Misquith v. Palm Beach Cnty. Health Care Dist.
| Docket Number | 20-CV-81123- AMC |
| Decision Date | 29 September 2021 |
| Parties | DR. EUGENE MISQUITH, Plaintiff, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY HEALTH CARE DISTRICT, ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER, ROBERT BORREGO, and PALM BEACH TRAUMA ASSOCIATES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 86)
In his verified Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Plaintiff, Dr Eugene Misquith, a sexagenarian Indian-American male with a history of heart problems, sues four defendants for employment discrimination and retaliation under both Federal and State law. He also brings common law contract-based claims. The Defendants jointly move to dismiss all counts with prejudice. This matter was referred to me by the Honorable Aileen M. Cannon for a Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 88. For the reasons stated, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.
Dr Misquith filed this lawsuit on July 13, 2020. ECF No. 1. In a detailed 44-page motion, all four defendants moved to dismiss the original Complaint. ECF No. 26. Rather than responding to the motion, Dr. Misquith filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 39. The defendants moved to dismiss in a 35-page motion that again pointed out potential issues with Dr. Misquith's legal theories. ECF No. 53. After full briefing, Magistrate Judge Brannon recommended dismissing the First Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading. ECF No. 65. Judge Cannon adopted this recommendation, dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice, gave Dr. Misquith “one final opportunity to file an amended complaint” and instructed that the “second amended complaint must avoid incorporating into successive counts all preceding allegations and counts; must clearly identify the particular factual allegations relevant to each count; and must specify in explicit terms the exact cause of action in each count and against whom each cause of action is alleged.” ECF No. 70 at 2 (emphasis in original).
Dr. Misquith filed a verified Second Amended Complaint on June 16, 2020. ECF No. 73. It is 90 pages long, comprises 405 separately-numbered paragraphs, and contains over 350 pages of exhibits. Id. It alleges claims under (1) the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Florida Whistleblower Act (“FWA”) (collectively “the AntiDiscrimination Statutes”); (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Florida common law for breach of contract. Defendants once again move to dismiss, raising the same legal arguments asserted in their prior motions. ECF No. 86.
I have reviewed the Motion to Dismiss, the Response, and the Reply. ECF Nos. 90, 93. I am fully advised and this matter is ripe for decision.
This Report and Recommendation does not address every argument made by Defendants in support of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion. This analysis is unnecessary given the multiple grounds discussed below that warrant dismissal of the SAC.[1]
1. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To satisfy this Rule 8 pleading requirements, a claim must provide the defendant fair notice of plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). While a claim “does not need detailed factual allegations, ” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). Nor can a claim rest on “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must view the well-pled factual allegations in a claim in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016).Viewed in that manner, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the claim are true (even if doubtful in fact). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. at 570. In addition, “courts may infer from factual allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanations, which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct that plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Am. Dental Assoc. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6):
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Factually unsupported allegations based “on information and belief” are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Scott v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2018 WL 3360754, at *6 (S. D. Fla. June 29, 2018) (J. Altonaga) (“Conclusory allegations made upon information and belief are not entitled to a presumption of truth, and allegations stated upon information and belief that do not contain any factual support fail to meet the Twombly standard.”).
2. Shotgun Pleading
In addition to Rule 8(a)(2)'s requirement that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) states in pertinent part, “If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence - and each defense other than a denial - must be stated in a separate count or defense.” “Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.'” Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Failure to cure a shotgun pleading after having notice of its defects can result in dismissal with prejudice. Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018) ().
In Weiland, the Court of Appeals noted “four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings.” Id. at 1321-23. As relevant here, the categories included (1) the “mortal sin” of a later count of a complaint incorporating by reference an earlier count, (2) the “venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action, ” and (3) “the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. The common theme among all shotgun pleadings “is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. Defendants renew their argument that the Second Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading. As an initial matter, the SAC complies with Judge Cannon's instruction to not incorporate all preceding allegations and counts into successive counts. Each count also identifies the specific facts relevant to that count. The title of each count identifies the cause of action and the named defendant(s). Unfortunately, the SAC is replete with irrelevant facts, statements of legal principles, and citations to cases and statutes. Defendants argue that the individual counts still fail to clearly identify the named defendant. One reason, they assert, is that the causes of action are based on a “joint employment” theory. They argue that the joint employment theory creates ambiguity about which defendant(s) are named in the count. I disagree. The underlying joint employment theory does not convert an individual count against one named defendant into an impermissible shotgun pleading; rather, it merely makes clear that the count may seek to hold the named defendant liable for acts committed by other unnamed defendants. Defendants next allege that Counts XIX-XXI are shotgun pleadings because they are pled “in the alternative to the employment claims previously outlined, and pursuant to FRCP 8(d)(2).” ¶¶ 369 (Count XIX against Health Care District), 385 (Count XX against Health Care District), and 392 (Count XXI against St. Mary's Medical Center).[2] Defendants assert that this language brings the unnamed alleged joint employers into the respective counts. Defendants read too much into...
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