Missong Mgmt. v. Carmel of Jesus

• Decision Date: 31 October 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-3223
• Parties: MISSONG MANAGMENT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CARMEL OF JESUS, MARY AND JOSEPH IN ELYSBURG, PA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

MISSONG MANAGMENT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CARMEL OF JESUS, MARY AND JOSEPH IN ELYSBURG, PA, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-3223

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

October 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM

CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or to Transfer Venue from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Based on the findings below, the Court will transfer venue to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2022, Missong Management, LLC (hereinafter “Missong”) filed its Complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Defendant Carmel of Jesus Mary and Joseph in Elysburg, PA, Inc (hereinafter “Defendant”), alleging breach of contract claims based on its purported Sale Agreement of real property located at 430 Monastery Road Elysburg, Northumberland County, PA 17824 (the “Monastery Property”). ECF No. 1. Missong alleges, inter alia, that it entered into a Sale Agreement as a purchaser of the Monastery Property with Defendant as the seller and the terms stated Defendant must sell the Monastery Property for $900,000 with the Settlement of the transaction to occur by Monday, August 8, 2022 Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. Plaintiff's Complaint arises out of Defendant's alleged refusal to abide by the terms of the Sale Agreement and complete the Settlement. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff further asserts that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) as “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” here. Id. ¶ 21.

On September 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 8), adding an amended document to its proposal the following day (ECF No. 9). On October 5, 2022, in accordance with the parties' joint agreement, the Court ordered a Temporary Restraining Order preserving the Monastery Property as requested by Plaintiff. ECF No. 13. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction remains unresolved.

Defendant immediately filed its Motion to Dismiss for lack of venue or in the alternative, transfer venue to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 15. Defendant raised a number of factors regarding venue in this District, including the Monastery Property's location in Northumberland County, the lack of operations Defendant has in this District, and that the Sale Agreement between parties was signed by Defendant in Northumberland County. ECF No. 15-1. Defendant adds that all the witnesses and evidence are also located in Northumberland County, which is located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id.

On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed its Response in opposition. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff allows that venue is proper in both the Eastern District and Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 5. Yet Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rise to its breach of contract claim occurred exclusively in this District and the location of the Monastery Property itself is not the controlling factor. Id. Plaintiff emphasizes that the Sale Agreement was sent from Defendant in the Middle District to First Platinum Abstract, LLC (“First Platinum”) in this District, where two nuns intercepted the package on the day of settlement to prevent the sale of the property. Id. at 6-7. The location where the breach occurred, according to Plaintiff, is the location that matters most for venue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a). “An action may be transferred to another district if (1) venue is proper in the transferee district, and (2) the transferee district can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” SKF USA Inc. v. Okkerse, 992 F.Supp.2d 432 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “The burden rests with the moving party to prove that transfer is appropriate.” Dariz v. Republic Airline Inc, 377 F.Supp.3d 499, 502 (E.D. Pa. 2019).

“[A] court must examine factors set out in the statute as well as other factors that involve public or private interests. The statutory factors are: (1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of the witnesses; (3) the interest of justice; and (4) whether the case could have been brought in the proposed transferee forum.” Am. Littoral Soc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 943 F.Supp. 548, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1996). However, “courts have not limited their consideration” to the statutory factors. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). Courts should consider the broader categories of private and public interests, which include those statutory factors. Id.

Private interests include plaintiff's forum preference, the defendant's preference, whether the claims arose elsewhere, the convenience of the parties when considering their relative physical and financial positions, and the location of books and records. Id. Public interests include the enforceability of the judgment, administration of an expeditious or inexpensive trial, court congestion, the local interest in deciding the dispute, and the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases. Id. at 879-80.^[2]

The Court has broad discretion in deciding a motion to transfer venue because the evaluation occurs on a case-by-case basis. See Dariz, 377 F.Supp.3d at 502 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)). “A transfer, however, should not be granted liberally.” Dariz, 377 F.Supp.3d at 502 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391, prior to discussion of the private and public interest factors, the Court finds that the proposed venue of the Middle District of Pennsylvania is a proper forum for this dispute. This action could have been brought in the Middle District of Pennsylvania because, inter alia, the Monastery Property at the center of this transaction is located within that district. Plaintiff and Defendant agree that this action could have been brought in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. As detailed below, the Court also finds that the public and private interest factors weigh in favor of transfer of this action to that district.

A. Private Interests

1. Plaintiff's Choice of Forum

“Unless the moving party can demonstrate that the relevant factors weigh strongly in its favor, the plaintiffs choice of forum will likely prevail.” Dariz, 377 F.Supp.3d at 502-03.

However, “when a plaintiff chooses a forum other than its home forum, that choice receives less deference.” Am. Littoral Soc., 943 F.Supp. at 551 (“that choice is not controlling or absolute”); Aamco Transmission Inc. v. Johnson, 641 F.Supp.2d 464, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[C]ourts have given great deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum [...] Notably, however, when a plaintiff has not brought suit in his home forum and the cause of action did not occur in the forum, the choice is given less weight.”).

Plaintiff Missong resides in Wyoming, not in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff does not appear to operate a business in this District either. Therefore, the Court gives Plaintiff's choice of forum considerably less deference. While the Court still grants some weight to Plaintiff's chosen venue, “the deference given to a plaintiff's choice of forum is reduced when the operative facts that give rise to the action occur in another district.” Cameli v. WNEP-16 The News Station, 134 F.Supp.2d 403, 405, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).

2. Defendant's Preference

The Court may consider Defendant's preference of forum but it is given “considerably less weight than Plaintiff's” preference. EVCO Tech. & Dev. Co., LLC v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 379 F.Supp.2d 728, 730 (E.D. Pa. 2005). “[T]he defendant's preference-in reality does little more than frame the issue, because there would be no motion to transfer unless the defendant prefers a different forum. The essential question is whether a combination of other factors are sufficient to overcome the presumption that the plaintiff's preference governs.” Edwards v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 313 F.Supp.3d 618, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (emphasis in original).

Here, the Court finds a combination of other factors outweigh Plaintiff's forum preference. Defendant asserts that two significant factors establish that the Eastern District is an inconvenient forum for resolution of this dispute - namely that the Monastery Property and Defendant's principal place of business both reside in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and that almost all the negotiation and execution of documents related to this transaction occurred between that district and Missong's location outside the state.

3. Where the Claims Arise

Defendant asserts that, but for one event related to this contract, the entirety of the transaction occurred either in Northumberland County in the Middle District of Pennsylvania or outside of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 15-1 at 8. Defendant contends that this is apparent even from the Complaint. During the relevant period, Defendant's registered place of business was in Northumberland County and is currently in Adams County, both in the Middle District. ECF No. 1 ¶ 23. The Monastery Property that Missong contracted to purchase is in Northumberland County, again in the Middle District. Id. ¶ 1. All the negotiations, communications and execution of documents related to the transaction occurred between the Seller in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Buyer who resides in Wyoming. Id. ¶ 22. Only settlement of the Monastery Property was scheduled to take place within...