court issued a bench warrant.

On March 19, the court ordered bail forfeited and the clerk mailed Minor a notice reciting in relevant part, "Pursuant to Section 1305 of the Penal Code, you are hereby notified of an order of the Court this date forfeiting bail...." That notification started the 180-day time running for Minor to seek relief from the forfeiture under Penal Code section 1305. ¹

The 180 days would have expired in September 1984, but Minor sought extensions of time, which were granted on October 26 and 30, and November 16. Together they extended the time to January 10, 1985. The municipal court on that last date denied a fourth motion for further time in which to produce Arbaiza. Meanwhile, at the end of November 1984, the forfeited funds were deposited into the city's general fund. Arbaiza was apparently never found.

In February 1986, Minor filed a "Complaint for Return of Funds" against the municipal court and the city controller in superior court, seeking return of the $18,000 plus interest. Minor moved for summary judgment in December 1988, which the city opposed, and an order granting the motion after a hearing was filed on February 10, 1989.

We have no transcript of the hearing. In the order, the court held, "as a matter of law, that the bail forfeiture notice issued by the Municipal Court Clerk was not 'reasonably calculated' to inform [Minor] of the applicable time limitations under Penal Code, sections 1305, et seq." The city filed notice of appeal from that order on February 28, 1989.

APPEAL

The city attacks the grant of summary judgment in two arguments, first, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and second, that there was, in any event, a triable issue of fact whether Minor received adequate notice. ²

I

The jurisdictional argument has two parts, one being that the superior court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to proceed because the $18,000 which Minor sought by this suit was below the monetary floor of that court and, thus, could only be brought, if at all (the second jurisdictional argument), in the municipal court. The argument is inexcusably raised for the first time in the city's reply brief. Yet, because the defect goes to the lower court's "jurisdiction" in the strictest, most fundamental sense (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942), it may be raised for the first time on appeal and, in fact, would have to be raised on our own if not raised by the parties (Bachis v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 722, 724, 71 Cal.Rptr. 486; Linnick v. Sedelmeier (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 12, 68 Cal.Rptr. 334).

The amount in controversy generally required for filing actions in superior court was raised effective January 1, 1986, from $15,000 to $25,000. (Code Civ.Proc., § 86; Stats.1985, ch. 1383, § 1, pp. 4903-4905; Roybal v. University Ford (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1080, 1088, 255 Cal.Rptr. 469; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) Minor filed suit in February 1986. The complaint, whose prayer determines the amount in controversy (Campbell v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 151, 261 Cal.Rptr. 509), sought recovery of the $18,000 cash bail plus interest and costs. Interest and costs had to be excluded from the calculation in this case, as is generally true. (2 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 21, pp. 387-388; Code Civ. Proc., § 86(a)(1).) Had there been doubt, Minor confirmed in response to a request for statement of damages (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.11) that he sought only a return of the $18,000 bail plus legal interest. Thus, the amount in controversy was obviously under $25,000.

Nevertheless, the superior court's jurisdiction can be saved by construing the complaint as one for declaratory relief, and we assume in support of the judgment that the court placed that construction on it. Declaratory relief is available where an actual controversy exists as to property, among other things (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060), and is commonly used to resolve constitutional issues arising from the application of statutes (5 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 809, p. 252). The superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over such actions unless raised by cross-complaint in municipal court (id., § 800, p. 244; Code Civ. Proc., § 86, subd. (a)(7)), regardless of the amount in controversy (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 43, p. 410).

The fact that Minor's complaint was not labeled one for declaratory relief is not important. "[S]ince there are no forms of action, a declaration of rights will be upheld if the complaint states sufficient facts even though the pleader did not think he was proceeding under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1060 and did not appropriately label his complaint." (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 804, p. 247.) A complaint is legally sufficient " 'if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties under a written instrument or with respect to property and requests that the rights and duties of the parties be adjudged by the court....' " (Cardellini v. Casey (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 389, 395, 226 Cal.Rptr. 659, quoting Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, 947, 148 Cal.Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970.)

The pleading, labeled "Complaint for Return of Funds," set forth facts showing the timing of posting bail, the notice and forfeiture, and asserted a right to return or "exoneration" of the cash bail then in the city's possession. We uphold the superior court's construction of the pleading as sufficient to support declaratory relief. That construction is implied in the court's written order granting summary judgment, which declared, "as a matter of law, that the bail forfeiture notice issued by the Municipal Court Clerk was not 'reasonably calculated' to inform [Minor] of the applicable time limitations under Penal Code, sections 1305, et seq...."

The city's second jurisdictional argument is that Minor's proper remedy was not to file suit in superior court, but to move the municipal court to set aside the forfeiture and, should the motion be denied, appeal the order to the appellate department of the superior court. Moving to set aside in the court which entered forfeiture is, of course, prescribed by the statute (§ 1305; fn. 1, ante), and the motion-appeal procedure urged by the city was followed in People v. Houle (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d Supp. 894, 316 P.2d 100 (disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rolley (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 639, 642, 35 Cal.Rptr. 803). We observe that the appellate division could then certify questions to this court if desired. (People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 742, 744-745, 236 Cal.Rptr. 501.) On the other hand, Minor notes that relief was directly sought in superior court in People v. Swink (1984) Whatever the merits of this idea that relief should have been sought in the municipal court, it does not alter our holding that the superior court properly treated the action as one for declaratory relief. Declaratory relief is by statute made cumulative to other remedies. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1062.) "In view of this statute, it is difficult to see how a good complaint for declaratory relief can be deemed insufficient because some other remedy is available." (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 816, p. 258.) We hold that the availability of relief in the municipal court did not preclude this action.

                150 Cal.App.3d 1076, 198 Cal.Rptr. 290 (Swink ).   However, Swink may be distinguishable in that [219 Cal.App.3d 1549] the depositor moved the superior court to set aside the forfeiture declared by the municipal court, and it appears from the opinion that the criminal case was transferred to superior court between the time when forfeiture was ordered and relief was sought.  (Swink, supra, at pp. 1078-1079, 198 Cal.Rptr. 290.)   As to monetary limits, we note that once a superior court obtains jurisdiction over bail, it has continuing jurisdiction so that a low amount of bail in controversy (e.g., $5,000 in Swink ) does not defeat the court's jurisdiction (People v. Argonaut Ins. Co.  (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 994, 996-997, 139 Cal.Rptr. 795)
                

II

On the merits of the superior court's ruling, we agree that the notice of forfeiture, as worded, was constitutionally deficient.

The controlling case is Swink, where a cash bail depositor received notice stating that " 'bail will remain forfeited until the defendant appears.' " (Swink, ...