Miranda v. Graham
| Decision Date | 11 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | 11-CV-1803 (PKC) |
| Parties | EDUARDO MIRANDA, Petitioner, v. HAROLD D. GRAHAM, Superintendent of Auburn Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Petitioner Eduardo Miranda ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction and sentence entered on May 18, 2006 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County. Following a guilty plea, Petitioner was convicted of one count of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Robbery in the Second Degree. He received an indeterminate sentence of sixteen years to life on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
Petitioner challenges his conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to permit Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea after he claimed that it was not knowing and voluntary; (2) the trial court erred by sentencing Petitioner without a presentence report; and (3) Petitioner's appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to: (a) argue on appeal that the trial court should have inquired further into Petitioner's claim of innocence when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea; and (b) inform Petitioner of his right to file for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York and to seek such appeal on Petitioner's behalf. For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
I. Relevant Facts
On January 18, 2005, Petitioner robbed Linda Postell and, in the course of committing the crime and his subsequent flight, caused serious physical injury to Postell by pushing and kicking her. (Affidavit in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Opp. Br."), Dkt. No. 5, at ¶¶ 4, 11.) On February 26, 2005, Petitioner entered a hair salon and robbed Ruthy Agron and Kelsa Perez, and attempted to rob Hilda Quesada. (Id. ¶ 5.) On February 27, 2005, Petitioner robbed Robert Clark and, later that same day, robbed Sean Sonderegger. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) During the incidents on February 26 and February 27, Petitioner displayed a handgun. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) For his conduct on January 18, Petitioner was charged with one count of Robbery in the Second Degree, one count of Robbery in the Third Degree, two counts of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree, one count of Petit Larceny, and one count of Assault in the Third Degree. (Id. ¶ 7.) For his conduct on February 26 and February 27, Petitioner was charged with four counts of Robbery in the First Degree, four counts of Robbery in the Third Degree, one count of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, four counts of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree, four counts of Petit Larceny, one count of Attempted Petit Larceny, and five counts of Menacing in the Second Degree. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Petitioner appeared before Justice Patricia DiMango of the New York Supreme Court (the "trial court") on March 13, 2006. (Respondent's Exhibits 1-6 ( ), Dkt. No. 5-2 at ECF1 2.) Petitioner was represented by James Kildoff Esq. (Id. at ECF 3:6-7.) Pursuant to a pleaagreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree for attempting to rob Ms. Quesada on February 26, 2005 and one count of Robbery in the Second Degree for robbing Ms. Postell on January 18, 2005. (Id. at ECF 4-6.) The trial court conducted an extensive plea allocution, during which she asked Petitioner, among other things, if he was satisfied with his attorney's help, if he authorized his attorney to enter the guilty pleas, if he knew that the case had been ready to go to trial, if he knew what rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and if he was pleading guilty freely and voluntary and without any undue coercion. (Id.) Petitioner replied in the affirmative to these inquiries. (Id.)
Petitioner appeared before the trial court again on May 18, 2006 for sentencing. (Id. at ECF 10.) Petitioner was represented by new counsel, Howard Greenberg Esq. (Resp. Ex. A at ECF 11:3-4.) Petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea claiming that he had been coerced into pleading guilty by his previous attorney. (Id. at ECF 11-12.) Petitioner further claimed that at the time he pleaded guilty he was confused. (Id. at ECF 14.) He claimed that he had been seeing a psychiatrist on Rikers Island. (Id.) He stated that Mr. Kildoff "ate his mind" into taking the plea. (Id. at ECF 14:23.) Petitioner claimed that he was innocent of the charges and that he could prove his innocence at trial and urged the court to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. (Id. at ECF 14-15.) The trial court stated that based on Petitioner's criminal history, he was being disingenuous about being coerced into a guilty plea and that he had been asked at his plea allocution if he was pleading voluntarily. (Id. at ECF 13.) The court did not permit Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to sixteen years to life on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. (Id. at ECF 16-18.)
Petitioner, represented by Barry S. Zone, Esq., timely appealed his conviction to the Second Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York ("Appellate Division"). (Id. at ECF 28.) Petitioner raised three issues on appeal: (1) that he did not waive his right to appeal because his waiver was not knowing and voluntary; (2) that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowing and voluntary; and (3) that the case should have been remanded for a presentence report to determine Petitioner's ability to plead guilty. (Id. at ECF 29.) The government conceded that Petitioner had not waived his right to appeal, but the Appellate Division ruled against Petitioner on the second and the third issues, and affirmed his conviction. See People v. Miranda, 67 A.D.3d 709 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). Petitioner applied pro se for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York ("Court of Appeals"). (Resp. Ex. A at ECF 71.) The Court of Appeals denied the application. People v. Miranda, 15 N.Y.3d 922 (2010).
In April 2010, Petitioner, moving pro se, applied to the Appellate Division for a writ of error coram nobis claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Respondent's Exhibits 6-9 ( ), Dkt. No. 5-3 at ECF 2.) The Appellate Division denied the application stating that Petitioner had failed to establish that he had been denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. People v. Miranda, 76 A.D.3d 1105 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). Petitioner moved pro se for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. (Resp. Ex. B at ECF 75.) The Court of Appeals denied the application. People v. Miranda, 16 N.Y.3d 833 (2011).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a federal district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." "[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Howard v. Walker, 406 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) ().
If petitioner's claim "was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings," the district court may only grant the petition if the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is often referred to as "AEDPA2 deference".
An '"adjudication on the merits' is one that '(1) disposes of the claim on the merits, and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment.'" Bell v. Miller, 500 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001)). Review under § 2254(d)(1) is "limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if "the state court reached a conclusion of law that directly contradicts a holding of the Supreme Court" or, "whenpresented with 'facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent,'" the state court arrived at an opposite result. Evans v. Fischer, 712 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)).
A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. "[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 410; see also Grayton v. Ercole, 691 F.3d 165, 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (). A federal habeas court may only "issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with the Supreme Court's precedents." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
A pro se petition for habeas corpus relief must be "construe[d] . . . to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests." Barnes v. Burg...
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