Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera v. State of New York Westover v. United States State of California v. Stewart 8212 761, 584, Nos. 759

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWARREN
Citation384 U.S. 436,16 L.Ed.2d 694,10 A.L.R.3d 974,86 S.Ct. 1602
Decision Date13 June 1966
Docket NumberNos. 759
PartiesErnesto A. MIRANDA, Petitioner, v. STATE OF ARIZONA. Michael VIGNERA, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW YORK. Carl Calvin WESTOVER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. Roy Allen STEWART. —761, 584

384 U.S. 436
86 S.Ct. 1602
16 L.Ed.2d 694
Ernesto A. MIRANDA, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA. Michael VIGNERA, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW YORK. Carl Calvin WESTOVER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. Roy Allen STEWART.

Nos. 759—761, 584.
Argued Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966.
Decided June 13, 1966.
Rehearing Denied No. 584 Oct. 10, 1966.

See 87 S.Ct. 11.

No. 759:

[Syllabus from pages 436-437 intentionally omitted]

Page 438

John J. Flynn, Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioner.

Gary K. Nelson, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.

Telford Taylor, New York City, for State of New York, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. (Also in Nos. 584, 760, 761 and 762)

Duane R. Nedrud, for National District Attorneys Ass'n, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. (Also in Nos. 760, 762 and 584)

No. 760:

Victor M. Earle, III, New York City, for petitioner.

William I. Siegel, Brooklyn, for respondent.

No. 761:

F. Conger Fawcett, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.

Sol. Gen. Thurgood Marshall, for respondent.

No. 584:

Gorden Ringer, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.

William A. Norris, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

[Amicus Curiae intentionally omitted]

Page 439

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which accure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

Page 440

We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said 'I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it,' they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.

This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions.1 A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and underpinnings.2 Police and prose-

Page 441

cutor have speculated on its range and desirability.3 We granted certiorari in these cases, 382 U.S. 924, 925, 937, 86 S.Ct. 318, 320, 395, 15 L.Ed.2d 338, 339, 348, in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give

Page 442

concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.

We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution—that 'No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' and that 'the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel' rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured 'for ages to come, and * * * designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it,' Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated:

'The maxim 'Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,' had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which (have) long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, (were) not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the

Page 443

questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.' Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 597, 16 S.Ct. 644, 646, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896).

In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these constitutional rights, this Court declared in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 30 S.Ct. 544, 551, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910):

'* * * our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into importent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The

Page 444

meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.'

This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be enforced against overzealous police practices. It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a 'form of words,' Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920), in the hands of government officials. And it is in this spirit, consistent with our role as judges, that we adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.

Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.4 As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the

Page 445

process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

1.

The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of...

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47814 practice notes
  • Maryland v. Shatzer, No. 08-680.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • October 5, 2009
    ..."[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Court adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right from the ......
  • U.S. v. Ruiz, No. 96-CR-227 S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • April 3, 1997
    ...appellate review. --------------- Notes: 1. "Hispanic" is not a race. See Geyer, Americans No More, p. 222 (1996). 2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 3. Defendant's original memorandum quoting the statute left out important parts of the new amended statute. 4......
  • United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, No. 19977.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 5, 1970
    ...S.D.C.L.Ann. § 16-13-10 (1967); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861. Cf. United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522 (7 Cir. 1962). 3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U......
  • Gomez v. U.S., No. CIV. 99-3022.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • May 19, 2000
    ...type of rule with protections similar to those announced by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), decided three years after the treaty was drafted. United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 88......
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47769 cases
  • Maryland v. Shatzer, No. 08-680.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • October 5, 2009
    ..."[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Court adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right from the ......
  • U.S. v. Ruiz, No. 96-CR-227 S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • April 3, 1997
    ...appellate review. --------------- Notes: 1. "Hispanic" is not a race. See Geyer, Americans No More, p. 222 (1996). 2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 3. Defendant's original memorandum quoting the statute left out important parts of the new amended statute. 4......
  • United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, No. 19977.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 5, 1970
    ...S.D.C.L.Ann. § 16-13-10 (1967); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861. Cf. United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522 (7 Cir. 1962). 3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U......
  • Gomez v. U.S., No. CIV. 99-3022.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • May 19, 2000
    ...type of rule with protections similar to those announced by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), decided three years after the treaty was drafted. United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 88......
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4 firm's commentaries
  • By 6-3 vote, SCOTUS rules <em>Miranda</em> violations cannot provide a basis for § 1983 suit
    • United States
    • LexBlog United States
    • June 23, 2022
    ...authored the dissent, which was joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. It starts this way: The Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), affords well-known protections to suspects who are interrogated by police while in custody. Those protections derive from the Constit......
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    • LexBlog United States
    • July 5, 2022
    ...an interrogation conducted by LA County Sheriff’s Deputy Carlos Vega. Vega did not inform Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. During Tekoh’s trial, his signed confession was admitted against him, but the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Tekoh then sued Deputy V......
  • Warning You Of Your Right To Remain Silent Is Not A Right After All
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    • Mondaq United States
    • July 19, 2022
    ...the current generation, has always been the law. Footnotes 1. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3. See id. at 443-44 ("Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue ......
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    ...6-3 split occurred in Vega v. Tekoh, in which the Court considered whether a violation of a person’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), could give rise to a suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, seeking damages for alleged violations of a person’s constitutional rights. Reversin......
37 books & journal articles
  • Rights, Structure, and Remediation: The Collapse of Constitutional Remedies.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 7, May 2022
    • May 1, 2022
    ...silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence," and that he has a right to an attorney, "either retained ot appointed." 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Police must cease all questioning as soon as a suspect invokes the right to remain silent or requests counsel. Id. at 473-74. A......
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    • Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol. 72 Nbr. 3, March 2022
    • March 22, 2022
    ...(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936)) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (70.) Id. at 806. (71.) Id. at 793 ("[P]olice departments almost invariably measure their own efficiency in terms of 'clearances by arrest,'......
  • PROCEDURAL LOSSES AND THE PYRRHIC VICTORY OF ABOLISHING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 99 Nbr. 5, June 2022
    • June 1, 2022
    ...a later established right could lead to a claim, even while past claims failed. (305.) See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). (306.) 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (decided June (307.) This example shows one of several ways that plaintiffs can go from clearly established-prong losses to merits v......
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    • United States
    • International Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 24-4, December 2014
    • December 1, 2014
    ...407 (2008)Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)Ohio Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998)Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)S......
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1 provisions
  • Chapter 335, SB 203 – Juveniles: custodial interrogation
    • United States
    • California Session Laws
    • January 1, 2020
    ...(f) For these reasons, in situations of custodial interrogation and prior to making a waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a youth under 18 years of age should consult with legal counsel to assist in their understanding of their rights and the consequences of waivi......

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