Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 30 April 1934
• Docket Number: 31225
• Citation: 159 So. 562,173 Miss. 507,154 So. 533
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: MISSISSIPPI CENT. R. CO. v. SMITH

154 So. 533

159 So. 562, 173 Miss. 507

MISSISSIPPI CENT. R. CO. v. SMITH

No. 31225

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 30, 1934

Division B

Suggestion Of Error Sustained In Part, February 25, 1935.

See79 L.Ed. 1673, 295 U.S. 718.

APPEAL from circuit court of Adams countyHON. R. L. CORBAN, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Mattie Rife Smith against the Mississippi Central Railroad Company.Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.Affirmed.

On suggestion of error, suggestion of error sustained in part and affirmed with remittitur.

Affirmed.Suggestion of error sustained in part, and affirmed with remittitur.

Brady Dean & Hobbs, of Brookhaven, for appellant.

Appellant was entitled to a peremptory instruction.

The great preponderance of credible evidence establishes that the bell was ringing for at least one thousand feet and the crossing whistle blown.

There is no issue that the car was operated in a grossly negligent manner.

Sims v. McIntyre, 8 S. & M. 327;McQueen v. Bostwick,12 S. & M. 604;Barbee v. Reese,60 Miss. 906;Fore v. Railway,87 Miss. 218, 39 So. 493, 600;Clarke v. Moyse,48 So. 721;McFadden v. Buckley,98 Miss. 28, 53 So. 351;Railroad Co. v. Bennett,127 Miss. 413990 So. 113;G. & S. I. R. Co. v. Adkinson, 117 Miss. 118, 77 So.954.

There is no question of imputed negligence involved, but all negligence was negligence of appellee, as well as of the driver.

This gross negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision, independently of signals.

Pugh v. I. C. R. R. Co., 23 So. 356;Pietri v. L. & N. R. R. Co.,152 Miss. 185, 119 So. 164;M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Jobe,69 Miss. 452, 10 So. 672;Railroad Co. v. Bennett,127 Miss. 413990 So. 113;Railroad Co. v. Buford, 150 Miss. 832, 116 So. 817.

On the showing of this record there is no statutory negligence here.The prima facie statute of the state of Mississippi is not involved.All the facts are in evidence and the legal principles by which those facts are to be weighed are general, common law principles of negligence.

C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U.S. 697, 24 L.Ed. 542;Scofield v. C. M. & St. P. Railroad Co.,114 U.S. 615, 29 L.Ed. 224;N. P. Railroad Co. v. Freeman,174 U.S. 389, 43 L.Ed. 1014;B. & O. Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 72 L.Ed. 167.

Appellant, whose rails are within one state but whose connections, as shown by contract for delivery, and actual carriage of goods in interstate commerce, generally and at the time of the accident in question, make it as truly an interstate carrier, and invest it with the same rights, as any road operating in the United States, even from coast to coast.To classify it differently by approving the instruction to the jury that it should not consider the question as to whether or not the applicant was engaged in interstate commerce at the time, and place when and at which the injuries complained of by appellee occurred, thereby denying it the benefit of the standard laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, would be to take away from it a title, right, privilege and immunity enjoyed by other citizens of the United States, would deny to it the equal protection of the law, and would deprive it of its property without due process of law, all in contravention and violation of section 1, article XIV, of the amendments to the constitution of the United States.

The verdict is excessive.

Y. & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835;G. N. & N. R. R. Co. v. Arrington,107 So. 378;Bateman case, 162 Miss. 404;Vicksburg v. Scott,168 So. 522;Galtney v. Wood,149 Miss. 56, 63;Kennedy case, 167 Miss. 305, 314;17 C. J. 1099;46 So. 959.

There is no weight of evidence for appellee, there is no, conflict in regard to visibility, the verdict of the jury was not based upon real evidence as to visibility, and is contrary to that which this court must accept because undisputed.

Full discussions of the admissibility of photographs as evidence appear in the following authorities:

55. A.L.R. 1343;10 R. C. L. 1153;22 C. J. 913;22 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 774;35 L.R.A. 808;51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 853.

Appellee's own testimony does most clearly and positively commit her, in the words of this court, not only to the fact that she stopped, looked, proceeded, and was struck, but, also, that she looked from about ten feet within the stop sign, proceeded at a speed of between five and ten miles per hour, and did not cease to look, at least until just before they were struck.

The engineer, S. C. King, testified that the speed of the car was fast while the speed of the train was about twenty-five miles per hour.C. Q. Smith, the fireman, likewise testified that the speed of the train was about twenty-five miles per hour.

There is no basis in the record to increase the rate of speed of the train from twenty-five miles per hour to forty-five miles per hour, nor to diminish the speed of the automobile to two and one-half or three miles per hour.To do so arbitrarily would shock every sense of justice, even though it would still not support appellee's contention.

Traveler struck by a train at a road crossing will be deemed to have seen and heard an approaching train in time to have avoided injury, if he had opportunity to do so, though he testifies that, though he looked and listened, he did not see or hear the train.

Railroad Co. v. Batsel, 140 S.W. 726;Ry. Co. v. Williams,137 S.W. 828;Peters v. Ry. Co.,135 Ala. 533, 33 So. 332;Zibbell v. Sou. Pac. Co.,160 Cal. 237, 116 P. 513;Westerkamp v. Railroad Co.,41 Colo. 290, 92 P. 687;Harten v. Railroad Co.,18 App. Cas. 260;Johnson v. Railroad Co.,61 Ill.App. 522;Railroad Company v. Kirby,86 Ill.App. 57;Railroad Co. v. Gallagher,109 Ill.App. 67;Railway Co. v. DeFrietas,109 Ill.App. 104;Railroad Co. v. Vremeister,112 Ill.App. 346;Railway Co. v. Hirsch,132 Ill.App. 656;Railroad Co. v. Fraze,150 Ind. 576, 65 Am. St. Rep. 377, 50 N.E. 576;Railway Co. v. Baker,104 S.W. 1182;Artz v. Railroad Co.,34 Iowa 153;Payne v. Railroad Co.,39 Iowa 523;Bloomfield v. Railway Co.,74 Iowa 607, 38 N.W. 431;Young v. Railway Co.,57 Kan. 134, 45 P. 583;Smith v. Railroad Co.,87 Me. 339, 32 A. 967;Blumenthal v. Railroad Co.,97 Me. 255, 54 A. 747;Day v. B. & M. R. R.,97 Me. 528, 55 A. 420;C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Houston,95 U.S. 697;McCarthy v. Railroad Co.,90 A. 490, 54 L.R.A. (N.S.) 140;N. C. Ry. Co. v. Medairy,86 Md. 168, 37 A. 796, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 411;Railway Co. v. Beasley,117 Md. 270, 83 A. 157;Carlson v. Railway Co.,296 Minn. 504, 105 N.W. 555, 113 Am. St. Rep. 655, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 349;State v. Dettner,27 S.W. 1117;Hook v. Railway Co.,162 Mo. 569, 63 S.W. 360;State v. Gurley,701 S.W. 875;Barrie v. Co.,102 Mo.App. 87, 76 S.W. 706;Porter v. Railway Co.,199 Mo.App. 82197 S.W. 880;Schaub v. Railway Co.,133 Mo.App. 444, 113 S.W. 1163;Waggoner v. Railroad Co.,152 Mo.App. 173, 133 S.W. 68;Dolfini v. Railroad Co.,178 N.Y. 1, 70 N.E. 68;Fiddler v. R. R. Co.,64 A.D. 95, 71 N.Y.S. 721;Madigan v. Railroad Co.,74 N.Y.S. 143, 68 A.D. 123;Swart v. Railroad Co.,81 A.D. 402, 80 N.Y.S. 906, 177 N.Y. 529, 69 N.E. 1131;McKinley v. Railway Co.,86 N.Y.S. 461, 91 A. D. 153;Stapp v. Railway Co.,29 N.Y.S. 1008, 80 Hun. 178;Belch v. Railroad Co.,36 N.Y.S. 56, 90 Hun. 477;Montenes v. Railway Co.,78 N.Y.S. 1059, 77 A.D. 493;Golden v. Railway Co.,98 N.Y.S. 848, 49 Misc. 521;O'Brien v. Railroad Co.,113 N.Y.S. 329, 129 A.D. 288;Railway Co. v. Elliott,28 Ohio St. 340;Marland v. Railroad Co.,123 Pa. St. 487, 16 A. 624, 10 Am. St. Rep. 541;Meyers v. Railroad Co.,150 Pa. 386, 24 A. 747;Urias v. Railroad Co.,152 Pa. 336, 25 A. 566;Holden v. Railroad Co.,169 Pa. 1, 32 A. 103;Railway Co. v. Wilson,60 S.W. 438;Railway Co. v. Skinner,119 Va. 843, 89 S.E. 887;Cawley v. Railway Co.,101 Wis. 145, 77 N.W. 179;Stafford v. R. R. Co.,110 Wis. 331, 85 N.W. 1036;Marshall v. R. R. Co.,125 Wis. 96, 103 N.W. 249;White v. Ry. Co.,147 Wis. 141, 133 N.W. 148;Railway Co. v. Smith,40 L.R.A. 246, 86 F. 295, 30 C. C. A. 58;Railway Co. v. Andrews,130 F. 65, 64 C. C. A. 399;Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Van Elderen,137 F. 557, 70 C. C. A. 255;Railway Co. v. Collier,157 F. 347;Railroad Co. v. Cundieff,171 F. 319, 96 C. C. A. 211;Railroad Co. v. Hurlburt,221 F. 907, 137 C. C. A. 477;Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Kinderman,216 F. 499, 132 C. C. A. 577;Hickey v. Railroad Corp.,8 F.2d 128;Michelson v. Nebraska, etc., Co., 63 F.2d 597.

Not even appellee has disputed or will dispute that the object of the statute is to give knowledge of the approach of the train, and when such knowledge is otherwise had, of course the statute, does not apply.In such case, the blowing of a whistle or the ringing of a bell would not add one iota of knowledge to that already possessed, except where such extraordinary circumstances obtain as were present in the McGee case.This is only the doctrine of proximate cause.One may, in violation of a statute, and with the grossest negligence, discharge a fire-arm upon a crowded street, or recklessly run a car at high speed through heavy traffic, and if no one is injured, no civil action will lie.That is elementary.

Bufkin v. R. R. Co., 161 Miss. 594, 137 So. 517;Pietri v Railroad Co.,152 Miss. 185, 119 So. 164;C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U.S. 697, 24 L.Ed. 542;Gundry v. Railway Co.,286 P. 718;Railway Co. v. Judah,65 Kan. 274, 70 P. 346;Hutchinson v. Railway Co.,161 Mo. 246, 61 S.W. 635, 852, 195 Mo. 546, 93 S.W. 931;Kilcummings v. Ry. Co.,185 Ill.App. 370;Gosa v. Ry. Co.,67 S.C. 347, 45 S.E. 810;Hickey v. R. R. Corp.,8 F.2d 128;Railway Co. v. Elliott,28 Ohio St. 340;Pakalinsky v. Railroad Co.,84 N.Y. 424;Daniels v. Transit Co.,125 N.Y. 407...