Miranda v. Cooper
| Decision Date | 17 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1080,91-1080 |
| Citation | 967 F.2d 392 |
| Parties | Valerio Ernest MIRANDA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Thomas COOPER, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee, and Frank Gunter, (Gunther) sic, Director, D.O.C., Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Vicki Mandell-King, Asst. Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, Colo., for petitioner-appellant.
John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Atty. Gen. , for respondent-appellee and respondent.
Before SEYMOUR and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER *, District Judge.
Valerio Ernest Miranda (Miranda), a Colorado state prisoner, appeals from the district court's order adopting the recommendations of the United States magistrate judge in denying his petition for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Miranda was convicted following trial by jury in the District Court of Larimer County, Colorado, and sentenced on January 17, 1986, to eight years imprisonment on a conspiracy to distribute cocaine count, sixteen years imprisonment on a distribution of cocaine count, and sixteen years imprisonment on a possession of cocaine count. The latter two sentences were to be served consecutively.
The case involves a series of undercover drug transactions wherein the government relied principally on the undercover services of one William R. Hannah (Hannah), a confidential informant. Several drug transactions between Hannah and one Ernest Benavidez (Benavidez) led the police to suspect Miranda's involvement. In time, the officers obtained a search warrant for Miranda's home and a warrant for his arrest. During a scheduled "buy" between Hannah and Benavidez, Miranda was arrested and his truck was seized pursuant to another search warrant. At trial, Miranda sought to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrants.
Miranda appealed his conviction to the Colorado Court of Appeals, contending that the evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures was unlawfully admitted into evidence. He further contended that: the trial court erred in limiting the evidence he offered concerning his theory that Hannah, the informant, supplied the cocaine; the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the possession count and the distribution count; the sentences imposed were unlawful and excessive; the court improperly restricted the defense from cross-examination of Hannah, the prosecution's primary witness.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in affirming Miranda's judgment and sentences, addressed the search and seizure issues, just as did the parties, on both federal and state law grounds. (R., Vol. I, Tab 9, Exhibit D, pp. 2-4). In its discussion of the claims of error in the imposition of the two consecutive sixteen year sentences on the possession and distribution convictions, the court rejected the urged adoption of the Alaska "simple transaction" test, ruling that Section 18-1-408 C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) requires concurrent sentences only if the counts of which the accused was convicted are supported by identical evidence. Conversely, the court cited to People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo.1983) for the rule that if the charges of which the defendant is convicted are not supported by identical evidence, it is within the discretion of the trial court to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences. No United States constitutional provisions, federal statutes or decisions were relied upon. Id. pp. 5-6. With respect to Miranda's contention that the length of his total sentence was excessive, again the court concluded, based exclusively on Colorado law, that the record revealed circumstances justifying the sentence in the extended range and, thus, no abuse of discretion by the trial court had been demonstrated. Id. pp. 6-7. Again, no federal law was relied upon by the parties or the court. Miranda's petition for rehearing was denied and the Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.
In Miranda's federal habeas corpus petition, he asserted three grounds: (1) that the searches of his home and vehicle were illegal and in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) that the consecutive sentences imposed were illegal in that both the possession and distribution charges arose out of the same transaction, in violation of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and (3) that the defense was improperly restricted from cross-examination of the primary prosecution witness in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (R., Vol. I, Tab 3, pp. 5-6C-1). Miranda impliedly represented that his challenge to the legality, under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, of the consecutive sentences imposed upon him, had been previously presented in state court because he did not complete question 13 which asked "If any of the grounds listed in 12A, B, C and D were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, state briefly what grounds were not so presented, and give reasons for not presenting them." Id. at p. 6.
The respondents answered, alleging that (1) Miranda was advancing in his federal habeas corpus action "[t]he same claims he did in the Colorado Court of Appeals, except now he claims that the consecutive nature and aggregate length of his sentences, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' proscription against cruel and unusual punishment," (2) Miranda failed to present his sentencing claims "[i]n a manner which would have alerted the state courts to a cruel and unusual punishment claim ... [which] either subjects the petition to dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies ... or, bars consideration of the cruel and unusual punishment claim because it cannot be raised now in any proceeding ..." (procedural default doctrine), (3) Miranda was precluded from raising his Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims since he was accorded a full and fair opportunity to, and did, litigate them in state court, and (4) Miranda was not denied his right of cross-examination in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id., Tab 9, pp. 2-3.
Based upon the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Answer to Show Cause, the complete state trial record and briefs the United States magistrate judge submitted his Recommendations to the district court. Id., Tab 16.
The magistrate judge, in submitting his Recommendations, did not address that portion of the Respondents' Answer alleging that Miranda had failed to exhaust his state remedies or, in the alternative, that he was procedurally barred from now presenting his cruel and unusual punishment claims. Miranda had never presented to the state courts his contention that the consecutive nature and aggregate length of his sentences violated the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the magistrate judge reached the merits of this issue, finding/concluding that the imposition of the two sixteen year sentences, to be served consecutively, was not excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as contended by Miranda in Ground Two because (a) the sentences are within the range of years authorized by the Colorado legislature, and thus non-reviewable, (b) the Eighth Amendment does not focus on the cumulative sentence but on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, and (c) the crimes charged did not involve one continuous transaction as asserted by Miranda, constituting but one offense for which only one sentence could be imposed, but, and rather, two separate transactions resulting in two separate crimes.
Based thereon, the magistrate judge concluded that he was in agreement with the Colorado Court of Appeals and he found no violation of Miranda's Constitutional rights. He recommended that Ground 2 be dismissed. Id. pp. 4-5. In the body of his § 2254 petition, as Ground Two, Miranda claimed that the imposition of the consecutive sentences violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. It was not until the last line of his attached Appendage 2 that he asserted the Fifth Amendment. (R., Vol. I, Tab 3). This accounts for the fact that the respondents, the United States magistrate judge and the district court addressed Miranda's Ground Two contention solely on Eighth Amendment law. The magistrate judge rejected Miranda's contention that certain evidence obtained through search warrants was obtained by unlawful means and should have been excluded. The magistrate judge concluded that, in accordance with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the State of Colorado had provided Miranda an opportunity for full and fair litigation of these Fourth Amendment claims, and Miranda may not raise the issue of exclusion of evidence in a petition for federal writ of habeas corpus. The magistrate judge thus recommended dismissal of Ground One. (R., Vol. I, Tab 16, p. 3). The magistrate judge also recommended that Miranda's Third Ground, wherein he asserted that the trial court improperly limited his right to cross-examination of the prosecution's chief witness, Hannah, in violation of Miranda's confrontation rights, be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at pp. 5-6.
Miranda filed written objections to the magistrate judge's recommendations. Id., Tab 23. Thereafter, the matter came on for review by the district court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The district court, based on its review of the complete court file, the transcript of all proceedings before the State trial court and the opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of Colorado, accepted...
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