Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am.

• Decision Date: 26 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18915.,18915.
• Citation: 61 A.3d 485,308 Conn. 146
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MISITI, LLC, et al. v. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA et al.

308 Conn. 146

61 A.3d 485

MISITI, LLC, et al.

v.TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA et al.

No. 18915.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 2012.

Decided March 26, 2013.

Jack G. Steigelfest, Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Paul G. Roche, Avon, for the appellee (named defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The principal issue in this case is whether an insurer has a duty to defend an additional insured when the complaint in the underlying personal injury action draws no connection between the injured person's use of the insured premises and her injuries, and undisputed extrinsic facts indicate that the underlying action falls outside of the scope of coverage under the policy. The named plaintiff, Misiti, LLC (Misiti), was an additional insured on a commercial general liability insurance policy (policy), which was issued to Misiti's tenant, Church Hill Tavern, LLC (tavern), by the named defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers).¹ Misiti sought to invoke Travelers' duty to defend under the policy after Sarah Middeleer was injured in a fall on Misiti's property and brought the underlying action against Misiti. Misiti's insurer, the Netherlands Insurance Company (Netherlands),² provided a defense to Misiti after Travelers denied any duty to defend Misiti in the underlying action. Misiti then brought the present action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that Travelers had a duty to defend Misiti in the underlying action and that Travelers was obligated to reimburse Netherlands for all or part of the defense costs that it had expended. In this certified appeal, Misiti claims that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court's judgment and improperly directed the trial court to render judgment in favor of Travelers because the Appellate Court misconstrued the language of the policy and incorrectly concluded that Middeleer's injuries did not arise out of the use of the leased premises under the terms of the policy. Travelers responds that the Appellate Court correctly construed the relevant policy language and that the complaint in the underlying action contained no allegations that could support a conclusion that Middeleer's injuries arose out of the use of the leased premises. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history, which are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Misiti owned commercial property at 1, 3 and 5 Glen Road in Sandy Hook,³ which included commercial buildings and a riverside park area. Misiti leased the first floor of the building at 1 Glen Road to the tavern and certain rights common to Misiti's other tenants, including the use of a nearby parking lot.⁴ The tavern carried a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Travelers, which included an endorsementthat named Misiti as an additional insured, “but only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased to [the tavern]....” ⁵

In the underlying action, which Middeleer ⁶ brought and settled before the present declaratory judgment action was commenced, Middeleer claimed that she had been injured after falling on Misiti's premises. Middeleer did not sue the tavern, nor did she mention the tavern in her complaint. The underlying complaint contained the following relevant allegations: “Misiti ... was at all [relevant] times ... the owner of record of the real property, structures and improvements situated at, behind and adjacent to the commercial buildings located at 1, 3 and 5 Glen Road, Sandy Hook.... A portion of [Misiti's] premises ... consisted of a steep retaining wall of over six ... feet in height. Beneath the retaining wall located on [Misiti's] premises is the riverbed of the Pootatuck River.... There was at all [relevant] times ... a wood guard consisting of a wooden fence of split-rail design located along the top of the ... retaining wall.... On July 22, 2008, [Middeleer] was a business invitee [on Misiti's] premises.... While ... Middeleer leaned against the top rail of the wood guard, the top rail collapsed into pieces, causing [her] to fall off the retaining wall onto the rocks situated on the riverbed located below the retaining wall.... The purpose of [Misiti's] premises involved persons being invited onto [them] to do business with its commercial tenants.... Misiti ... managed, operated, possessed and/or controlled the premises [on which] the injur[ies] occurred....”

On the basis of these allegations, Travelers determined that it had no duty to defend Misiti in the underlying action. Misiti then brought the present action, seeking a judgment declaring that it was entitled to a defense under the policy and that Travelers was obligated to reimburse Netherlands for the costs that it had expended in defending Misiti. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, seeking a determination of whether Travelers had a duty to defend Misiti on the basis of the allegations contained in the underlying complaint. At the trial court's request, however, the parties also stipulated to certainundisputed facts in addition to those set forth in the underlying complaint.⁷

After the trial court granted Misiti's motion for summary judgment and denied Travelers' motion for summaryjudgment, Travelers appealed to the Appellate Court. Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, 132 Conn.App. 629, 630, 33 A.3d 783 (2011). Travelers claimed that the trial court improperly had granted Misiti's motion for summary judgment and denied Travelers' motion for summary judgment upon concluding that Travelers had a duty to defend Misiti in the underlying action. Id., at 637, 33 A.3d 783. Travelers specifically contended that Middeleer's injuries did not arise out of the use of the leased premises under the terms of the policy. Id., at 640, 33 A.3d 783. The Appellate Court agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court, directing the trial court to deny Misiti's motion for summary judgment, to grant Travelers' motion for summary judgment, and to render judgment thereon for Travelers. Id., at 644, 33 A.3d 783. We granted Misiti's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court improperly granted [Misiti's] motion for summary judgment and denied [Travelers'] motion for summary judgment?” Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, 303 Conn. 930, 930–31, 36 A.3d 241 (2012).

On appeal, Misiti claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly construed the governing policy language and further claims that the underlying complaint contains sufficient facts to raise the possibility that Middeleer's injuries arose out of the use of the leased premises because the tavern, located at 1 Glen Road, fell within the area described in the underlying complaint, which included the commercial property located at 1, 3 and 5 Glen Road and the surrounding area. Travelers counters that the Appellate Court properly interpreted the policy language and correctly concluded that Middeleer's injuries did not arise out of the use of the leased premises because the underlying complaint made no mention of the tavern or otherwise alleged that the tavern's negligence, rather than Misiti's, caused Middeleer's injuries. As a result, Travelers asserts that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for Misiti and that the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court's judgment. We agree with Travelers.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review. With respect to summary judgment, our standard of review is well established. “Summary judgment rulings present questions of law; accordingly, [o]ur review of the ... decision to grant [a] ... motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Farrell v. Twenty–First Century Ins. Co., 301 Conn. 657, 661, 21 A.3d 816 (2011); see also Practice Book § 17–49. In addition, the interpretation of an insurance contract presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. E.g., Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 457, 462, 876 A.2d 1139 (2005); QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 352, 773 A.2d 906 (2001). Finally, with respect to an insurer's duty to defend a claim brought against the insured, “[t]he question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured is purely a question of law, which is to be determined by comparing the allegations of [the] complaint with the terms of the insurance policy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wentland v. American Equity Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 592, 599 n. 7, 840 A.2d 1158 (2004).

The following legal principles inform our analysis. “It is the function of the court to construe the provisions of the contract of insurance.... The [i]nterpretation of an insurance policy ... involves a determination of the intent of the parties as expressed by the language of the policy ... [including] what coverage the ... [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy.... [A] contract of insurance must be viewed in its entirety, and the intent of the parties for entering it derived from the four corners of the policy ... [givingthe] words ... [of the policy] their natural and ordinary meaning ... [and construing] any ambiguity in the terms ... in favor of the insured....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 256 Conn. at 351–52, 773 A.2d 906; accord Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Illinois, 247 Conn. 801, 805–806, 724 A.2d 1117 (1999). This rule of construction that favors the insured in case of ambiguity applies only when the terms “are, without violence, susceptible of two [equally reasonable]...