Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Ed. and Welfare, No. 74-1362
| Decision Date | 14 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-1362 |
| Citation | 514 F.2d 996 |
| Parties | Manuel A. MIRANDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Morton Hollander, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Carla A. Hills, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, Julio Morales Sanchez, U. S. Atty., San Juan, P. R., William Kanter, and Paul Blankenstein, Attys., Appellate Section, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellant.
Osvaldo Perez Marrero, Hato Rey, P. R., with whom Plinio Perez Marrero, Hato Rey, P. R., was on brief, for appellee.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, ALDRICH and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has filed an appeal from a decision of the district court overturning the Secretary's termination of social security disability benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 423, previously granted to Manuel A. Miranda. In reversing, the court remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with its views. The Secretary now contends that the legal standards invoked by the court and which he has been directed to follow are erroneous. The case is properly before us. See Lopez v. Secretary, 512 F.2d 1155 (1st Cir. 1975).
The district court's reversal and remand were premised on several grounds. The second of these is a ground held to be erroneous in Lopez, to wit that the Secretary had a duty to consider whether Miranda "would be employed as a result of the diminishment of his productivity due to his physical condition". As pointed out in Lopez, the statutory standard is not employability as such but capacity not whether claimant could actually locate a job but whether health limitations would prevent him from engaging in "substantial gainful work . . . which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in the several regions of the country". 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). To the extent the court directed the Secretary to apply a different standard, it was in error. This error was compounded by the court's reference, in its original filed opinion, to the special weight said to be owed to the opinion of claimant's personal physician. It is for the Secretary, not a reviewing court, to determine what weight to give to particular items of evidence. See, e. g., Gonzalez v. Richardson, 455 F.2d 953, 954 (1st Cir. 1972).
The district court may also have based its review of the Secretary's findings upon a more exacting standard than the substantial evidence test laid down in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Citing Pedroza v. Secretary, 382 F.Supp. 916 (D.P.R.1974), the court described the Secretary as having the burden of proof on the issue of Miranda's continued disability, and as having to produce medical evidence that runs "in a positive vein". If this means that the Secretary's finding of termination must rest upon more than substantial evidence, the court erred.
The concept of "burden of proof" is in this context rather confusing. It is true that one claiming benefits is sometimes described as having the "burden of proof", meaning that he must furnish requisite medical and other evidence within his grasp, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), and show reasonable diligence in maintaining his claim. See Mayes v. Secretary, 300 F.Supp. 76 (M.D.N.C.1968). For his part, however, the Secretary must make an investigation that is not wholly inadequate under the circumstances. And once having found a disability, the Secretary may not terminate the benefits without substantial evidence to justify so doing. This will normally consist of current evidence showing that a claimant has improved to the point of being able to engage in substantial gainful activity; but it might also consist of evidence that claimant's condition is not as serious as was at first supposed. * As for the claimant, he continues at all times under a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in furnishing the Secretary with evidence relevant to his claim.
These responsibilities resist translation into absolutes, especially because social security proceedings are not strictly adversarial. For this reason we see no point in deciding abstractly whether the "burden of proof" at a termination proceeding is on the claimant or Secretary. Both have responsibilities. The question in each case is whether the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence; and this means evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion". Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). The district court should approach the inquiry in that light, and with reference to the criteria stated in the statute and regulations, rather than in different, more expansive terms.
Turning to the facts concerning Miranda, we consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's determination that a period of disability granted as of March 10, 1969, had terminated on August 31, 1971. Miranda hurt his back in March, 1969, while lifting a heavy beam. He was hospitalized for nearly two months beginning in early May, 1969, and for a week in the fall. He asserts continuing inability to work due to severe back pain accompanied by pain and numbness in the left arm and leg.
At a termination hearing the Administrative Law Judge studied Miranda's medical history as reflected in reports of examining physicians in 1969 as well as 1971 medical reports, including the report of an orthopedist, Dr. Arzola, who examined Miranda in August of 1971 at the request of the Social Security Administration. The Administrative Law Judge found the impairment had medically improved to the point where claimant "could perform work which does not require stooping or heavy lifting", and hence could work at jobs in the furniture making and shoe industry which exist in substantial numbers in Puerto Rico. This finding of medical improvement was said to be based on Dr. Arzola's evaluation. However, Dr. Arzola made no affirmative finding that Miranda could work. Like previous examiners, Dr. Arzola diagnosed a sacrolumbar strain; his report concluded:
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