Miranda v. State, No. 759

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWARREN
Citation86 S.Ct. 1602,384 U.S. 436,36 O.O.2d 237,10 Ohio Misc. 9,16 L.Ed.2d 694,10 A.L.R.3d 974
PartiesErnesto A. MIRANDA, Petitioner, v. STATE OF ARIZONA. Michael VIGNERA, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW YORK. Carl Calvin WESTOVER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. Roy Allen STEWART.
Decision Date10 October 1966
Docket NumberNo. 759,No. 760,No. 584,No. 761

384 U.S. 436
10 Ohio Misc.
9
10 A.L.R.3d 974
16 L.Ed.2d 694
36 O.O.2d 237
86 S.Ct.
1602

Ernesto A. MIRANDA, Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF ARIZONA.

Michael VIGNERA, Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF NEW YORK.

Carl Calvin WESTOVER, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner,
v.
Roy Allen STEWART.

No. 759
No. 760
No. 761
No. 584

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued February 28, 1966
Argued March 1, 1966
Argued March 2, 1966
Decided June 13, 1966
Rehearing Denied No. 584 October 10, 1966


Attorneys and Law Firms

86 S.Ct. 1609

No. 759:

384 U.S. 438

John J. Flynn, Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioner.

Gary K. Nelson, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.

Telford Taylor, New York City, for State of New York, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. (Also in Nos. 584, 760, 761 and 762)

Duane R. Nedrud, for National District Attorneys Ass'n, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. (Also in Nos. 760, 762 and 584)

No. 760:

Victor M. Earle, III, New York City, for petitioner.

William I. Siegel, Brooklyn, for respondent.

No. 761:

F. Conger Fawcett, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.

Sol. Gen. Thurgood Marshall, for respondent.

No. 584:

Gorden Ringer, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.

William A. Norris, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

384 U.S. 439

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

384 U.S. 440

We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in

86 S.Ct. 1610

Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said 'I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it,' they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.

This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions. 1 A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and underpinnings.2 Police and prosecutor

384 U.S. 441

have speculated on its range and desirability.3 We granted

86 S.Ct. 1611

certiorari in these cases, 382 U.S. 924, 925, 937, 86 S.Ct. 318, 320, 395, 15 L.Ed.2d 338, 339, 348, in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give

384 U.S. 442

concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.

We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution—that 'No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' and that 'the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel'—rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured 'for ages to come, and * * * designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it,' Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated:

'The maxim 'Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,' had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which (have) long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, (were) not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the

384 U.S. 443

questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.' Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596—597, 16 S.Ct. 644, 646, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896).

In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these constitutional rights, this Court declared in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 30 S.Ct. 544, 551, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910):

'* * * our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted
86 S.Ct. 1612
by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The
384 U.S. 444
meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.'

This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be enforced against overzealous police practices. It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a 'form of words,' Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920), in the hands of government officials. And it is in this spirit, consistent with our role as judges, that we adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.

Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his...

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135 practice notes
  • State v. Roberts, No. 86-779
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • September 2, 1987
    ...for appellant. Oglesby & Oglesby and Geoffrey L. Oglesby, Sandusky, for appellee. HERBERT R. BROWN, Justice. In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 478, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the United States Supreme Court " * * * [T]hat when an individual is taken into custody or ......
  • State v. Jenkins, No. 84-478
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 17, 1984
    ...motion to suppress the inculpatory emergency room statement, as it had not been obtained in conformity with Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [36 O.O.2d 237], and State v. Kassow (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 435 [57 O.O.2d 390], vacated in part ......
  • State v. Maurer, No. 84-642
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 20, 1984
    ...Fourteenth Amendments and were obtained in violation of both due process guarantees and his rights outlined in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [36 O.O.2d It is settled law that a person arrested without probable cause cannot have incriminating statemen......
  • Evans v. State, No. 93-DP-01173-SCT
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • September 11, 1997
    ...of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion." See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
135 cases
  • State v. Roberts, No. 86-779
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • September 2, 1987
    ...for appellant. Oglesby & Oglesby and Geoffrey L. Oglesby, Sandusky, for appellee. HERBERT R. BROWN, Justice. In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 478, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the United States Supreme Court " * * * [T]hat when an individual is taken into custody or ......
  • State v. Jenkins, No. 84-478
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 17, 1984
    ...motion to suppress the inculpatory emergency room statement, as it had not been obtained in conformity with Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [36 O.O.2d 237], and State v. Kassow (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 435 [57 O.O.2d 390], vacated in part ......
  • State v. Maurer, No. 84-642
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 20, 1984
    ...Fourteenth Amendments and were obtained in violation of both due process guarantees and his rights outlined in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [36 O.O.2d It is settled law that a person arrested without probable cause cannot have incriminating statemen......
  • Evans v. State, No. 93-DP-01173-SCT
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • September 11, 1997
    ...of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion." See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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