Miramontes v. Ralph Lauren Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-04192 (CM) |
| Parties | GLORIA MIRAMONTES, Individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Gloria Miramontes ('‘Plaintiff') is a resident of El Paso, Texas. Her attorney has a habit of bringing consumer fraud class actions against Ralph Lauren Corp, in federal courts - taking advantage of the generous jurisdictional provision of the Class Actions Fairness Act (CATA), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Thus far Plaintiffs counsel's efforts to sue Ralph Lauren for having an allegedly insufficient amount (less than 100%) of Pima cotton in its Pima cotton sweaters have been rebuffed in the Middle District of Florida and the Eastern District of Wisconsin. This is counsel's second try at suing in this court; a motion to dismiss a first filed action nearly identical to this one (although brought on behalf of a different plaintiff) is presently pending before my colleague, The Hon Paul G. Gardephe.
Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. Her effort to sue Ralph Lauren pursuant to New York's consumer fraud statute, N.Y. General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 is dead on arrival, because the purchase of an allegedly mislabeled item in Texas by a Texan is not actionable under a law that was passed to protect New Yorkers consumers engaged in New York transactions. Nor will this court allow Plaintiff to sue as the representative of classes of consumers who are protected under the laws of other states -- especially where, as here, there is no allegation that the Plaintiff ever engaged in any commercial transaction in any state but Texas, where her consumer fraud claim appears to be time barred. Her claims for breach of express and implied warranty, as well as for violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, are frivolous on their face. And Miramontes fails to state any claim for negligent misrepresentation, fraud or unjust enrichment, whether under New York or Texas law.
Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, failure to plead fraud with particularity, and for failure to establish a certifiable class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 9(b), and 12(f). For the following reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed, with costs to the Defendant.
Plaintiff is a resident of El Paso, Texas. Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, New York. .
On or about November 9, 2019, Plaintiff bought a "women's burgundy lightweight V-neck sweater” (the “Product”) at The Polo Factory Store in in Canutillo, Texas, just outside of El Paso.[1]She fails to plead what she paid for the sweater, except to say that it cost “no less than $39.99. ” (Id. ¶¶ 1, 44, 59).
The neck tag on the sweater said, “WASHABLE PIMA COTTON.” (Id. ¶ 2). The Product's hangtags stated, “Fine luxurious yarns crafted from Pima Cotton fibers distinguish this signature design, knit in a fine gauge stich for lightweight comfort and an exquisitely soft hand.” (Id. ¶ 3). The tags said nothing about how much Pima cotton was used to craft the yarn that was knitted into the sweater or whether any other fiber was used to make the yarn. It did not, however, represent that the sweater was made of 100% Pima Cotton. . (Id.).
According to the Complaint, different types of cotton are distinguished by their “different characteristics, such as strength, softness, and fiber length.” (Id. ¶ 6). However, “the main criteria [sic] to identify the type of cotton is the fiber length.” (Id. ¶ 7). Pima cotton is alleged to be a “type of extra-long staple (‘ELS') cotton with a range of 1.2 inches to 1.48 inches." (Id. ¶ 9). The Complaint alleges that, “Pima cotton products are costlier than those made of shorter types of cotton.” (Id. ¶ 13).
Plaintiff did not buy the sweater because she needed something to wear. Rather, she (and her attorney) submitted it for testing to determine the length of its cotton fibers, as well as the types and amounts of cottons contained in the Product. Plaintiffs counsel had the sweater tested using the Single-Fiber Test developed by the American Society for Testing and Materials. (Compl. ¶ 9). The test results, which are summarized in something called the “TexTest Report,” showed that all of the cotton fibers in the sweater were shorter than 1.20 inches. (Id. ¶ 17). But that did not mean there was no Pima cotton in the sweater. Indeed, an expert retained by Plaintiffs attorney. Dr. Sabit Adenur, reviewed the TexTest Report and opined that as much as 62% of the fibers in the sweater could have been Pima cotton, accounting for the 25% fiber shortening that occurs during the manufacturing process. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19). Since her own expert declined to opine that the sweater did not contain Pima cotton, Plaintiff was reduced to suggesting, “It is unlikely the cotton fibers used in the Product were reduced in size by 25% from the time the cotton was harvested until it was analyzed." She pleaded no fact supporting her “suggestion" that, contrary to the opinion of her expert, it was “unlikely” that the fibers in the sweater shrank by that amount during the manufacturing process. (Id. ¶ 23).
Plaintiff alleges that she “believed and expected the Product contained cotton that was only Pima cotton, because the neck tag stated Pima cotton and the hang tag described only Pima cotton," and failed to mention any other fiber that was in the sweater. (Id. ¶ 60). Plaintiff claims that the contents of the neck tag and hang tags contained representations, promises, and warranties by the Defendant that the sweater was made entirely of Pima cotton. (Id. ¶¶ 60-61). “Plaintiff believed and expected the Product contained cotton that was only Pima cotton . . . because that is what the representations and omissions said and implied, on the front label and the absence of any reference or statement elsewhere on the Product.” (Id. ¶ 60). In reliance on “the words, terms [sic] coloring, descriptions, layout, placement, packaging, hang tags, and/or images on the Product, on the label, statements, omissions, claims, statements, and instructions, made by Defendant or at its directions . . . Plaintiff bought the Product at or exceeding [$39.99].” (Id. ¶¶ 61-63).
Plaintiff asserts she was injured by her reliance on the Defendant's purported representation that the Product was constructed exclusively of Pima cotton. (Id. ¶¶ 60-65). Plaintiff states she either “would not have purchased the Product if she knew the representations and omissions were false and misleading or would have paid less for it.” (Id. ¶ 63). She alleges, “The Product was worth less than what Plaintiff paid and she would not have paid as much absence Defendant's false and misleading statements and omissions.” (Id. ¶ 65).[2] Plaintiff asserts nine causes of action, all of which are premised on her allegation that the sweater was comprised of, at the very most, 62% Pima cotton, when “the Product purports to be only Pima Cotton.” (Id. ¶ 36). Plaintiff also seeks to certify two classes - a Texas Class and the Consumer Fraud Multi-State Class - on behalf of other consumers who purchased these sweaters, either in Texas or in other states. (Id. ¶ 68).
As mentioned, Plaintiffs counsel has filed three other putative class action lawsuits, in federal courts in New York, Florida, and Wisconsin, in which the named plaintiff alleges that RLC misleadingly labeled its cotton products as being entirely constructed from Pima cotton when they were in fact not. Plaintiff s counsel discontinued two of those lawsuits - one shortly after an order was entered dismissing the case with leave to refile an amended complaint,[3] and one shortly after RLC filed a motion to dismiss.[4] In the third lawsuit, which is presently pending before my colleague Judge Gardephe, the plaintiff is a New Jersey resident who purchased a RLC sweater in New York; in that case, plaintiffs expert concluded that the product at issue contained just 7% Pima cotton. Carter v. Ralph Lauren Corp., No. 1:21-cv-01202-PGG (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 10, 2021).
Each of the plaintiffs in the Carter, Ross, and Cota cases either actually lived in the state whose consumer protection law was invoked or bought the allegedly mislabeled products in the state whose consumer protection law was invoked. In the case at bar, however, Plaintiff Miramontes, who resides in Texas and purchased the Product in Texas, has sued in New York, alleging a violation of New York's consumer protection law. It seems that her purchase took place outside the two-year statute of limitations that applies to claims brought under the relevant consumer protection law in Texas. (Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 11 (“Def. Br.”) at 1). So instead she sues under New York law, ostensibly on the theory that, as New York is where Defendant's principal place of business is located, its consumer protection law applies to her purchase.
In addition to pursuing her own claim, Miramontes seeks to represent two classes of purchasers of the Product (this specific, women's burgundy V-neck sweater) - one consisting of individuals who. like Plaintiff, purchased the Product in Texas, and the other consisting of individuals who purchased the Product in one of the following nineteen states: New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Indiana Virginia, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Alaska, Vermont, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, Delaware, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, South...
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