Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Kincannon

• Decision Date: 17 November 1941
• Docket Number: 4-6516
• Citation: 156 S.W.2d 70,203 Ark. 76
• Parties: MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, v. KINCANNON, JUDGE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

156 S.W.2d 70

203 Ark. 76

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, v. KINCANNON, JUDGE

4-6516

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 17, 1941

Prohibition to Crawford Circuit Court; J. O. Kincannon Judge; writ denied.

Writ denied.

Thos B. Pryor, W. L. Curtis and Thomas Harper, for petitioner.

R Edwin Hough, Wall & Green and Partain & Agee, for respondent.

OPINION

SMITH, J.

Dave Reed filed a complaint on April 9, 1941, in the Crawford circuit court against the petitioner railroad company and two of its employees in which he alleged that through the negligence of said employees he had sustained a personal injury in the state of Oklahoma of which state the plaintiff, Reed, is a resident. The defendants in the suit objected to the jurisdiction of the court and, when that motion was overruled, filed here a petition for a writ of prohibition restraining the circuit court of Crawford county from proceeding with the trial.

The relief prayed, that of prohibition against the court from proceeding with the trial, is predicated upon act 314 of the Acts of 1939, p. 769, which, in its entirety, reads as follows:

"An act to fix the venue of actions for personal injury and death.

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas:

"Section 1. All actions for damages for personal injury or death by wrongful act shall be brought in the county where the accident occurred which caused the injury or death or in the county where the person injured or killed resided at the time of injury, and provided further that in all such actions service of summons may be had upon any party to such action, in addition to other methods now provided by law, by service of summons upon any agent who is a regular employee of such party, and on duty at the time of such service.

"Section 2. This act shall not repeal any provision for venue of actions except such as are inconsistent herewith and all laws and parts of law in conflict herewith are repealed.

"Section 3. It is found that the revenues of many counties are reduced by paying expenses of courts for the trial of actions brought from other counties to the damage of the taxpayers, and the dockets of the circuit courts in many counties congested and the time of such courts taken up by actions from other counties so that there is not sufficient time for the courts properly to try local cases, and an emergency is thereby created and is declared and this act shall be in force immediately from and after its passage.

"Approved: March 15, 1939."

The legislative journals show that this act was House Bill No. 172, and that it was passed in the House by a vote of 64 for to 21 against, 15 members not voting. Fifty-one votes were necessary for its passage, and it was, therefore, passed in the House. On the adoption of the emergency clause, 63 voted in the affirmative and 21 in the negative, with 16 members not voting. As a two-thirds vote was required to adopt the emergency clause, that clause failed of adoption. A sufficient vote was cast in the Senate to pass the bill and to adopt the emergency clause.

Now while the emergency clause was not adopted, for the reason that it did not receive the vote of two-thirds of the members of the House, as required by the Constitution, we may read the emergency clause in determining the legislative intent in passing the bill. This emergency clause states the fact to be that the revenues of many counties of this state had been reduced by having to pay the cost of the trial of actions "Brought from other counties" of the state, and this was the practice which the General Assembly sought to stop. The act was, as its title recites, "An act to fix the...