Mishra v. Coleman Motors, LLC

Decision Date15 March 2017
Docket NumberCase number 4:16cv01553 PLC
PartiesGYANESHWAR PRASAD MISHRA, Plaintiff, v. COLEMAN MOTORS, LLC, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gyaneshwar Prasad Mishra moves to remand this case to state court [ECF No. 6].1 Defendant Coleman Motors, LLC, opposes remand. The motion is denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Missouri, a three-count petition seeking monetary relief from Defendant for conduct arising out of Plaintiff's March 2016 purchase of a 2010 Mercedes Benz GLK from Defendant. (Pl.'s Pet'n [ECF No. 3].) To support each of his claims, Plaintiff alleged that in February 2016 he searched the internet for a motor vehicle, found one in which he was interested, and viewed information about the car on the internet. (Id. ¶¶ 18-21.) Plaintiff called Defendant on March 1, 2016 and "asked for more details . . . on the quality and condition of a 2010 Mercedes Benz GLK" he had seen and provided the Vehicle Identification Number. (Id. ¶¶ 22 & 23.) Defendant's employee allegedly "told Plaintiff that the vehicle was a good car, that it ran great, that it had never been in an accident, and that 'there's absolutely nothing wrong with it.'" (Id. ¶ 24). Later that day, Defendant's employee sent pictures of the vehicle to Plaintiff's cell phone, which Plaintiff viewed. (Id. ¶ 25.)Based on Defendant's representations and transmissions, Plaintiff texted Defendant's employee that Plaintiff "was interested in traveling to Florida to purchase the vehicle." (Id. ¶ 26.) In response, "Defendant actively discouraged Plaintiff from leaving Missouri telling Plaintiff he would have to pay Florida and Missouri taxes, [and stating] that Defendant would ship the vehicle to Missouri." (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff subsequently provided Defendant with Plaintiff's home address, and signed and mailed to Defendant a purchase order Defendant had emailed to Plaintiff, along with Plaintiff's certified check. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30.) Plaintiff allegedly received the vehicle and vehicle title on March 10, 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 35 & 36.)

On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff texted Defendant advising Defendant of problems Plaintiff had noticed "within approximately sixty miles of driving the vehicle," including an illuminated check engine light, illuminated airbag light, and "a burning oil smell." (Id. ¶¶ 40 & 41.) The next day, Plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to speak with Defendant by telephone. (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff took the vehicle to a Mercedes-Benz dealership and two automotive shops in Missouri. (Id. ¶¶ 44-46.) Plaintiff was told: (1) the vehicle had "numerous defects and nonconformities" that "would cost in excess of $13,000 to repair"; (2) "the vehicle showed evidence of previous body work, indicating that the front end had been totaled and rebuilt"; and (3) "the damage to the vehicle from a prior accident was so severe that the[ automotive shop] did not want to do any work on the vehicle." (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently learned the vehicle "had been announced as having structural damage at an auction." (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff further alleged the vehicle had a value of $13,500.00 "if it had been as warranted at the time of purchase." (Id. ¶ 66.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant is liable for: violating the Magnuson Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. (Count I); negligent misrepresentations about the car's qualities (Count II); and violating the MissouriMerchandising Practices Act ("MMPA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 et seq. (Count III). For Defendant's alleged violations of the MMWA, Plaintiff seeks an award of "[t]he full purchase price of the vehicle, collateral charges, finance charges, incidental [damages,] . . . consequential damages[ and] [c]osts, including expert witness fees and reasonable attorney's fees." (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff requests an award of compensatory damages plus costs for Defendant's allegedly negligent misrepresentations. (Id. at 9.) With regard to Defendant's alleged violations of the MMPA, Plaintiff asks for an award of "actual damages that will fairly and justly compensate Plaintiff, punitive damages in the amount of the greater of $500,000 or five times the actual damages, . . . his costs, attorneys' fees, [and] interest." (Id. at 11.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1446, Defendant removed the lawsuit from state court, on three grounds: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Plaintiff's MMWA and MMPA claims; (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 over Plaintiff's state law negligence and MMPA claims; and (3) supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (Def.'s Notice Removal [ECF No. 1].) Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court on the ground the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, Plaintiff argued Defendant failed to: (1) establish the $50,000.00 amount in controversy needed for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the MMWA claim; (2) demonstrate the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 for the Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims; and (3) show the MMPA claim turns on substantial questions of federal law so as to fall within the Court's federal question jurisdiction. (Pl. Suggestions Supp. Mot. Remand [ECF No. 7].)

II. Discussion
A. Removal Jurisdiction

A defendant may remove to federal court any state court civil action over which the federal court could exercise original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "The [removing] defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). The federal court must remand the case to state court if it appears the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Importantly, "[a]ll doubts about federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court." In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d at 620.

B. Amount in controversy for original jurisdiction over the MMWA claim

In his motion to remand, Plaintiff argues the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the MMWA claim because the statutorily required $50,000.00 jurisdictional minimum, exclusive of interest and costs, is not satisfied. Plaintiff urges the Court can neither use any request for attorney's fees nor a request for punitive damages in the MMPA claim to satisfy the MMWA's jurisdictional amount. In its removal notice, Defendant asserts the Court may consider: (1) "correspondence prepared [by Plaintiff]'s counsel . . . claim[ing Plaintiff] has incurred $900.00/month to store the vehicle at issue, as well as (2) the punitive damages Plaintiff seeks with regard to his MMPA claim to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum required for the MMWA claim.

The MMWA provides that "a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief." 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). Importantly, a federal district court has jurisdiction over MMWA claims only "if the amount in controversy is [not] less than $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in the suit."15 U.S.C. §§ 2310(d)(1)(B), 2310(d)(3)(B). The statutory reference to "all claims," however, does not allow consideration of the amount of damages requested for any non-MMWA claim to satisfy the jurisdictional amount required for an MMWA claim. See Scarlott v. Nissan N. Am. Inc., 771 F.3d 883, 887-88 (5th Cir. 2014) ("damages for any pendent state-law claims should not be included to satisfy the jurisdictional amount [under the MMWA]"); Ansari v. Bella Auto. Grp., Inc., 145 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 1998) ("the amount in controversy for purposes of [the MMWA] does not include damages flowing from any pendent state law claim brought by a plaintiff"); Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC, No. 15 Civ. 1600 (JCM), 2016 WL 828135, at *5 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 23, 2016) (due to text of statute, legislative history, and concept of supplemental jurisdiction, only MMWA claim damage may be considered), appeal pending, No. 16-815 (2nd Cir. filed Mar. 16, 2016); Poindexter v. Morse Chevrolet, Inc., 270 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1292 (D. Kan. 2003) (to preserve Congress's distinction between state court and federal court jurisdiction, the "all claims" statutory language "must be construed to mean all Magnuson-Moss Act claims, not all federal and state claims"); but see Harnden v. Jayco, Inc., 496 F.3d 579, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2007) (considering damages in state law claims to satisfy MMWA jurisdictional amount).

Additionally, attorney's fees are excluded from the calculation of the jurisdictional minimum necessary for a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over an MMWA claim. See, e.g., Scarlott, 771 F.3d at 887; Ansari, 145 F.3d at 1271-72; Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1069 (5th Cir. 1984); Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). A court may, however, consider a request for punitive damages under the MMWA in the calculation of the jurisdictional amount for that claim if an award of punitive damages is permitted under state law for a related claim. See, e.g., Boelens, 748 F.2d at 1069; Saval, 710F.2d at 1033; Baker v. Auto Stop, Inc., No. 4:12cv00244 CEJ, 2012 WL 3762047, at *2 (Mo. ED. Aug. 29, 2012).

With regard to his MMWA claim, Plaintiff alleged the value of the vehicle, "if it had been as warranted at the time of purchase, was $13,500.00"; he "suffered incidental and/or consequential damages as a result of Defendant's breach of the implied warranties"; and he sought "all costs, including attorney's fees and expert witness fees." (Pl.'s Pet'n ¶¶ 66-68.) Plaintiff demanded damages consisting of "[...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT