Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. United States
| Decision Date | 09 April 1910 |
| Docket Number | 3,090. |
| Parties | MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Syllabus by the Court.
The question whether or not a written instrument complies with a statute which requires it is a question of law for the court because its decision depends entirely upon the construction of the statute and of the written instrument, and it is error to submit the question of its conformity and legality to a jury.
The trial court submitted to a jury the question whether or not written requests for extensions of the time of confinement of shipments of cattle from 28 to 36 hours upon railroad forms partly in manuscript and partly in print, which were separate and apart from any bill of lading or other railroad form, and some of which were made before the cattle started on their way, constituted a compliance with Act June 29, 1906, c 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 918; Supp 1909, p. 1178), which provides that such an extension may be permitted 'upon the written request of the owner or person in custody of that particular shipment, which written request shall be separate and apart from any bill of lading or other railroad form. ' Held error. (1) The question of the legality of the written requests, and of their compliance with the act of Congress, was a question of law for the court, and it was error to submit it to the jury.
(2) A legal request under this act of Congress may be printed, engraved, or stamped, or partly printed, engraved, or stamped, and partly in handwriting.
(3) A legal request may be made on or in a railroad form separate and apart from a printed bill of lading or other railroad form than one which contains the request alone.
(4) Such a request may be made before the transportation of the shipment commences.
(5) Such a request may be made, although it is not induced by any contingency that arises after the transportation commences and that was unforeseen at the time of the shipment.
The greater weight of the evidence is sufficient to sustain an action by the United States for a violation of the 28-hour law, and it is not required to establish its case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
It is the province and duty of the court to fix the amounts of the recoveries in actions for violations of the 28-hour law, and that of the jury to determine whether or not the defendants have violated that law.
A carrier that delivers a shipment of cattle to a connecting carrier in time, according to the usual course of transportation, for their carriage to and unloading within the 28 hours, at pens suitably equipped for unloading, feeding, watering, and resting them, either at their destination or on their way, without notice or knowledge that they must be or will be delayed in their arrival beyond that time, cannot be held to have violated this act of Congress knowingly and willfully.
W. W. Brown (John Madden, J. G. Slonecker, and James Hagerman, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
H. J. Bone and J. S. West, for the United States.
Before SANBORN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and McPHERSON, PHERSON, District judge.
The Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company complains of alleged errors in the trials of four charges against it for as many violations of Act June 29, 1906, c. 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 918; Supp. 1909, p. 1178), which prohibits the confinement of certain animals in cars in transit for more than 28 hours, except in certain specified contingencies, under a penalty of a fine of from $100 to $500 for knowingly and willfully violating this inhibition. The act provides that an extension of the time of confinement from 28 to 36 hours may be permitted 'upon the written request of the owner or person in custody of that particular shipment, which request shall be separate and apart from any bill of lading or other railroad form,' and in defense of three of the charges the defendant introduced evidence which tended to show that the cattle shipped were not confined more than 36 hours and a separate request by the owner of each of these shipments that the time of their confinement be extended to 36 hours.
Counsel for the United States contended below, and still insist, that these requests fail to comply with the act of Congress (1) because they were partly printed and partly in handwriting; (2) because they were made on railroad forms, notwithstanding the fact that these forms contained nothing but the requests; (3) because some of the requests were made before the transportation to which they relate commenced; and (4) because some of them were not induced by any contingencies that arose after the cattle started on their way and that were not anticipated before they started. The defendant assigns as error the ruling of the court whereby it submitted to the jury the question whether or not, in view of these objections, the requests conformed to the act of Congress and were legal. The objections to the requests were not sound, and the requests complied with the statute, for the reasons which are stated at length in the opinion of this court in Wabash Railroad Company v. United States (C.C.A.) 178 F. 5, a case that was argued at this term and was decided after a deliberate consideration of the briefs and arguments in that case, in this case, and in the case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States (C.C.A.) 178 F. 12, which involved similar questions.
The question whether or not the requests conformed to the statute was a pure question of law, it presented no dispute about any fact, and its decision depended entirely upon the construction of the act of Congress and of the written requests. It is the exclusive province, as well as the duty of the court to construe statutes and written instruments, and, where the validity of the latter is conditioned by a compliance with the provisions of the former, to decide their legality, and to instruct the jury accordingly. Any other course would destroy all security for property and lead to intolerable confusion and...
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