Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Robinson

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MEHAFFY, J.
• Citation: Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Robinson, 191 Ark. 428, 86 S.W.2d 913 (Ark. 1935)
• Decision Date: 14 October 1935
• Docket Number: 4-3987
• Parties: MISSOURI PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. ROBINSON

86 S.W.2d 913

191 Ark. 428

MISSOURI PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. ROBINSON

4-3987

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 14, 1935

Appeal from Saline Circuit Court; H. B. Means, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

W A. Utley and Carmichael & Hendricks, for appellant.

Kenneth C. Coffelt and Wm. J. Kirby, for appellee.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

Mrs Fearney Robinson, on September 4, 1934, took passage on the bus of the appellant at Crow's Station in Saline County, Arkansas, and paid her fare to Benton. The bus stopped at appellant's station for passengers to alight. In attempting to alight appellee alleges that, without any negligence on her part, she caught her shoe on a badly torn and worn upward projecting piece of metal stripping which had been tacked to the floor of said bus at its door, where passengers alight from same, and as a result she alleges she was caused to fall through the door and against the steps and onto and against the concrete curbing and pavement, and that she was painfully and permanently injured thereby. She alleged that appellant failed to furnish safe transportation and failed to provide a safe place to alight, and that the appellant caused and allowed said metal stripping to be and remain on the floor of said bus in a dangerous, torn and worn upward projecting position; that appellant failed to warn appellee of the dangerous condition which it knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known; that on the same day, a short time after her injury, she was in bed in a stupor suffering and under the influence of drugs and medicine, and without any warning or information, and through trickery and deceit, a claim agent of defendant obtained a release from her. She alleged damages in the sum of $ 3,000.

The appellant answered, denying that it was guilty of any negligence, and denying all the material allegations in appellee's complaint. It also alleged that, if appellee was injured, it was due to her own negligence and carelessness. It alleged that its agent in good faith and without prejudice, paid the full amount that appellee demanded, and that said payment discharged any and all claims for injury.

There was a trial, verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for $ 2,500. The case is here on appeal.

It is first contended by the appellant that the appellee was guilty of contributory negligence, which bars her recovery; that the proximate cause of her injuries was her own negligence.

The evidence shows that appellee was a passenger, and, when she undertook to alight from the bus, she fell and received the injuries she complains of. There is a conflict in the evidence as to the condition of the metal strip. All of the witnesses, however, admit that the strip was somewhat loose. The evidence on the part of the appellant shows that the bus was inspected daily, and that the inspectors found nothing wrong with the metal strip or any part of the bus where appellee alighted. The evidence shows that there were handholds that passengers might take hold of in alighting or boarding the bus.

We do not deem it necessary to set out the testimony in detail because there is a sharp conflict, and the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were properly submitted to the jury.

It was the duty of appellee, of course, to exercise reasonable care for her own safety, and, if she did not do this and was injured because of her own negligence, she would not be entitled to recover. Whether she was guilty of negligence, and whether appellant was guilty of negligence, were both questions of fact, and the evidence is in conflict, and it was therefore a question for the jury to determine whether she was guilty of negligence and whether the appellant was guilty of negligence. The jury's finding on these questions, if supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed by this court.

Appellant calls attention to the case of Little Rock & Ft. Smith Ry. Co. v. Cavenesse, 48 Ark. 106, 2 S.W. 505. That case merely holds that it is the duty of the carrier to provide a safe and convenient means for entrance to and departure from their trains, and that passengers must exercise ordinary care in taking care of themselves.

In the instant case the court instructed the jury that, if the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care to use the appliances furnished by the carrier, and such failure to use ordinary care caused or contributed to cause the injuries of which the plaintiff complained, then she could not recover. They were also told in another instruction, given at the request of the appellant, that contributory negligence is such negligence or want of care as contributed or helped to cause the injuries complained of, and, if they found the injuries would not have occurred if plaintiff had used ordinary care for her own safety, and they found that she did not exercise such ordinary care, they would find for the defendant. It thus appears that the question of appellant's negligence and of appellee's contributory negligence were submitted to the jury on proper instructions requested by the appellant.

The next case to which attention is called by the appellant is St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Forbes, 63 Ark. 427, 39 S.W. 63. In that case the party injured was not a passenger, but was injured in stepping from the carrier's freight house onto a platform. There were no steps, he had just entered through the door, and stepped out onto the platform, and, as he did so, fell. The court said: "According to his own statement, if it be conceded that the appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to provide steps to the door, he was guilty of contributory negligence and is not entitled to recover."

That is because he had entered the freight house through this door immediately before the injury, and was bound to know there were no steps there, and stepped out with a box in front of him and fell. The court held that he was guilty of contributory negligence because he knew all about the entrance and knew there were no steps there.

Appellant...