Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada
| Decision Date | 08 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-15734.,00-15734. |
| Citation | 279 F.3d 1102 |
| Parties | Roberto Hernandez MIRANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA; Morgan Harris; Thomas Rigsby, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
J. Douglas McCalla (briefed and argued), Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, Wyoming, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas D. Beatty (briefed and argued), Law Offices of Thomas D. Beatty, Las Vegas, Nevada, for defendant-appellee Morgan Harris.
Gloria J. Sturman (argued) and Lance A. Maningo (briefed), Edwards, Hale, Sturman, Atkin & Cushing, Ltd., Las Vegas, Nevada, for defendant-appellee Thomas Rigsby.
Janson F. Stewart (briefed and argued), District Attorney's Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, for defendant-appellee Clark County.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada; Lloyd D. George, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-01121-LDG.
Before: SNEED, TROTT, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
OVERVIEW
We are asked to decide whether an indigent client in a criminal case may resort to the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to challenge the manner in which he was represented by his public defender. We answer that question in the negative.
Roberto Hernandez Miranda ("Miranda") brought this action under § 1983 against Clark County, Nevada (the "County"), the County's public defender, Morgan Harris ("Harris"), and deputy public defender, Thomas Rigsby ("Rigsby"), alleging the deprivation of his constitutional rights to confrontation, due process, and effective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
On appeal, Miranda contends the district court (1) erred in determining that Rigsby did not act under color of state law as required by § 1983, and (2) misapplied the pleading requirements in holding that he failed to state a claim against Harris and the County for alleged unconstitutional policies.
We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We hold that Rigsby, in defending Miranda, performed the traditional functions of a defense attorney and, thus, did not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Miranda's claims against the remaining defendants fail because he attacks policies that are not unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Miranda's claims against his former public defender, the public defender's supervisor, and the county agency that employed them.
On April 1, 1982, following a homicide investigation by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Miranda was charged with the following crimes in connection with the death of Manuel Torres: first degree murder with a deadly weapon; robbery with a deadly weapon; and larceny. Miranda was represented in his capital case by deputy public defender Rigsby, a recent law school graduate who passed the Nevada bar in late 1980 and began work in the County public defender's office in February of 1981. Rigsby had no prior experience defending a murder suspect.
Miranda vigorously maintained his innocence from the outset, and supplied Rigsby with the names of numerous people who could have testified on his behalf or provided exculpatory evidence. According to Miranda's complaint, Rigsby's approach to contacting or subpoenaing these potential defense witnesses and investigating other leads ranged from the halfhearted to the nonexistent. Miranda alleged that "[o]ut of more than forty possible witnesses, Rigsby interviewed three, and did not manage to serve a subpoena on a single witness." Miranda was equally critical of Rigsby's performance during trial, characterizing it as a succession of missed opportunities to exonerate Miranda and incriminate others. In August 1981, a jury found Miranda guilty of all charges. He was later sentenced to death.
Miranda continued to contest his conviction and sentence while in jail, filing several petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In February 1996, his sustained campaign for postconviction relief finally bore fruit when the Nevada Supreme Court overturned his conviction due to the ineffectiveness of Rigsby's counsel. The State declined to re-prosecute, and Miranda was released from jail.
Later, Miranda brought suit against Rigsby, Harris, and the County, for alleged violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983.1 In his action against Rigsby Miranda claimed that Rigsby's failure to adequately investigate, prepare for, and defend his case demonstrated a deliberate indifference to and callous disregard for Miranda's constitutional rights, including his rights to confrontation, compulsory process, due process and the effective assistance of counsel. Rigsby moved to dismiss, claiming he did not act under color of state law and, thus, could not be liable under § 1983. The district court agreed, and dismissed Miranda's claim.
In his actions against the remaining defendants, Harris and the County, Miranda asserted claims for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). In his Monell action, Miranda asserted that Harris, as the County's official policymaker, instituted a policy for the public defender's office whereby resources were allocated to a criminal defendant's case based on the defendant's performance on a polygraph test. Fewer resources were allocated to the investigation for and representation of a criminal defendant whose polygraph results suggested guilt. Miranda contended that because he performed poorly on his polygraph, the public defender's office, pursuant to the alleged policy, provided a "minimal and inadequate investigation" and "substandard defense" which denied his rights to due process, confrontation, effective assistance of counsel, and a fair trial.
In his second action, Miranda contended that the public defender's office had a practice of assigning inexperienced attorneys to defend defendants charged with serious felonies. The County's failure to train adequately its inexperienced attorneys, says Miranda, evinced deliberate indifference to Miranda's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, and constituted actionable conduct under the City of Canton line of cases.
The district court granted Harris's and the County's motions to dismiss on the grounds that Miranda alleged insufficient facts to support his claims. Because causes of action remained between Miranda and other parties not relevant to this appeal, he moved for certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) to expedite the appeal of his dismissed claims against Rigsby, Harris, and the County. The district court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.
We review de novo the district court's orders to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.1996). While we accept as true all material allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to Miranda, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See id. at 1140.
To state a claim against Rigsby under § 1983, Miranda must allege two essential elements: (1) deprivation of a right secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that Rigsby committed the deprivation while acting under color of state law.2 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir.2001). A person acts under color of state law only when exercising power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941); McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir.2000).
In determining whether Rigsby acted under color of state law, we are guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). There, the Court took a "functional approach," holding that whether a public defender acts under color of state law in a particular context depends on the nature of the duties he performs. See Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319-20, 102 S.Ct. 445. Thus, "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions" — e.g., "enter[ing] `not guilty' pleas, mov[ing] to suppress State's evidence, object[ing] to evidence at trial, cross-examin[ing] State's witnesses, and mak[ing] closing arguments." Id. at 325, 320, 77 S.Ct. 1064. The Court reasoned that a public defender serves his traditional, and primary, role by "advancing the undivided interests of his client," an "essentially[] private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority are not needed." Id. at 318-19, 77 S.Ct. 1064 (internal quotations omitted).3
Because the public defender in Polk County functioned as the State's adversary, "exercis[ing her] independent judgment on behalf of the client," she did not act under color of state law and, thus, was not liable under § 1983. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321, 102 S.Ct. 445.
The Supreme Court has not passed on whether a public defender's pre-trial decisions involving the interview and subpoenaing of witnesses are traditional functions and, thus, shielded from liability under § 1983. The Court, however, has considered the liability of state prosecutors under § 1983 for similar actions. In so doing, the Court has repeatedly applied its functional analysis which...
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