Mishaga v. Schmitz
| Decision Date | 30 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | 10–cv–03187 |
| Citation | 136 F.Supp.3d 981 |
| Parties | Ellen Mishaga, Plaintiff, v. Leo P. Schmitz, Director of the Illinois Department of State Police; Michael W. Vorreyer, Master Sergeant, Illinois Department of State Police, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Steven J. Lechner, Lakewood, CO, James M. Manley, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
Deborah L. Barnes, Illinois Attorney General, Bianca R. Chapman, Office of the Attorney General, Joanna Belle Gunderson, Illinois Attorney General, Springfield, IL, for Defendants.
This cause is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants Leo P. Schmitz1 and Michael W. Vorreyer, of the Illinois State Police, seek an order upholding the Illinois Firearm Owner Identification Act ("the FOID Act" or "the Act"), 430 ILCS 65/1 et seq., as constitutional as applied to Plaintiff Ellen Mishaga, a nonresident of the State of Illinois. Mishaga seeks an order declaring the FOID Act unconstitutional as applied to her because it violates her rights under the Constitution's Article IV and Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
After extensive discovery and briefing, the undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that Mishaga does not have standing to challenge the FOID Act. Because Mishaga lacks standing, her complaint contains no live case or controversy. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, and so Mishaga's Complaint must be dismissed, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment granted.
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because Mishaga's complaint, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges a deprivation, under color of the laws and regulations of the State of Illinois, of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). Venue is proper in this Court because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Mishaga's claims occurred in the Central District of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). No genuine issue of material fact exists if no reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.2007). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir.2008).
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the same standard of review in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies to each movant. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 427 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir.2005). The Seventh Circuit has explained that courts "look to the burden of proof that each party would bear on an issue of trial; we then require that party to go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively establish a genuine issue of material fact." Diaz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir.1997) ). Cross-motions for summary judgment are considered separately, and each party requesting summary judgment must satisfy the Rule 56 standard before judgment will be granted in its favor. See Tegtmeier v. Midwest Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust Fund, 390 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir.2004) ; Santaella, 123 F.3d at 461. Thus, the facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party, which differs depending on which motion is under consideration. Tegtmeier, 390 F.3d at 1045.
The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff Ellen Mishaga is a United States citizen and a resident of Ohio. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., d/e 22, at 5.)2 Mishaga frequently travels to Illinois with her husband and, while here, stays in the home of friends who are Illinois residents. (Id. ) Mishaga wishes to possess a functional firearm for her self-defense while staying in her Illinois friends' home, but she does not wish to possess or carry a functional firearm outside of her friends' home. (See id., Ex. 2, at 11.) At least one member of Mishaga's Illinois friends' household possesses a valid Firearm Owner Identification, or "FOID," card and lawfully possesses firearms for hunting and self-defense purposes. (See id., Ex. 1, at 2.) Mishaga's Illinois friends want Mishaga to be able to possess firearms for self-defense while she stays with them in their home.3 (See id. at 3.)
In Illinois, the Firearm Owner Identification Act generally prohibits a person from possessing firearms or ammunition unless that person also possesses a FOID card, or unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. (430 ILCS 65/2 ; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., d/e 20, at 3; Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., d/e 22, at 8–9.) One such exception, called Exception 10 throughout this Opinion, provides that nonresidents may possess firearms or ammunition without a FOID card while in Illinois if the nonresidents are "licensed or registered to possess a firearm in their resident state." 430 ILCS 65/2(b)(10).
The Illinois State Police accepts and processes applications for FOID cards, performs background checks on applicants, and issues FOID cards to individuals who are not disqualified by state or federal statutes from possessing firearms. (See Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., d/e 22, at 5.) As part of the application, the Illinois State Police requires applicants to provide the number from a valid Illinois driver's license or Illinois identification card. (Id. at 6.) By statute, the only nonresidents who may obtain a FOID card are military, law enforcement, and security personnel employed in Illinois. (Pl.'s Supplemental Br., d/e 34, at 6; see also 430 ILCS 65/4(a–10) (); 430 ILCS 65/8(q) ().)
Mishaga, as an Ohio resident, possesses neither an Illinois driver's license nor an Illinois identification card. ( Id. at 7.) Mishaga also does not have any sort of firearm permit from her state of residence, Ohio, because Ohio does not issue permits merely to possess a firearm and because Mishaga does not want the permit Ohio does issue that would license her to carry a concealed firearm outside of the home. (Id. ) Further, Mishaga is not disqualified from possessing a firearm or ammunition under any state or federal statute, and she and her husband do lawfully possess firearms in Ohio. (Id. ) However, Mishaga is not a law enforcement officer, an armed security officer in Illinois, or military personnel permanently assigned in Illinois.
On March 27, 2010, Mishaga submitted an application for a FOID card to the Illinois State Police. (Id. at 6.) On April 30, 2010, Defendants denied Mishaga's FOID card application because she had not provided an Illinois driver's license number or Illinois identification card number, which she does not have, on the application. (Id. ) On May 17, 2010, Mishaga submitted a second application for a FOID card. (Id. ) On June 14, 2010, Defendants denied Mishaga's second application, stating, "Due to Illinois state law, you must have a valid [Illinois] driver[']s license or [Illinois] state ID in order to be eligible for an [Illinois] FOID card." (Id. )
On Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court assumes without deciding that, other than possessing an Illinois driver's license or Illinois identification card, Mishaga meets every other qualification for a FOID card. (Id. at 7.) Mishaga wishes to be issued a FOID card because she believes that without a FOID card, the FOID Act prohibits her from possessing a functional firearm for self-defense when she stays in her Illinois friends' home.
Mishaga filed suit against Defendants on July 27, 2010, alleging that Illinois's FOID Act violated her right, under the Constitution's Article IV and Second and Fourteenth Amendments, to possess a functional firearm for self-defense while staying in her Illinois friends' home. On October 15, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the Court denied in an Opinion issued November 22, 2010. Mishaga filed an Amended Complaint on March 1, 2011. Following discovery, Defendants and Mishaga filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment on October 3, 2011. The Court twice requested supplemental briefing from the parties on March 28, 2014, and denied the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment on September 20, 2014, with leave to refile.
On October 31, 2014, Mishaga filed a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendants renewed their Motion for Summary Judgment on November 14, 2014. These Motions for Summary Judgment (d/e 39 & d/e 40) have been fully briefed and are now ripe for decision.
As a preliminary matter, the Court denies Mishaga's motion to strike incorporated into her Response to Defendants' Supplemental Brief (d/e 41). Mishaga seeks to strike Defendants' Supplemental Brief (d/e 38) and Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 40) because, Mishaga says, these motions do not comply with this Court's Order of ...
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