Minter v. William K. Mattson, Dan Beggs, John Lear, Friends Home At Woodstown And/Or Vill. At Woodstown, Morrison Senior Dining, of Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-1916-15T4,DOCKET NO. A-0022-16T4 |
| Parties | ANTOINE D. MINTER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WILLIAM K. MATTSON, DAN BEGGS, JOHN LEAR, FRIENDS HOME AT WOODSTOWN and/or VILLAGE AT WOODSTOWN, MORRISON SENIOR DINING, A DIVISION OF MORRISON MANAGEMENT SPECIALISTS, INC., Defendants-Respondents, and MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. ANTOINE D. MINTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM K. MATTSON, FRIENDS HOME AT WOODSTOWN and/or VILLAGE AT WOODSTOWN, Defendants, and DAN BEGGS, JOHN LEAR, MORRISON SENIOR MANAGEMENT SPECIALISTS, INC. and MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Ostrer, Whipple and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Docket No. L-0087-14.
Patrick W. Conner argued the cause for Manufacturers Alliance Insurance Company, appellant in A-1916-15 and respondent in A-0022-16 (Law Offices of Monique T. Moran, attorneys; Patrick W. Conner, on the briefs).
Mati Jarve argued the cause for Antoine D. Minter, appellant in A-0022-16 and respondent in A-1916-15 (Jarve Kaplan Granato Starr, LLC, attorneys; Mati Jarve and Katherine M. Jarve, on the briefs).
Jennifer A. Hindermann argued the cause for respondent William K. Mattson in A-1916-15 (Cooper Maren Nitsberg Voss & DeCoursey, attorneys; Jennifer A. Hindermann, on the brief).
Michael E. Sullivan argued the cause for respondent Friends Home at Woodstown and/or Friends Village at Woodstown in A-1916-15 (Parker McCay, PA, attorneys; Michael E. Sullivan, on the brief).
Aaron K. Kirkland (Shook Hardy & Bacon) of the Missouri bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents Dan Beggs, John Learand Morrison Management Specialists, Inc. in A-0022-16 (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; Charles T. McCook, Jr. and Aaron K. Kirkland, on the brief).
In these back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for our opinion, we determine that the trial court properly exercised its concurrent jurisdiction, and correctly decided that plaintiff Antoine Minter, a kitchen worker, was acting in the course of covered employment under the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, with respect to his employer, Friends Village at Woodstown, a continuing care retirement community (CCRC).1 However, we part company with the court's decision that Minter was also a special employee of an outside food service management contractor, Morrison Senior Dining, which the Village retained to supervise its dining operation.
Minter was injured during a journey to work undertaken at the behest of his supervisors. It had been snowing since the previous night, and Minter's regular morning bus to work was not running. Minter called his supervisor, Dan Beggs, the executive chef, to say he would miss his early morning shift. That was a problem forthe dining director, John Lear, because food service was essential, and the Village was short-staffed that day because of the snow.
Lear came up with a plan to get Minter to work. At Lear's behest, Beggs told dining supervisor, William Mattson, to come in earlier than his 10:30 a.m. shift, and pick up Minter on the way.2 According to Minter, Mattson called, reported that Beggs said they both "had to come to work" and Beggs told him to pick up Minter. Minter accepted the ride. At that point, he believed he would be fired if he refused. Minter knew he was deemed an essential employee. Also, Beggs previously had given him a verbal warning for showing up late.
Critical to the "special employer" issue, the Village had hired Morrison to manage its dining operations and its various dining-related employees. Lear and Beggs were Morrison's only employees on site at the Village. Morrison presented no evidence that Minter was aware that Lear and Beggs worked for an outside company. Minter received his paychecks from the Village, which hired him. Beggs was Minter's supervisor and controlled his work, although Minter, given his low-level position, took orders fromothers. Beggs reviewed Minter's performance, but the Village retained the power to fire or discipline him.
It was still snowing as Mattson and Minter headed to work around 7:30 a.m. Travelling on a snow-and-ice-packed road, Mattson lost control of his car. It entered the path of an oncoming pick-up truck, which struck the passenger side of Mattson's vehicle. Minter suffered two broken legs, fractured ribs, and a deep laceration to his left arm.
A few months after the accident, plaintiff filed suit against Mattson. After three amendments, he added the Village, Lear, Beggs, Morrison, and Manufacturers Alliance Insurance Company, the Village's workers' compensation insurer. Before Manufacturers was added, the Village and Mattson filed separate motions seeking summary judgment dismissal on the ground that Minter was acting within the course of his employment and his exclusive remedy was under the Compensation Act. Minter initially opposed the motion. The court deferred its decision pending Minter's deposition and the completion of discovery.
In light of that discovery, Minter withdrew his opposition and filed a petition in the Division of Workers' Compensation. Manufacturers then asserted that Minter was not acting in the course of employment when the accident occurred. Minter secured permission to add Manufacturers as an indispensable party to thelawsuit, after contending that he risked inconsistent decisions in the two pending matters.
Thereafter, the court decided several dispositive motions. The court denied Manufacturers' motion to dismiss the complaint and transfer the matter to the Division to determine whether Minter was acting within the course of employment when the accident occurred. Instead, the court held that it had concurrent jurisdiction to reach that threshold issue, which Mattson and the Village had raised in their renewed motions for summary judgment. At that point, Beggs, Lear, and Morrison had joined in the motion. The court held that Minter was acting within the course of employment. On that ground, the court dismissed the complaint, so Minter could pursue his exclusive remedy under the Compensation Act before the Division. The court denied Manufacturers' subsequent reconsideration motion.
Several months later, upon a motion by Morrison, Lear, and Beggs, the court held that Morrison was a special employer, and that Minter's remedy against those three defendants lay under the Compensation Act. The court later denied Minter's motion for reconsideration.
Manufacturers appeals (A-1916-15), contending the court lacked jurisdiction to decide, and then erroneously decided, theemployment status issue. Minter appeals (A-0022-16) from the court's determination that he was Morrison's special employee.3
We first consider Manufacturers' jurisdictional argument. Manufacturers contends the court should have dismissed the claim against it, because the Division has "primary jurisdiction over plaintiff's employment status."
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies "'when a case is properly filed in the Superior Court but the court declines original jurisdiction, referring specific issues to the appropriate administrative body.'" Estate of Kotsovska, ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 588 (2015) (quoting Magic Petroleum Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 218 N.J. 390, 405 (2014)). Manufacturers does not argue the trial court lacked the power to decide whether Minter was acting in the course of employment.4
The Supreme Court has held, "'Despite the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to determine the existence of the employment relationship and such other employment issues as are raised by way of defense to the employee's tort action.'" Kotsovska, 221 N.J. at 587 (quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 42.1 on R. 4:5-4 (2014)). The Supreme Court distinguished between whether jurisdiction exists, and whether the court should exercise it. The Court stated, "Having determined the Superior Court had jurisdiction, we next consider whether . . . the trial court erred in declining to transfer plaintiff's claim to the Division under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." Id. at 587-88.
In essence, Manufacturers contends the trial court erred by failing to stay its hand. That was a discretionary decision. Id. at 588. We may disturb it on appeal only if it was "made without a rational explication, inexplicably departed from established practices, or rested on an impermissible basis." Ibid. (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
The Supreme Court has applied a four-part test for ascertaining whether a court should apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine:
Applying those factors, we discern no abuse of discretion. First, the issue whether a person has acted within the course of employment is not outside a judge's conventional experience. "[A] workers' employment status is a matter that is often determined by trial judges and juries." Ibid. We recognize that whether a person is an employee (as distinct, say, from an independent contractor) is different from whether that employee was acting in the course of his or her employment — the issue in this case. However, a court is equally...
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