Mish v. Wood et Ux.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1859
• Citation: 34 Pa. 451
• Parties: Mish versus Wood et ux.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

34 Pa. 451

Mish versus Wood et ux.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the District Court of Allegheny county.

Roberts & Mellon, for the plaintiff in error, cited Whitmarsh v. Angle, 3 Am. L. J. 274; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136; People v. Rector, 19 Id. 576; People v. Bodine, 1 Denio 311; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 440; Westlake v. St. Lawrence Ins. Co., 14 Barb. 206; Lewis v. Teukey, 20 Id. 387.

R. Arthurs, for the defendant in error, cited and relied on Detweiler v. Groff, 10 Barr 378.

The opinion of the court was delivered by THOMPSON, J.

The assignment of error here is upon the exception to the admission of the witness Eaton, "to testify his opinion of the value of the goods, mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, merely from a knowledge of their kind and quality as detailed in the testimony of plaintiff below — the said witness having previously testified, he had no other knowledge of them."

The plaintiff herself had testified as to the contents of the trunks, and the value of the articles in them, which the defendant had taken, broken open, and sold at public auction, in discharge of a supposed lien for an innkeeper's bill. After her testimony had been given, without objection, Eaton was called, and testified under objection, that he was engaged in the business of selling trimmings and fancy goods, and gave his opinion of the value of the articles described by the plaintiff, in her testimony. Was it error to permit him to do so?

A general rule of evidence, and which may be found stated in 1 Greenl. Ev. § 440, is, that on "questions of science, skill, trade, or others of the like kind, persons of skill, sometimes called experts, may not only testify to facts, but they are permitted to give their opinions in evidence;" and the instance of the medical men as to the cause of death, or the consequence of injuries, and on the subject of professional skill, is given; so, a ship-builder may give his opinion as to the sea-worthiness of a ship, even on facts stated by others: Id. § 440; for which several English cases are cited; so, with us, an expert has been allowed to prove the method of laying bricks, so as to reach an estimate of the number put into a square yard: Pittsburgh v. O'Neill, 1 Barr 342; and nautical men may give their opinions as to the sea-worthiness of a ship: Reed v. Dick, 8 Watts 481. And in questions of science, skill, trade, &c., experts, it was said, in Detweiler v. Groff, 10 Barr 376, may give their opinions on the facts proved in evidence: see 12 Moore 148; 22 Eng. C. L. 443. The object of such evidence is, generally, if not always, to ascertain either values or injuries. What is then to prevent a merchant from testifying, in corroboration of an invoice, as to values, where no values are given, when goods are lost? The fact of the existence or loss of the goods is not touched by such testimony. That remains to be established by other evidence. I think I have known many instances of this kind. If a trunk should be packed by a servant, incapable of placing a value on the wardrobe of his or her master or mistress, although able to testify to each article, and describe its quality, yet wholly incompetent to give the slightest idea of the real value of the articles; in case of loss, how is the value to be ascertained, but by the testimony of a tradesman acquainted with the value of such articles, based upon a description of them? So, in regard to furniture insured, and lost by fire, it can hardly be doubted, but that it would be competent, to fix the value, by persons acquainted with such matters, and competent, as such, to testify, after its quality had been described. If the rule be, that...