Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 28 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 05-0734.,No. 05-0762.,No. 05-0763.,05-0734.,05-0762.,05-0763.
• Citation: 253 S.W.3d 653
• Parties: MISSION CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. Gloria GARCIA, Respondent. Mission Consolidated Independent School District, Petitioner, v. Melinda Sotuyo, Respondent. Mission Consolidated Independent School District, Petitioner, v. Deborah Medina, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

253 S.W.3d 653

MISSION CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. Gloria GARCIA, Respondent.

Mission Consolidated Independent School District, Petitioner, v. Melinda Sotuyo, Respondent.

Mission Consolidated Independent School District, Petitioner, v. Deborah Medina, Respondent.

No. 05-0734.

No. 05-0762.

No. 05-0763.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 28, 2008.

Rehearing Denied June 20, 2008.

David P. Hansen, Stephen Jon Moss, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, Dennis J. Eichelbaum, Frisco, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, P.C., Austin, for Petitioner.

Savannah Robinson, Law Office of Savannah Robinson, Danbury, Carlos Enrique Hernandez Jr., Law Offices of Carlos E. Hernandez, Jr., Edinburg, for Gloria Garcia, in No. 05-0734.

Savannah Robinson, Law Office of Savannah Robinson, Danbury, Carlos Enrique Hernandez Jr., Law Offices of Carlos E. Hernandez, Jr., Edinburg, for Melinda Sotuyo, in No. 05-0762.

Savannah Robinson, Law Office of Savannah Robinson, Danbury, Carlos Enrique Hernandez Jr., Law Offices of Carlos E. Hernandez, Jr., Edinburg, for Deborah Medina, in No. 05-0763.

Clay T. Grover, Feldman & Rogers, L.L.P., Houston, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of School Boards Legal Assistance Fund in 05-0734.

Justice O'NEILL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, three terminated school-district employees filed suit against the district and its superintendent alleging violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA") and various common-law claims that do not fit within the Texas Tort Claims Act's limited waiver of immunity. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021. We must decide whether the Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision applies to the employees' claims. See id. § 101.106. We hold that the Act's election scheme governs all suits against a governmental unit, and that its application here bars all common-law recovery against the superintendent and the school district. However, in this case, the Act's election scheme does not bar the employees' recovery under the TCHRA because the Legislature has consented to suits against the government under the TCHRA, see id. § 101.106(b), and a suit that is based on the TCHRA is not one brought under the Tort Claims Act, see id. § 101.106(e). Accordingly, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the court of appeals' judgment.

I. Background

On February 19, 2003, the Mission Consolidated Independent School District ("the ISD") terminated the employment of three long-time employees, Gloria Garcia, Melinda Sotuyo, and Deborah Medina (collectively, "Garcia"). All three filed identical lawsuits against the ISD and H.F. "Jackie" Dyer, the ISD superintendent which have been consolidated on appeal. Garcia sued the ISD for discriminatory wrongful discharge in violation of the TCHRA. TEX. LAB.CODE §§ 21.001-21.556. She also alleged common-law claims against the ISD and Dyer for intentional infliction of emotional distress and against Dyer for defamation, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.

The ISD filed pleas to the jurisdiction contending Garcia's decision to sue both the ISD and its employee barred recovery against the ISD pursuant to section 101.106(b) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, which provides that the "filing of a suit against any employee of a governmental unit ... immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(b). The trial court denied the ISD's pleas, and the court of appeals affirmed. 166 S.W.3d 902, 903. We granted the ISD's petitions¹ to determine the scope of the Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision and its effect on Garcia's claims.

II. The Texas Tort Claims Act

Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, exist to protect the State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages.² Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006). Such lawsuits "hamper governmental functions by requiring tax resources to be used for defending lawsuits and paying judgments rather than using those resources for their intended purposes." Id. at 375 (citing Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002)). Accordingly, we have long recognized that "no State can be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent." Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847). Because the Legislature is better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues associated with waiving immunity, we look to pertinent legislative enactments to determine the extent to which immunity has been voluntarily relinquished. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. 2003). We interpret statutory waivers of immunity narrowly, as the Legislature's intent to waive immunity must be clear and unambiguous. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.034.

The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain suits against governmental entities and caps recoverable damages. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.023. The Act generally waives governmental immunity to the extent that liability arises from the "use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment" or from "a condition or use of tangible personal or real property." Id. § 101.021. For school districts, the Act's waiver is even narrower, encompassing only tort claims involving the use or operation of motor vehicles. Id. § 101.051.

After the Tort Claims Act was enacted, plaintiffs often sought to avoid the Act's damages cap or other strictures by suing governmental employees, since claims against them were not always subject to the Act. See Michael S. Hull et al., House Bill 4 and Proposition 12: An Analysis with Legislative History, Part Three: Detailed Analysis of the Medical Liability Reforms, 36 TEX. TECH L.REV. 169, 290-93 (2005). To prevent such circumvention, and to protect governmental employees, the Legislature created an election-of-remedies provision. As originally enacted, section 101.106, entitled "Employees Not Liable After Settlement or Judgment," provided:

A judgment in an action or a settlement of a claim under this chapter bars any action involving the same subject matter by the claimant against the employee of the governmental unit whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.

Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R. S., ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3305 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106). Employees were thus afforded some protection when claims against the governmental unit were reduced to judgment or settled, but there was nothing to prevent a plaintiff from pursuing alternative theories against both the employee and the governmental unit through trial or other final resolution.

In 2003, as part of a comprehensive effort to reform the tort system, the Legislature amended section 101.106. That section, entitled "Election of Remedies," now provides:

(a) The filing of a suit under this chapter against a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.

(b) The filing of a suit against any employee of a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter unless the governmental unit consents.

(c) The settlement of a claim arising under this chapter shall immediately and forever bar the claimant from any suit or recovery from any employee of the same governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.

(d) A judgment against an employee of a governmental unit shall immediately and forever bar the party obtaining the judgment from any suit against or recovery from the governmental unit.

(e) If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.

(f) If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee's employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee's official capacity only. On the employee's motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.

TEX. CIV. PRA C. & REM.CODE § 101.106. The revision's apparent purpose was to force a plaintiff to decide at the outset whether an employee acted independently and is thus solely liable, or acted within the general scope of his or her employment such that the governmental unit is vicariously liable,³ thereby reducing the resources that the government and its employees must use in defending redundant litigation and alternative theories of recovery. By requiring a plaintiff to make an irrevocable election at the time suit is filed between suing the governmental unit under the Tort Claims Act or proceeding against the employee alone, section 101. 106 narrows the issues for trial and reduces delay and duplicative litigation costs. See id.

It is true, as Garcia claims, that the Tort Claims Act's election scheme is intended to protect governmental employees by favoring their early dismissal when a claim regarding the same subject matter is also made against the governmental employer. See id. § 101.106(e), (f). But it is equally true that by forcing plaintiffs to make an irrevocable election at the time suit is filed, the Legislature intended to reduce the delay and expense associated with...